I'm Seeing Ghost's

 It's curious that after I bring up the Shell vs. Venture Global arbitration decision and its reporting implications for all producers, X is now reporting a ghost ban! Google suggests various reasons for being ghost banned, but I find the "mass reporting" reason particularly interesting and likely responsible.

Podcast # 24, Knowledge & Learning Module

 The Research & Development and Knowledge & Learning modules are designed to align scientific and technical capabilities with the locus of decision rights. Within the industry, that locus is the Joint Operating Committee, which integrates legal, financial, operational decision making, cultural, communication, strategic and innovative frameworks. The Joint Operating Committee embodies the property partnership, and the Knowledge & Learning module aggregates and presents the explicit technical knowledge of each producer within the Joint Operating Committee—making the collective expertise available for decision-making.

People, Ideas & Objects shifts knowledge to where decisions are made, directly addressing the primary operational accountability gap that exists today. Consider the drilling of a well: the operator proposes a program, the Joint Operating Committee votes, and if the approval threshold is met, the operator proceeds. If the well fails, who is responsible—the operator or the Joint Operating Committee? The Preliminary Specification resolves this ambiguity. The Research & Capabilities and Knowledge & Learning modules movement of the knowledge to where the decision rights are held ensures that outcomes are properly attributed, not to penalize individuals, but to capture learnings, avoid repetition of mistakes, and replicate successes.

This structure also mitigates the chronic engineering resource constraint facing the industry. Today, each producer maintains just-in-time engineering capacity across all their properties—an approach that is costly and ultimately unsustainable. By reorganizing around specialization and division of labor, the industry can scale capabilities more efficiently, ensuring commercial viability while reducing duplication of effort. Specialization on particular scientific capabilities, each producer contributes that high value knowledge of theirs to the Joint Operating Committee. Generic capabilities can be augmented from the Resource Marketplace module. 

The accompanying podcast provides further detail and explores the auxiliary aspects of these modules.

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Remember When...

 ...there was a time when investors lined up around the block whenever a producer announced an offering. That world has long since disappeared—so long ago that many today may not even recall it. By 2015, investors had delivered a clear message: dissatisfaction with the performance and accountability of oil and gas producers. From that point forward, they withdrew from further investment in the industry, in effect telling management—restore accountability, deliver results, and perhaps we’ll return.

Meanwhile, at People, Ideas & Objects, we spent two decades warning that North American producers were unprofitable and inflicting lasting damage across the broader energy economy. We documented multi-trillion-dollar losses and argued relentlessly that this was not sustainable. It was easy for producers to dismiss these warnings, casting us as outliers who “didn’t understand” their so-called strategic brilliance.

Officers and directors, of course, chose to rely on the conviction, confident that “muddling through” would eventually prove the critics and investors wrong. Yet here we stand: a decade without investor support and two decades of repeated warnings ignored.

The truth is unavoidable. When value is abandoned or left unrealized by its rightful owners, others inevitably capture it and make something of it. To allow such leakage of value—on this scale, over this length of time—constitutes mismanagement. Especially when numerous mitigating strategies, solutions, and investor demands have long been available and ignored.

Natural Gas Price Structure Destruction

Few will forget the summer of 2025. It marked the moment producers were proven wrong—conclusively. The questions now are unavoidable: What happens next? Where do we go from here? How will this be resolved? And why did it happen at all?

Shareholders deserve clarity. The issue at hand is the collapse of natural gas price structures. Over the past 22 months, since People, Ideas & Objects first raised the alarm, two central facts have remained unaddressed:

1. Producers’ fundamental misunderstanding of free-on-board LNG.
2. The long-term structural decline in natural gas—from a 6:1 oil-gas ratio in 2009 to 50:1 in 2024.

The resulting revenue destruction is quantifiable: $4.7 trillion in losses across the industry.

Initially, People, Ideas & Objects paid the credibility cost of raising such an extraordinary figure. The market reacts to trillion-dollar claims, and in our case, it responds with indifference and isolation. For nearly two years, nothing was done.

Then came the turning point. Shell elected to sue Venture Global—suing, in effect, over the very issue we raised. The case, seeking $3.6 billion, highlighted that Venture Global had purchased gas at Henry Hub, liquefied it, and sold it FOB into Japan and Europe at global prices. The tribunal’s rejection of Shell’s claim validated our analysis: Shell acknowledged its own lost revenues, Venture Global captured the arbitrage, and the credibility has shifted back to People, Ideas & Objects.

Now, as of September 2, 2025, officers and directors of all producers face a non-negotiable duty. They must disclose material risks, along with mitigation steps, through press releases and, more importantly, through quarterly reports. With the Q3 10-Q reports due September 30, 2025, there is no excuse for silence on a $4.7 trillion structural revenue shortfall.

Can producers continue to avoid reporting obligations while value destruction compounds? The record is damning:

• Did they fail to understand the issue?

• Were they conflicted?

• Or simply too indifferent to act?

For each officer and director over the past 16 years, one of those answers will apply. And it must be remembered: over the past 22 months of their silence producers were aware of the legitimacy of our claims.

A Pattern of Avoidance

Our hypothesis of “a designed lack of accountability” has its roots in history. Oracle abandoned its oil & gas ERP effort in 2000; IBM followed in 2005. Both cited the same issue: producers had no appetite for systems that enforced accountability. People, Ideas & Objects have faced the same resistance with the Preliminary Specification. The conclusion is clear—this absence of accountability is not incidental, it is systemic. Implemented by way of skeleton budget allocations to accounting and systems. 

Shell’s Response and the Industry’s Default

In the wake of the tribunal ruling, Shell stated:

Shell said it was disappointed with the tribunal’s decision. “Trust in long-term contracts is the bedrock of the LNG industry and essential for continued investment and sustainable growth,” the company said in a statement.

This is emblematic of the industry’s reflexive posture—deflect blame, warn of dire consequences, and ignore the root cause. Yet the facts remain:

• Shell signed the contracts.

• Shell delivered the gas.

• Shell accepted payment.

• Industry ignored a decade of investor demands for accountability and profitability.

• Shell has dismissed People, Ideas & Objects’ solutions since 2012.

• Shell failed to address the collapse in gas pricing from 2009 to 2024.

• Shell chose litigation over reform.

• Shell valued its claim at $3.6 billion and Venture Global estimates upwards of an additional $197.9 billion in incremental revenues from their contract.

This is not misfortune. It is mismanagement.

Historical Dishonesty

The industry’s dishonesty is not new. On July 4, 2019, when People, Ideas & Objects published Profitable, Energy Independence in North America—Through the Commercialization of Shale, we argued that unprofitable wells should be shut in. Producers countered with a falsehood: that shutting in wells caused reservoir damage. Within nine months, 25% of global oil production was shut in during the negative oil price crisis. No subsequent reservoir damage was reported to have been realized.

This pattern—deny, disparage, and deflect—has defined the producers’ response for decades.

The fiduciary obligations of officers and directors are clear. They cannot claim ignorance of a $4.7 trillion destruction of value, nor can they dismiss a solution on the table since 2012. Instead, they have defied their shareholders, disregarded investor warnings, and undermined the integrity of the industry.

They must now answer for it.

A kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being.
— Sun Tzu

Arbitration Decisions & Consequences

The outcome of Shell’s arbitration makes one point inescapable: every producer now owes a duty to their shareholders to disclose the consequences. SEC rules are clear—material events must be disclosed promptly, typically within four business days via press release or Form 8-K, or sooner if the stock price is materially impacted.

Yet no 8-K filings have been observed. This silence is unacceptable.

For two decades, producers sold gas at Henry Hub netback prices, leaving the $4.7 trillion shortfall to accumulate across the industry. Whether a startup or a major, each producer’s exposure is proportional to its period of operations. The arbitration ruling validates the claim. Venture Global’s own Q2 report disclosed $197.9 billion in potential future earnings under the disputed contract, providing undeniable evidence that value leakage on this scale is real and material. People, Ideas & Objects’ $4.7 trillion assessment over 25 years is no longer speculative—it is substantiated.

If producers fail to issue a timely press release or 8-K, they remain obligated to disclose in their 10-Q filings for the quarter ending September 30, 2025. For Shell, this will be filed October 30, 2025. The clock is ticking. Officers and directors face serious consequences if failure to disclose is determined. And disclosure must include not only the financial impact, but the qualitative context: a decade of obstinacy toward investor demands and repeated rejection of viable solutions such as the Preliminary Specification.

Litigation Exposure

Shareholder litigation will not be straightforward. A record exists of management’s willful neglect:

• 2009 – Ignored the beginning of the structural decline in natural gas pricing.

• 2012 – Preliminary Specification published as a solution.

• 2015 – Investors explicitly demanded greater accountability and performance.

• 2019 – Industry dismissed shut-in strategy as damaging reservoirs.

• 2020 – Covid crisis shut in 25% of global oil production with no reservoir damage.

• 2023 – People, Ideas & Objects identified LNG FOB value leakage.

• 2024 – EIA recorded lowest average natural gas prices in history (February 50:1 ratio).

• 2023–2025 – Producers maintained silence on LNG and larger structural price breakdown.

• 2025 – Shell lost arbitration against Venture Global.

This is a track record of conscious disregard.

D&O Insurance at Risk

It's been nearly two decades since insurers faced a systemic challenge on this scale. The $4.7 trillion shortfall may yet rival the collapse of synthetic CDOs. Insurers have grounds to cancel coverage, leaving officers and directors personally liable. While most producers indemnify their executives, the sheer magnitude of this disaster could easily overwhelm both indemnification and insurance. The result would be bankruptcy proceedings, in which shareholders would likely be extinguished, with only unsecured creditor claims in litigation offering them any potential recovery.

The alternative for shareholders may be to exit positions now, before insolvency risk escalates.

Mitigation Options

There is a path to mitigation—but it requires action. Producers officers and directors can reduce their litigation and fiduciary exposure by funding development of the People, Ideas & Objects Preliminary Specification. This would demonstrate to courts, insurers, and investors that officers and directors acted decisively to resolve long-standing issues and deliver the performance gains demanded by shareholders.

Investors have consistently asked for a Tier-1 ERP solution. Only two exist:

• SAP – Already installed in many producers, but performance has not improved. Its custom integrations simply mirror existing culture, reinforcing the status quo. As our disconcerting hypothesis suggests, lack of accountability is preserved by design. SAP is the bureaucracy.

• Oracle Cloud ERP – The basis of the Preliminary Specification. Oracle has invested since 2004 in rebuilding its ERP from scratch in Java, and combined with their premier database, provides the foundation necessary to achieve industry transformation.

The Preliminary Specification is purpose-built for oil & gas. It delivers a decentralized, price-maker model ensuring all production is profitable, with 14 modules, 7 organizational constructs, and 3 marketplaces. It embeds a new culture of reserve preservation, performance and profitability.

Intellectual Property Constraints

It must also be emphasized: People, Ideas & Objects’ Intellectual Property is a protected competitive advantage. Any solution producers adopt must respect that IP. Replicating our design is not an option. Our research took a decade before publication in 2012, and would take any alternative at least another decade, based on some other methods to replicate where the Preliminary Specification was in 2012. Time producers simply do not have.

The choice is stark: acknowledge the $4.7 trillion shortfall, disclose truthfully, and act on it—or continue to stonewall until insurers, investors, and the courts enforce accountability through failure, bankruptcy, and litigation, both corporate and personal. 

Podcast # 23, Research & Capabilities

 Following our discussion of the Business Operations Management Module, we now turn to the Research & Capabilities Module—a conceptually new addition for the oil and gas industry. This module is designed to capture and organize a producer’s explicit engineering and geological knowledge, the very foundation of its competitive advantage. By doing so, it ensures that resources are aligned and that tacit expertise is applied consistently across the organization—putting everyone on the “same page.”

A central aim of the module is to strengthen accountability. Today, operational knowledge and decision rights are split between producers and their Joint Operating Committees, creating confusion and misplaced responsibility. By embedding knowledge directly within the Joint Operating Committee’s operational decision-making framework, accountability becomes clear, eliminating the cycle of finger-pointing that has long plagued the industry.

The module also manages two critical processes of innovation. First, it isolates research and development activities from day-to-day operations, allowing costs to be managed more effectively while preventing disruptions. Recognizing that innovation is defined as much by its failures as its successes, this approach ensures that lessons learned are retained, duplication is avoided, and future efforts can build directly on prior work. In this way, producers develop an institutional memory that sustains innovation rather than restarting it each time.

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Podcast #22, Business Operations Management

 One of the core challenges in developing the Preliminary Specification has been the sheer breadth of accounting, administrative, and operational concerns facing producers and the Joint Operating Committee. This stems from the reality that what is required is not a minor adjustment—but a wholesale rebuild of the producer, the industry, and the service sector on a cultural foundation of reserves preservation, performance, and profitability.

The status quo has collapsed under its own weight. Its culture of “muddle through” has failed predictably and spectacularly, leaving no value worth reconciling. Any attempt to accommodate such a culture would only obstruct progress, frustrate innovation, and exhaust resources.

The Business Operations Management Module offers a new path forward. It empowers engineers, geologists, and business leaders to actively manage operational performance, innovation, accountability, and profitability within their assigned domains—anchored to the financial realities of the Joint Operating Committee. This ensures that their initiatives not only survive but continue to build lasting value.

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The $4.7 Trillion Question

The questions facing the industry today are unavoidable: Have producers simply written off the $4.7 trillion in lost natural gas revenues? How do they intend to make their investors whole again? Will there be anything left to finance the rehabilitation of the service industry? Or are we expected to accept court rulings as the final word, declare it a lost cause, and “muddle through” as always? My perspective differs sharply from theirs—as obvious as their reliance on muddle through has become.

By litigating against Venture Global, Shell has revealed more than it may have intended. The very act of filing suit demonstrates prior knowledge—knowledge of both the LNG revenue leakage and the broader structural destruction of natural gas pricing that they themselves authored. Without the collapse of natural gas prices, the LNG issue would not exist. This litigation proves that officers and directors recognized their losses as real, not mere “opportunity costs.” They cannot deny that the money ended up in others’ hands. LNG leakage is merely a symptom of the deeper cause: shale gas overproduction. That overproduction drove the ratio from 6:1 in 2009 to 50:1 in 2024—a remarkable, if destructive, achievement. Their lawsuit implicitly acknowledges that they understood this dynamic comprehensively.

So when, exactly, did this structural decline ever provoke meaningful action from a producer’s board? They cannot claim ignorance. People, Ideas & Objects has been raising these issues for decades: from our Preliminary Research Report in May 2004, to the publication of the Preliminary Specification in August 2012. And yet Shell’s suit against Venture Global was the first tangible industry action on the overproduction and price destruction that has hollowed out oil and gas. For me, the catalyst came much earlier: the 1986 oil price collapse that devastated the industry for more than a decade and set me on the path of building this software.

Will we wait another forty years before anything is done again? Organizational paralysis seems to be the producers’ only true competitive advantage. What actions—if any—will they now take? And by what method, and to what purpose? If the past is any guide, their efforts will be as specious as Shell’s litigation. Officers and directors are unlikely to do anything beyond muddling through—hoping to ride out the storm. 

The unresolved issue is the $4.7 trillion in losses. Investors already voted with their feet in 2015, when they stopped providing capital, citing a lack of producer performance and accountability. They will not accept excuses in 2025 for a sudden enlightenment. The Preliminary Specification addressed the overproduction problem explicitly in August 2012, well before the crisis deepened. Its relevance was reinforced on July 4, 2019, when People, Ideas & Objects published the white paper “Profitable, North American Energy Independence — Through the Commercialization of Shale.” The impact was immediate, prompting producers to peddle the falsehood that shutting-in production would cause formation damage. That lie was designed to discredit our work.

Nine months later, the lie collapsed. In April 2020, oil prices fell to negative $37.63 per barrel and 25% of global production was shut in—the first time producers ever paid others to take production. Today, many producers now shut in production voluntarily to conserve reserves—one of eleven practices the Preliminary Specification has long recommended.

Our calculation of $4.7 trillion covers only the natural gas revenue lost to shale-induced price destruction. These are not “opportunity costs.” Opportunity cost refers to the forgone value of an alternative decision. These are direct, realized losses—revenues willfully and knowingly surrendered through overproduction. Venture Global’s LNG litigation confirms the obvious: this was real money that ended up in other hands. Officers and directors cannot deny it, nor can they claim they failed to understand the implications of “free on board.” The real question is whether their failure was incompetence, malicious—or a conflict of interest.

Meanwhile, gas was being sold at discounts of up to 88%. Did no board find this alarming? Investors had already withdrawn in 2015, unwilling to finance this kind of reckless destruction. Yet when People, Ideas & Objects presented solutions, we were dismissed and attacked.

Now, producers, officers, and directors have no credibility left. D&O insurers are reviewing their contracts for clauses to relieve them of liability, knowing claims of at least $4.7 trillion are well documented and possible.

The broader industry impact is catastrophic. Oil and gas, as a primary sector, has gutted its own service industry. No rational investor will return to that space for at least a generation. Rehabilitation will require at least $1 trillion in producer-funded grants. From the remaining $4.7 trillion, royalties of 16.67% ($783 billion) and taxes of 15% ($437 billion) reduce the pool to $2.48 trillion. Spread over 25 years, that amounts to $49.6 billion annually—split between dividends and capital expenditures.

So, is there really a hole in oil and gas of this magnitude? At least, and maybe more. What is certain is that officers and directors can no longer ride out the storm under their desks. It is time for them to put their own skin in the game.

The Corporate Living Dead of Oil & Gas

We have watched oil & gas producers reduce themselves to little more than corporate zombies, then subsisting on the lifeblood of the service sector for a few extra years of survival. They have abandoned any semblance of business logic, ignored the destruction they’ve caused, and dismissed the consequences to others. The officers and directors of these producers have committed an act that is both vile and despicable, not only against the industry itself but also against society at large.

What makes this even more troubling is the silent verdict delivered by their own shareholders and investors. Over a decade ago, the capital markets simply walked away—refusing to fund producers any further. That is the one signal that any corporation should treat as terminal, a clear indication to act decisively or perish. Yet producers did nothing. Over that same period, I have pressed forward with our proposed solution the Preliminary Specification, published in August 2012, only to be met with obstinate denials and outright lies. Time, however, has proven our position correct and solution accurate. Today, it is their credibility that stands in question, not ours.

The industry’s chronic inability to manage even the most basic commercial arrangements underscores the risk. Take, for example, the 2023 LNG “free on board” fiasco. Producers designated Henry Hub as their point of sale, effectively ceding arbitrage profits to counterparties such as Venture Global, who pocketed margins as high as 500% by capturing export values. That such contracts not only exist but remain enforceable for years to come speaks volumes about the operational ignorance, business incompetence, and utter lack of accountability among producers.

This failure is doubly tragic because LNG exports represented a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to rehabilitate natural gas pricing. Instead, since the advent of shale, gas prices have been systematically destroyed at levels unprecedented in modern business. Historically, natural gas traded at its 6:1 heating value equivalent to oil. That ratio has since collapsed—sliding to 50:1 in February 2024, and averaging 124:1 throughout July 2025 in Alberta. Producers remain in denial, dismissing our solution at People, Ideas & Objects as “collusion.” Their objections reveal either staggering naiveté or a complete absence of business understanding.

If one were to calculate the differential between the actual prices producers received for natural gas and the 6:1 oil-equivalent benchmark, the magnitude of this dereliction becomes clear. The result: an estimated $4.7 trillion in lost natural gas revenues over the past 25 years. That figure alone should stun the industry. Yet outside of People, Ideas & Objects, the number provoked no discussion whatsoever—producers casually dismissing it as “opportunity costs.”

The absurdity of this denial was compounded in early 2025, when the EIA reported that 2024s average annual natural gas prices were the lowest on record in inflation-adjusted terms. And by August 2025, we finally learned what producers had been doing since late 2023.

Litigation as Strategy: A Symptom of Failure

Months after this pricing anomaly was first identified, producers had the choice to engage with People, Ideas & Objects to pursue a structured, constructive, and productive solution—or attempt a legal workaround. Predictably, they chose litigation. Shell, most notably, sought to claw back lost export revenues from those domestic purchasers. This reaction underscores not strategy, but desperation: a misplaced reliance on courts to remedy what are fundamentally managerial and structural failures.

The results are staggering. By the most conservative measure, producers have already forfeited $4.7 trillion in natural gas revenues over this century alone—dismissed by officers and directors as mere “opportunity costs.” This framing is a distortion. No rational operator willingly abandons trillions in value. The reality is systemic incompetence. Counterparties such as Venture Global, recognizing producer sloth, have extracted profits effortlessly. It begs the question: why wouldn’t others ship the gas to Japan or Norway themselves and realize the windfall? The notion that litigation can restore that lost value or credibility is not only implausible—it is untenable. 

The surreal element is Shell itself. When Shell, of all companies, believes it is entitled to sue for revenues it willingly concedes? For more than a decade, Shell and its peers defied their shareholders, delivered performance that scarcely registers on the commercial scale, and ridiculed in debate with People, Ideas & Objects—dismissing our solution as an argument over “opportunity costs.” Meanwhile, counterparties like Venture Global took the “opportunity” to earn billions in margins producers themselves abandoned. Only now, with litigation, does Shell acknowledge the true ”cost” of their negligence.

The Issue Now

Shell’s litigation—and any subsequent actions—implicitly acknowledges that producers were fully aware of the issue, its scope, its scale, and the enormous losses incurred. It also concedes an understanding of the differential between domestic and export prices as a direct consequence of the structural deterioration in natural gas pricing from the historical 6:1 ratio. Otherwise, those prices would be harmonized.

People, Ideas & Objects has spoken to these matters extensively, while also putting officers and directors on notice regarding their fiduciary obligations and the implications of inaction for their Directors & Officers (D&O) Liability Insurance. If producers were aware of the issues and chose not to act, then their coverage could be jeopardized. Filing a weak, almost perfunctory lawsuit that fails the smell test does not constitute a remedy for their share of a $4.7 trillion problem.

“Muddling through” may be an option, but not for D&O insurers. Producers had been warned. People, Ideas & Objects formally advised officers and directors of the leakage in LNG revenues beginning October 11, 2023, in a series titled “This One’s Nuclear,” which detailed the free-on-board issue and the erosion of natural gas price structures. On January 24, 2024, in “Willful Misconduct or Negligence?” We specifically addressed the looming D&O liability exposure. Yet natural gas prices went on to record their lowest annual average ever, and the industry’s only visible response was to launch superfluous lawsuits.

Throughout 2024, People, Ideas & Objects published a 54-part series under the label Notice, documenting and discussing these issues. The final entry, “These Are Not the Leaders We’re Looking For, Part XXIV,” appeared on May 1, 2024. Taken together, these notices establish a clear evidentiary record—one that insurers could use to disavow liability in any shareholder vs. officers and directors action tied to the $4.7 trillion in losses.

The only regret we have is that the strategy People, Ideas & Objects developed to give officers and directors a “get-out-of-jail-free card” has gone unused. Our approach, “Issue Mitigated, Nothing Litigated,” would allow producers to materially reduce their exposure by supporting the development and implementation of the Preliminary Specification. With our budget fully funded, we could execute this strategy and meaningfully reduce their risk.

I am not a lawyer and this should not be taken as legal advice. These are facts based on the interactions between producers and People, Ideas & Objects since the LNG issue was identified. Anyone seeking legal guidance or validation should consult qualified counsel.

New Issues to Contemplate 

First…

What we need are dynamic, innovative, accountable, and profitable producers. Instead, what we have are organizations defined by lethargy and denial. When natural gas prices began their structural decline in 2009, which officers and directors recognized the gravity of the problem? The silence spoke volumes—no one stirred. By 2015, it was evident that capital structures were unsustainable, yet again, no one acted. The reality is that solutions were available, and industry leadership was aware of them. Their willful inaction is indefensible.

Second…

The alternative is clear. Clinging to outdated practices will only amplify losses as industry velocity accelerates. The combination of speed and complexity in today’s market all but guarantees the creation of countless “Venture Globals” at producers’ expense. Structural reform is no longer a choice—it is a necessity. Litigation may acknowledge that problems exist, but it is no substitute for strategy. Shell’s case was only the beginning; BP is next, with more to follow. These losses were predictable from the outset. The rational response is not the courtroom but the adoption of the Preliminary Specification. Equally troubling is the industry’s persistent reliance on tackling complex issues with one narrow, serial “solution” at a time. Such a piecemeal approach is a guaranteed path to failure in this marketplace.

A New Paper

People, Ideas & Objects is preparing a paper that evaluates the legislative and policy initiatives advanced under President Trump’s Administration which directly affect American oil & gas producers. These measures are being assessed through the framework of the Preliminary Specification, demonstrating how this shifting policy environment will reshape industry practices. The conclusion is clear: the oil & gas sector emerging from these changes will bear little resemblance to the industry of today.
Our review includes:

• The Big Beautiful Bill

• The GENIUS Act

• The proposed Clarity Act

• “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology”

• “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan”

• Several tariff and trade agreements

• Alaska’s energy development initiatives

• Energy sector deregulation

Our deadline for publication is September 18, 2025. 

Financial Marketplace Podcast # 21

Once again, the virtual presenters in our podcast series have managed to distill the larger strategic themes embedded within the finer points of our content. This episode focuses on the Financial Marketplace Module, which—like its predecessors—will no doubt provoke renewed debate over the Marketplace Interface. At People, Ideas & Objects, we’ve become entirely numb and fully desensitized to the criticism and laughter this interface has generated. That said, the two presenters offered notably thoughtful commentary on the subject.

We currently have a major paper in development that addresses the Marketplace Interface directly, scheduled for release after our next publication. Once it’s out, we’ll see who shares in our laughter. 🤓

The Financial Marketplace Module is the third and final instalment in our marketplace module podcast series. From my perspective, there are three key takeaways:

• Increased throughput and speed in Financial Marketplace Module agreements and transactions, benefiting both producers and Joint Operating Committees (JOCs).

• Recognition that speed without control is an operational liability.

• Expanded integration between producers and JOCs, moving beyond an internal focus to embrace a broader spectrum of opportunities and risks.

For those seeking a concise introduction to the modules, the components of the Preliminary Specification, and People, Ideas & Objects as a whole, these podcasts offer an efficient, high-level way to gauge both interest and understanding.

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Podcast # 20, Petroleum Lease Marketplace

I am very pleased with the content of this podcast. It captures the subtle complexity inherent in the interactions within the Petroleum Lease Marketplace module—complexity that underpins the data and process integrity across all other modules of the Preliminary Specification.

As the second in our series covering the three marketplace modules, this episode moves beyond the central theme of data integrity to explore the broader strategic implications of the module and the downstream consequences of its design. I was impressed by the clarity and depth with which these topics were addressed, as well as the ease and fluency of the virtual presenters in navigating such a sophisticated discussion.

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Resource Marketplace, Podcast # 19

We are transitioning our podcast series from this year’s White Papers to a focused exploration of the fourteen modules within the Preliminary Specification. The first episode in this new series, released today, covers the Resource Marketplace module. Upcoming episodes will feature the Petroleum Lease Marketplace module on Tuesday, followed by the Finance Marketplace module on Friday.

One of the remarkable aspects of substantive writing is how it can evolve in meaning over time. When a document is set aside for six months or more, revisiting it often reveals insights and themes the author was unaware of during its creation. This has been my experience with the six papers published this year, and it is motivating me to expand certain sections of the Preliminary Specification to incorporate these new perspectives.

Separately, I’ve observed an unusually high volume of asset sales in the oil and gas sector. What stands out most is that the identities of the buyers are rarely disclosed.

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