Is the party over?
Or just Beginning to get exciting?
April 30, 2007
Matthew R. Simmons
Although the majority of this information is sourced from this Simmons presentation, little specifically is referenced. I felt that most of the information was factual and therefore not subject to Mr. Simmons copyright. (You can't copyright a fact.) I highlighted only what I thought was Mr. Simmons opinions in the noted references below.
Simmons noted the significance of the earlier period of the years 1859 to the 1930's where "no one had any idea what to do with so much oil"! The 148th year of the oil era is marked this year. 70 Years ago drilling teams began hunting for oil in the Middle East. Scouting for oil in Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Many of the large commercial fields that still produce in that region where found. Ghawar, the biggest was discovered in 1948, Safaniyah in 1951, up to 1967 with the last great super giant onshore Middle East find being Shaybah.
During 1947 Kerr-McGee moved offshore beyond piers and brings in the era of offshore oil and gas. These initial wells reached as deep as 150' feet of water. 150 feet being the limit of human endurance and safety due to the "bends". 1967 saw the Siberian Samoltar region develop, ARCO discovered the North Slopes Prudhoe Bay in 1968, Phillips found Ekofisk in 1969 and in 1975 Pemex found Cantarell. These regions and discoveries were the last 3 great oil frontiers.
With the development of mixed gas for diving, hyperbaric chambers, and the "Jim Suit" c/w GE's robotic arm. Led to testing and drilling into 1,000 feet of water in the early 1970's. Commensurate with this deeper diving capability Drill-ships and Semi-Submersible were able to conduct drilling into 150 to 400 - 450 feet of water. Further development of sub-sea production systems led to offshore satellite fields. During the 1980's the offshore drilling industry was faced with declining returns due to the costs of these technologies and the relative decline in demand for offshore drilling due to the delcine in the price of oil. As I recall it went to $10 / barrel in 1985 or 86. The pricing problem led to what was believed as the overbuilding of the offshore drilling fleet. This lack of offshre drilling demand dropped the capacity utilization rates to 43% overall. However when 1993 saw new offshore drilling technologies being introduced, the associated declines in costs and the producers earning reasonable returns on moderate oil prices of around $18 - 21 / barrel. This led to the real deep-water / ultra deep-water opportunities. This lead to a rebound or recovery of offshore drilling when in May 1997 Sonat Offshore announced the building of a deep-water rig with a 5 year contract at $200,000 / day day-rates.
"After 1980: all growth in oil output came from offshore oil". In his presentation Matthew Simmons shows the volume of oil production increases since 1980 are attributable to the offshore drilling discoveries. 120% of the 1980 to 2007 increase in the global oil production has come from offshore exploration and production. This is significant in showing the way in which the industry should turn. If the industry was able to make these discoveries with immature technologies and imploding commodity prices, I think the answer as to where the oil and gas industry needs to turn is evident.
Today after 38 years, the contractors for offshore drilling are financially healthy and prosperous. Only the number of rigs has not changed in the last 20 years. And the vintage of that fleet is quickly realizing its useful life. Recall that rust never sleeps and the useful life issue becomes more focused. Only 15% of the total fleet is new, with the majority being 25 years or more in age. It is unknown how quickly the fleet can be refurbished and how fast the fleet could be rebuilt. Simmons asks what does 500 offshore rigs cost. With 126 rigs on order, the delivery dates being from 2008 to 2011 it would seem the drilling platforms are very limited in their opportunities for the energy industries redevelopment capabilities. Time seems to be the greater cost in rebuilding the fleet. One must recall the effort of the United States during WWII, mixed in with some modern day innovation and science in seeing how the number of platforms could be built in time. With all of the oil found from offshore wells since the early 1980's, what is the prospect of the industries productive capacity and uptake?
One of the reasons that I follow Simmons is his analysis is usually unimpeachable. He is / has been a lightning rod for the wrath of the industry soothsayers that state all is well. Dr. Daniel Yergin seems to have sampled some magic cool-aid when it comes to predicting the supply possibilities, and hence his popularity. Simmons on the other hand has consistently put quality analysis that has proven correct over time. I have been following him since 1997 and his comments are stark, to the point and not something that Yergin appears to want to wake up to. For example, in this article Simmons notes the following prospective changes with respect to the supply that Yergin thinks is going to explode in the next 10 years.
- USA's onshore oil totals approximately 4.5 MB/D with an associated produced water of 128 MB/D. A 96.6% overall average water cut.
- Middle Easts giant oilfield now in decline. (Based on reserve analysis and decline in production from the region.)
- Mexico's Cantarell complex is beginning its steep decline.
- Lake Maracaibo is a "mess".
- Niger Delta is a rust belt of decay.
- The North Sea is in steep decline.
In light of this and the fact that 120% of the increase in oil and gas production in the past 27 years is from offshore oil exploration and production. How is it that Yergin believes the onshore oil and gas industry can respond to today's demand challenge. If it didn't contribute in the past 27 years to the global capacity of production, what is it that Yergin believes will solve this problem? More and more each day I think that Yergin is actively attempting to impeach his history and contribution to the oil and gas industry. As time passes he will become known for getting it all wrong.
Simmons falls definitively in the category of Peak Oil Theorists. He asks if the January 2007 production profile is 1 MB/D lower then May 2005's 74,151,000 B/D. This decline may show that May 2005 was the point of no return from a Peak Oil theory point of view. Unless the number of wells that can be drilled increases size-ably, then Peak Oil starts it's otherwise impossible decline. With the associated growth in the global fleet of offshore drilling capability, production decline will accelerate.
Its at this time that Simmons puts across one of the other phenomenon he has asserted many times before. The ability to accelerate the decline by aggressive exploitation is the only thing that the industry has really done in all of the onshore and offshore fields. This has raised the deliver-ability of oil and gas from known reserves to its absolute optimum, and cleaned out what was producible form the formations quicker then what has been found to replace it. In some companies in Canada this replacement rate is consistently 15% of the production! If you see a hamster in the wheel running at full speed your correct, however, this last point demands a doubling in the speed from the hamster. Our current consumption of energy is enabled by the aggressive and highly technical exploitation of known reserves over the past 25 years. This deliver-ability rate is therefore not sustainable. And if the peak oil theory is proven right, since May 2005 a very large clock has been ticking for the energy consumer who is unawares and unprepared. Thank you Dr. Yergin.
The dire nature of Simmons facts are captured in his 27th slide. Asking "Can the industry survive post peak oil?
- Will the global economy survive post-peak oil world?
- How high could oil prices go?
- When demand outstrips supply are shortages inevitable?
- Will the Offshore Technology Conference (OTC) survive Post Peak Oil? (The OTC is the group Simmons made this presentation too.)
How this gets done, and I cannot imagine anyone arguing for the bureaucracy to lead this charge. We need to organize our efforts to scale to this level. The industry is significantly bound by constraints and needs to reorganize around this proposed software development. How much longer will we face an angry consumer regarding the alleged gouging at the pump? How much longer will the bureaucracy feel complacent and wealthy in their deliberate inaction? How much longer will Yergin continue to belittle the Peak Oil theories and Simmons, and tell his customers, the consumers and bureaucracies, things are not as rosy as he has stated?
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