Synallagi’s Price Maker Strategy and the Consumer
We’re reviewing Synallagi’s price maker strategy: how it works, how it is constructed, and the changes it requires in the organization of oil & gas production. From there, we’ll consider what this means for consumers and their need for affordable, abundant, and secure energy.
The starting point is a distinction between the characteristics of a commodity market and the pricing power of an individual business. A price maker, in the conventional economic sense, has sufficient market power or product differentiation to influence the price it charges. An individual oil & gas producer generally faces prices established in competitive markets. Limited substitutes for petroleum do not, by themselves, give that producer control over prices.[1]
Nevertheless, oil & gas have characteristics that make production decisions consequential. Substitution is often difficult, particularly over short periods. Hydroelectricity does not lubricate an engine, and wind power cannot directly replace petroleum feedstocks in chemical manufacturing. Alternatives exist for some applications, but adopting them can require different equipment, infrastructure, and substantial investment.
When supply and demand respond slowly, relatively small changes in their balance can produce substantial price movements. A 2% reduction in available oil supply could have a significant effect, although the outcome would depend on inventories, spare capacity, demand, and market expectations. Price sensitivity is a characteristic of the market; it is not proof that every participant can set its price.[2]
Synallagi’s price maker strategy begins with the producer’s authority over its own production. The producer assesses whether a well can operate profitably and makes an independent decision to produce, shut in, or undertake remediation. Its commercial discipline begins with knowing the economics of its assets and acting on that information.
The negative natural gas prices experienced at Waha in the Permian during 2026 illustrate the consequences of supply exceeding available takeaway capacity. Production can continue because the economics of associated oil production support it, even when producers must pay to move their gas.[3] A negative gas price alone does not establish that the combined well is unprofitable. It does, however, expose the weakness of treating every additional unit of production as a desirable outcome.
The high-throughput production model reinforces that behaviour. Substantial fixed overhead creates pressure to maintain volumes and generate the cash necessary to keep the organization operating. Production becomes the means of supporting the cost structure, even where the financial return is inadequate. Changing that behaviour requires changing the cost structure itself.
Synallagi approaches accounting and administrative costs through shared capabilities, specialization, and a different organization of work. Our objective is to enable dynamic, innovative, accountable, and profitable producers by reducing the overhead that makes continued production appear unavoidable.
Our previous discussion considered the economics of cloud computing. Synallagi extends that principle to accounting and administration. We propose developing common capabilities once, maintaining and improving them through our user community and their service provider organizations, and distributing their costs across participating producers. Each producer gains access to capabilities that would be expensive to develop and maintain independently.
The scale of that undertaking warrants scrutiny. People, Ideas & Objects cannot accomplish it alone. Our user community requires sustained contributions from across the North American oil & gas ecosystem: engineers, geologists, accountants, administrators, contractors, service industry firms, technology providers, and producers. That involvement must continue throughout development and operation.
The familiar principle of “garbage in, garbage out” remains relevant. Reliable software requires reliable data, well-defined processes, and people who accept responsibility for both. The quality of the outcome will reflect the quality of that participation.
Producers considering alternatives must assess the full cost of achieving comparable capabilities. An independent development program would require software, specialized knowledge, implementation resources, ongoing maintenance, and the organizational changes necessary to use it effectively. It would also need to respect People, Ideas & Objects’ Intellectual Property. Existing ERP products offer other paths, but acquiring software alone does not establish the operating model described throughout our work.
Our user community and their service provider organizations are therefore designed around a variable service-cost model tied to profitable production. When a well becomes unprofitable, the producer should be able to shut it in without continuing to carry the same accounting and administrative burden. The well can then enter the inventory of innovative projects for assessment and remediation, supporting the 19 benefits identified in Appendix VIII of our Master Appendix.
We describe the intended outcome as a null operation: no production profit and no continuing production loss while the well is shut in. Achieving that outcome requires the relevant costs to stop with production. Any remaining lease, monitoring, contractual, financing, or other obligations must remain visible and funded. The model’s effectiveness must be demonstrated through the actual cost arrangements; shutting in a well does not automatically eliminate every obligation associated with it.
Synallagi is designed to provide actual, factual, standardized, and objective financial statements for every Joint Operating Committee, supported by sufficient well-level detail to identify the sources of profitability and loss. If a ten-well property reports disappointing results, management should be able to determine whether one well is responsible and whether shutting it in would improve the property’s economics. Where operationally feasible, the other nine wells can continue producing profitably while the unprofitable well is remediated.
That analysis must distinguish costs that disappear when production stops from costs that remain. Allocating overhead differently is not the same as eliminating it. The purpose is to improve actual economic performance.
Some officers and directors regard production discipline of this kind as collusion. The distinction requires precision. A producer independently evaluating its own economics is different from competitors agreeing on prices or restricting output. Accurate financial information does not, however, provide a blanket exemption from competition law. The FTC explicitly distinguishes independent market responses from agreements among competitors to fix prices or limit production.[4]
Synallagi must preserve that independence in its governance, information access, and decision processes. Shared software and accounting standards must not become a means of coordinating competitors’ prices or production. Each producer’s decisions must reflect its own circumstances, obligations, and economic assessment.
The commercial principle remains straightforward: production should earn a return sufficient to sustain the business over time. When it fails that test, management must identify the cause and determine whether to remediate, suspend, or discontinue the activity. The ability to generate cash today does not establish that the activity is economically sustainable.
Our natural gas analysis applies a roughly 6:1 energy-equivalence benchmark between natural gas and oil. In conventional industry usage, approximately six thousand cubic feet of natural gas represent the energy equivalent of one barrel of oil. That is a comparison of energy content; it does not establish that the two commodities must trade at equivalent prices.
Against that benchmark, People, Ideas & Objects calculates a cumulative natural gas revenue shortfall of $5.4 trillion for the twenty-first century. This is our measure of the gap between realized revenues and the revenues implied by the benchmark. The calculation depends on that methodology and should be distinguished from an independently established accounting loss. Disagreement with the benchmark does not resolve the underlying issue: producers still need to demonstrate that their actual revenues support profitable operations.
The consumer’s position deserves equal attention. Nobody welcomes higher energy bills. If production withdrawals increase commodity prices, consumers may face higher costs. Our argument must therefore address both immediate affordability and the industry’s capacity to provide reliable energy over time.
Two parts of the consumer’s energy expenditure need to be distinguished:
The costs incurred after the producer’s point of sale. Depending on the product and supply chain, these include transportation, processing, refining, distribution, retail margins, taxes, and other charges. They contribute to the final consumer price and are generally outside an upstream producer’s direct control.
The economics of producing the commodity. Producers are responsible for managing the costs and commercial decisions within their operations. Revenues must support operating obligations, capital recovery, future investment, and a return to shareholders. Sustainable investment also supports the service industry on which future production depends.
The point of sale is an accounting boundary, not a separation from the consumer’s interests. Upstream prices affect downstream costs. Equally, a low commodity price today offers limited reassurance if the economics behind it weaken the capacity to supply energy tomorrow.
For decades, cost control has been a dominant industry response to financial pressure. Too often, in our assessment, this has meant transferring that pressure to the service industry through lower prices, reduced activity, and payment practices that undermine suppliers’ financial capacity. Producers depend on those same businesses for the equipment, expertise, and innovation required to sustain operations. Repeatedly weakening them compromises the productive capacity the industry will need.
Synallagi seeks to address the producer’s underlying economics so that efficiency, investment, and supplier viability can be sustained together. Affordable energy depends in part on an industry capable of renewing its assets, developing its people, and paying for the capabilities it uses.
The expansion of LNG exports provides another reason to examine how value is distributed. Access to liquefaction facilities, shipping, and overseas markets enables businesses to purchase North American gas and sell into markets with different prices. The price spread must cover liquefaction, transportation, regasification, and other costs before it can be treated as a commercial margin.
Even after allowing for those costs, producers should examine whether their contracts and market access give them an appropriate opportunity to participate in the value their production supports. Selling heavily discounted gas does not ensure that the final consumer receives a corresponding saving. Depending on the contract structure, part of the benefit may accrue elsewhere in the supply chain.
We should not assume that every international price differential represents revenue a producer could have captured. Nor should producers assume that the price available through their existing arrangements represents the full range of commercial opportunities. Those opportunities require analysis, investment, and negotiation.
Producers cannot guarantee a market price, but they remain responsible for deciding whether their operations justify continued production and investment. The service industry cannot correct a producer’s commodity-marketing strategy, and shareholders cannot indefinitely supply the capital required to compensate for inadequate returns.
For at least four decades, in our assessment, the industry has too often treated continued production and access to cash as sufficient evidence of commercial success. Synallagi establishes profitability as the operating discipline: identify the economics, act on them, remediate unprofitable assets, and sustain the capabilities that make future production possible. Consumers have a direct interest in an industry that can meet their needs without repeatedly undermining its own financial foundations.
[1] Investopedia: Understanding Price Makers.
[2] International Monetary Fund: An Oil and Gas Model.
[3] Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas: Energy Indicators, August 20, 2026.

