The Power of Prices
Military conflict and supply disruptions in the Middle East have again demonstrated the power of commodity prices in oil & gas. In its third-quarter 2026 reporting, ConocoPhillips identified those disruptions as a driver of higher oil prices relative to a year earlier. Its benchmark comparison showed WTI up 32%, while Henry Hub natural gas was down 4%.
For North American producers, the lesson extends beyond the benefits of a stronger oil market. It should awaken their entrepreneurial instincts and prompt a comprehensive reassessment of how they conduct their business. Prices deserve the same sustained management attention that producers devote to volumes, drilling performance, and costs.
Cutting costs is not a business model. Producing additional volumes at a loss does not resolve an underlying failure to earn a profit. A viable business must manage the relationship between what it produces, what production actually costs, and the revenue it can secure. Why should an oil & gas property continue producing without a credible basis for profitability?
Synallagi is designed to make that discipline operational. Its decentralized production model begins with the producer’s authority over its own production and the information required to exercise that authority intelligently. Unprofitable properties are shut in and can be moved to an inventory of innovative projects, where science, engineering, technology, and commercial innovation are directed toward their return to profitable production. The objective is to meet market demand while earning the returns necessary to sustain the enterprise and attract capital.
That responsibility reaches beyond the producer’s own financial statements.
As primary industry participants, producers must secure sufficient commodity revenue to sustain the productive capabilities on which exploration and production depend. Their revenues pay for the people, equipment, technologies, and services supplied by secondary industries, whose spending supports businesses throughout the communities in which they operate. The producer’s commercial decisions therefore have consequences throughout this economic structure.
When producers defend their own margins by repeatedly transferring financial pressure to suppliers and service companies, they weaken the capabilities they will need in the future. A lower invoice may improve this quarter’s reported costs while contributing to the loss of experienced personnel, deferred equipment replacement, and reduced investment in innovation. Those consequences eventually return to the producer as capacity constraints, poorer service availability, and higher costs.
Liberty Energy’s third-quarter 2026 discussion provides a concrete example. The company identified fleet attrition, equipment cannibalization, and industry underinvestment as constraints on available fracturing capacity. The capabilities producers require cannot be assumed to remain available regardless of the economics imposed on those who provide them.
A consistently profitable Liberty Energy would retain skilled employees, maintain and replace equipment, develop technologies, and plan investments over a meaningful horizon. Producers would benefit through more reliable execution, innovation, and improved productivity. The same principle extends to smaller suppliers and local businesses whose prosperity depends on sustained industry activity.
These businesses retain responsibility for managing their own operations. They can innovate, compete, and control costs. What they cannot do is independently repair the commodity economics governing their customers’ spending. A frac company cannot restore a producer’s natural gas realization, and a local convenience store cannot reverse a collapse in regional investment.
Repeatedly dismantling technical teams and attempting to rebuild them when activity returns consumes resources that could have been invested productively. Some people will move permanently to other industries. Some businesses will disappear. The next recovery then begins with less capacity and a narrower base of experience. Producers should account for these consequences when assessing the apparent savings achieved during a downturn.
Securing an appropriate share of the commodities market value is therefore a commercial responsibility with implications for the entire production system.
The LNG market illustrates why this matters. When a producer sells natural gas under a domestic benchmark arrangement without retaining participation in its international value, subsequent participants may capture the remaining commercial opportunity. How much is available depends on liquefaction, transportation, financing, contractual obligations, and risk. Determining that amount, and establishing the arrangements required to earn it, is part of the producer’s business.
There are already examples of producers retaining that participation. Cheniere describes agreements under which producers receive prices linked to international LNG or natural gas benchmarks after deductions for liquefaction, shipping, and other costs. Those arrangements demonstrate that the allocation of value depends in part on commercial design. Producers should examine the opportunities available to them and determine which they have the capabilities to pursue profitably.
Capturing more of that value need not require an equivalent increase in the consumer’s energy bill. Where the opportunity concerns how an existing market value is distributed, a greater producer realization can come from a different allocation among participants. The downstream businesses must still earn returns commensurate with their costs, investment, and risks. Producers must likewise secure the revenues needed to sustain profitable production and the service industries supporting it.
The amount available will differ by transaction. It must be established through evidence, negotiation, and execution.
Meanwhile, stronger oil revenues can obscure deteriorating natural gas economics. An acceptable corporate result can encourage management to tolerate losses within individual properties or parts of the portfolio. “Muddle through” becomes the response, and the underlying problem remains unresolved.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s November 10 outlook illustrates the exposure. Following a warm start to November, the agency projected higher natural gas inventories and reduced its forecast for Henry Hub to an average of $2.87 per million British thermal units from November through March—16% below its previous forecast.
Consider a simple illustration. A property realizing $3.41 per million British thermal units, with an unchanged full cost of $3.07, earns approximately $0.34, or a 10% margin on revenue. At a realization of $2.87, it loses $0.20 per unit. A price reduction of approximately 16% has eliminated the profit and moved the property into loss.
The EIA figure is a forecast revision, and the illustration does not establish that all natural gas production is unprofitable. Actual results depend on each property’s costs, realized prices, contracts, and hedges. That is precisely why accurate property-level accounting matters. A producer must know which properties remain profitable and act on those that do not.
The familiar responses are inadequate: make it up on volume; accept the prevailing oil-to-gas price relationship; declare the industry a price taker; dismiss Synallagi’s price maker strategy as collusion; or point to an aggregate corporate profit.
None establishes the profitability of the property in question.
The approximate six-to-one energy-equivalence relationship does not compel oil and natural gas prices to maintain that ratio. Equally, accepting a ratio of 52.5:1 does nothing to establish whether natural gas production earns an adequate return. The relevant questions concern actual costs, realizable market value, available commercial alternatives, and the producer’s production decisions.
Synallagi’s price maker strategy begins with each producer exercising authority over its own assets on the basis of its own economics. Decisions concerning jointly owned properties operate through their Joint Operating Committee and the applicable agreements. The proposed discipline requires the information, authorization, and accountability necessary to determine whether production should proceed and what must change before an unprofitable property returns to production.
Since 2012, our criticism has been that the industry has failed to establish a sufficiently durable economic foundation to retain the capital and capabilities it requires. Over that period, the discussion has moved through competing prescriptions: shale cannot be profitable; clean energy is the future; shale is the future; consolidation is the route to survival. Each should be judged by its ability to produce sustainable economic results.
Moving revenues earned in oil & gas into another industry requires a credible investment case and accountability to shareholders. Changing the destination of capital does not, by itself, resolve the economics of the business that generated it.
Consolidation deserves the same scrutiny. An acquisition may improve particular operations, remove duplicated costs, or assemble a stronger portfolio. Its contribution should be measured against those outcomes. Larger corporate scale alone does not establish a discipline under which every producing property must be profitable.
Nor should the benefits of an externally driven oil price increase be credited to consolidation. The geopolitical component of third-quarter prices arose beyond the control of industry management. Had Synallagi already been implemented, it would have had no claim to creating that external increase either.
The lesson concerns the financial power of prices and the need to manage the business accordingly.
Shale expanded the industry’s productive possibilities and challenged an approach developed around supply scarcity. When additional production was the overriding requirement, organizing the firm to maximize output served an evident purpose. An abundance of productive opportunities requires greater discrimination about which production should reach the market, under what commercial arrangements, and at what return.
Continuing to emphasize volume while treating revenue as largely beyond management’s responsibility leaves producers exposed to the consequences of their own production decisions. It also exposes the secondary and tertiary industries that depend on them. Officers and directors should assess the durability of the capabilities their business requires alongside the durability of its earnings.
The industry has devoted decades of attention to the volume and cost sides of profitability. The third quarter 2026 financial effect of commodity prices demonstrates why the revenue side deserves comparable discipline.
Synallagi is intended to provide the organizational and economic means to make profitable production decisions, exercise commercial authority, and capture available commodity value. The objective extends to sustaining the people and businesses required to deliver the most profitable means of oil & gas operations, everywhere and always.
Uncertainty about the precise magnitude of an opportunity should lead to investigation. It should not become a reason to leave the opportunity unexplored. Analytical rigor belongs in determining how much value is available, what is required to earn it, and who has the capabilities to do so.
Money is on the table. How much is available, and how much can be earned, remains to be determined through the producer’s commercial judgment and execution.
