A Perception of Financial Status, Part II
Overhead Cost Reductions
Synallagi requires a reconfiguration of the industry’s accounting and administrative resources to deliver the financial detail necessary for commercial decisions. Capturing production data through the Internet of Things is the beginning. Overhead allowances must give way to the actual costs incurred in administering each property and well. What does it cost to perform production, revenue and royalty accounting for a particular well? How do those costs differ between oil and natural gas operations? Synallagi is designed to make these differences visible alongside operating costs and capital-recovery requirements. Standardized, consistently prepared, performance related accounting information would allow users to compare individual wells or aggregate their performance.
We see the potential for overhead costs under Synallagi to fall to a single-digit percentage of current expenditure. That potential rests on several methods designed to reinforce one another. Shared Cloud Computing infrastructure and specialized accounting and administrative services reduce the duplication involved when each producer builds and maintains these capabilities independently. Common infrastructure is developed once for shared use, with its development costs distributed proportionately across participating production on a BOE-per-day basis. Ongoing computing, software and service provider costs remain identifiable within the actual costs of delivering those services.
This structure expands hyper specialization and the division of labor beyond the boundaries of a single producer. A specialist’s work can serve properties across the industry, supporting a depth of expertise and volume of activity that an individual organization may be unable to sustain. Common processes provide a foundation for Artificial Intelligence to assist with repetitive work, identify exceptions and extend the capabilities of those specialists.
Adam Smith’s pin-making example illustrates the scale of improvement that reorganizing work can achieve. He described ten workers collectively producing approximately 48,000 pins per day—4,800 per worker—compared with fewer than twenty each if working independently without the relevant training. The comparison implies at least a 240-fold productivity difference. Smith connected this achievement to the division of labor, developed skills and machinery. What further possibilities emerge when specialization operates across an industry and is supported by Artificial Intelligence? Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter I.

Recognition of markets, the Joint Operating Committee, innovation and Intellectual Property as Organizational Constructs provides further means of organizing work and extending improvements across participating producers. Together, these arrangements are intended to reduce overhead while increasing the precision and usefulness of the accounting. The commercial benefit is lower actual costs per BOE, a clearer profitability calculation and greater financial resources available for productive information, analysis, decision making and investment.
Comparing Our User Community to Today’s Overhead Structure
People, Ideas & Objects has raised the industry’s overhead problem many times. We have documented it extensively. At one stage, we identified capitalized interest and other costs receiving similar treatment. Notably, interest and certain related costs were later removed from this reporting method under discussion and, soon afterward, from broader industry practice. We first noted this development on our blog on November 10, 2008.
What remains materially unchanged in 2026 is the capitalization of overhead. Why has gross overhead continued to be reported in the same manner? The discussion that follows suggests this is one of the principal mechanisms through which cash continues to bleed from the industry and their accountability reporting distortions continue to persist.
The relevant question is why capitalized overhead has not been corrected. Is there a specific intent behind the desire of officers and directors to continue reporting overhead in this manner? If so, what is that intent? Why has it persisted? And why were some related costs remedied while overhead remains untreated eighteen years later?
People, Ideas & Objects maintains that, under Synallagi, our user community and their service provider organizations would operate at single-digit percentages of today’s fixed gross overhead. If there is a chronic and systemic source of overproduction in oil & gas, it lies in the fixed gross overhead carried by producers. That is where the problem begins to reveal itself. Capitalization is the mechanism that makes the issue less visible. It creates a distinct cash flow problem while distorting reported financial performance.
The argument begins with two observations.
- First, overhead costs at any point in time amounts to roughly 10 to 20 percent of revenue.
- Second, at any point in time, approximately 85 percent of gross actual overhead is capitalized.
A related issue concerns overhead charged to Joint Operating Committees. Those charges are based on estimates agreed through the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies. In the broader industry picture, those overhead allowances are effectively zero. Any amounts charged are earned by the operator. Any net recovery merely reduces post-capitalization overhead costs. Under Synallagi those overhead allowances are replaced by the actual, factual overhead costs.
The core issue is straightforward. When overhead is capitalized, those costs are recovered over the life of the reserves. Producers allocate capital costs across all proven reserve volumes reported by their independent reservoir engineers. The cash spent on overhead in a given month is therefore returned in small increments each month over the life of the property.
That creates a structural cash problem. Each month, each producer must find new cash to fund the next month’s overhead. No cash float is created because overhead is not priced into the commodity, is not passed through to the consumer, and is therefore not returned to the producer in the current month to fund the next month’s overhead.
The materiality of overhead in oil & gas therefore creates a persistent drain on cash. This was masked when investors were subsidizing the majority of producer capital expenditures, which included capitalized overhead. Once that support disappeared, producers turned after 2015 to every available source of capital to sustain operations and overhead.

Leadership, behind the eight ball.
Today, with working capital diminished and in many cases negative, producers are financially and operationally impaired. They are barely able to fund the capital spending required to sustain production. Each year becomes more difficult as their competitive position depreciates further. Their prior conduct toward the service industry has compounded the damage, leaving trust, motivation, capacity, and capability far below what the service industry now requires.
People, Ideas & Objects therefore asks why a policy that has been in place for decades, and that is demonstrably destructive to producer cash requirements, has remained unchanged after more than a decade of industry discussion. What is it about capitalized overhead that makes it this persistent?
For all practical purposes, capitalized overhead has been a root cause of the loss of support for producer capital structures. That loss of support began in 2015, when investors withdrew because of poor performance and a fundamental lack of accountability. Nothing meaningful has been done to address either issue. How, then, does this critical cash problem remain in place in 2026?
There must be some continuing intent, motivation, or institutional desire to preserve the practice despite the absence of liquidity, the loss of support of their capital structures, and the existence of alternatives such as Synallagi.
Leadership has taken shale, one of Mother Nature's greatest endowments of wealth, delivered it to the greatest economy known to man, and for the sake of whatever remains concealed in overhead accounts, destroyed its present value.
Allocation of Capital Costs to Production
Recognition and retirement of capital costs in a timely, competitive period is one method of measuring the reality of the reported earnings. One person put it this way in terms of investing. It’s not the purchase of a stock on the basis of its price earnings ratio that’s the appropriate evaluation. Or how it performed against analysts expectations. It’s how those earnings were determined, are they “real?” Has the company put its competitiveness and performance as the priority in what is reported. Or is it just fudging the numbers? Moving capital assets to the income statement in a competitive manner is how the quality of a firm’s shareholders are determined. The quality of shareholders will subsequently dictate its market capitalization. Thinking on the basis of investing in these criteria will reveal the perception that People, Ideas & Objects sees oil & gas today.
For decades, producers have celebrated “building balance sheets” and “putting cash in the ground.” The language treats expenditure and asset accumulation as achievements in themselves. Yet capital committed to a property remains an investment to be recovered. A larger balance sheet establishes neither the quality of that investment nor the period within which shareholders will receive a return.
Allocating capital costs across substantial reserve volumes can produce a modest depletion expense per BOE and easily support reported earnings. The commercial question remains: how much of that investment is being recovered from current production, and how long will recovery take? Where much of the production lies decades ahead, a palatable accounting charge can coexist with an uncompetitive recovery period.
Shale makes this distinction particularly consequential. Heavy initial expenditure can be spread across a large estimate of proven recoverable volumes, reducing the apparent capital cost assigned to each BOE. But high initial production, steep decline and subsequent intervention costs determine when—and whether—the investment can actually be recovered. A low allocated cost per BOE cannot, by itself, demonstrate competitive financial performance.
Synallagi therefore establishes a commercial capital-recovery discipline against which production and investment decisions can be evaluated. The recovery period, expected production, additional expenditure and required return must be explicit. Financial statements must remain connected to that commercial reality through a clear account of what has been spent, what has been recovered and what remains outstanding. Taking account of North American capital markets expectations of competitive performance.
Officers and directors are responsible for making that relationship visible. Their integrity is demonstrated by the completeness of the information they provide and the decisions they make when performance falls short. Shareholders should not have to discover, years later, that reported profitability concealed a persistent failure to recover their investment.
Full Cost Accounting
The SEC formalized its Full Cost Accounting rules in the late 1970s. Under this method, qualifying acquisition, exploration and development expenditures—including unsuccessful exploration costs—are accumulated in broad cost centres, generally on a country basis. Capitalized costs are subsequently allocated to production through depletion. The accounting therefore evaluates a broader investment program rather than treating each unsuccessful exploration expenditure as an immediate loss. SEC Full Cost rulemaking, 1978.
The depletion calculation uses proved reserves, with the amortization base incorporating applicable estimated future development and abandonment expenditures. It does not permit costs to be spread indiscriminately across every resource thought to exist in a formation. Nevertheless, the resulting expense per BOE can distribute recognition of the investment across production extending well into the future. That allocation does not establish whether the investment is being recovered within a commercially competitive period. SEC: Oil and Gas Producing Activities.
Our argument concerns the financial culture that developed around this distinction following the 1986 oil-price collapse and became more consequential as shale expanded. Expenditure, reserve additions and production growth increasingly served as evidence of achievement. Where production failed to generate sufficient cash to replenish the investment, additional investor capital could sustain the next expenditure cycle. Existing shareholders supplied more money or accepted dilution, while the underlying recovery deficiency remained.
This is the culture we describe as “spending is profitable.” An expanding asset base could support the appearance of progress while the business remained dependent on investors to supply cash that profitable production was expected to generate. The commercial question became obscured: had the previous investment actually been recovered, and had it earned a competitive return?
Shale intensified that question through five interacting characteristics.
1. Substantial drilling and completion expenditure.
Long horizontal laterals and extensive completion programs can require substantial capital before production begins. The comparison with conventional development varies by reservoir, well design and location, but the obligation is consistent: the investment must be recovered from production within a period that justifies committing it. A technically successful well has not completed that commercial task merely by commencing production.
2. Access to extensive hydrocarbon resources.
Shale development opened large resource opportunities and, in established areas, reduced some of the uncertainty associated with finding hydrocarbons. Commercial uncertainty remained. Where qualifying proved reserves increase relative to the associated amortization base, the allocated capital cost per BOE can decline. That result must be evaluated alongside the expenditure still required to develop those reserves and the time needed to produce them. A large reserve denominator does not itself establish timely investment recovery.
3. High initial production volumes.
Strong early production creates an opportunity to recover capital quickly when the realized margin is adequate. The same production profile accelerates any under-recovery when the realized margin is not. A substantial portion of the well’s recoverable volume can be sold before its proceeds have discharged the corresponding investment obligation. Production records and cash receipts may look impressive while the remaining resource carries an increasing recovery burden.
4. Steep production decline.
Horizontal wells commonly combine high initial output with steep subsequent decline. As production falls, the volume available in each subsequent period to generate recovery receipts diminishes. Maintaining overall production can require further drilling while earlier investments remain unrecovered. Decline therefore makes the timing of profitability particularly important. It reflects reservoir and completion behaviour; it is not simply a consequence of having produced a large initial volume. EIA: Horizontal-well production and decline.
5. Further expenditure to sustain or improve production.
Workovers, recompletions, refracturing and additional development may require substantial expenditure. Each intervention must be evaluated against the production and financial contribution it is expected to deliver. It cannot be assumed to restore the original production rate or reproduce the original decline profile. Nor is every intervention automatically capitalized: routine operating work and qualifying development expenditure have different accounting treatments. Whatever its classification, the expenditure must enter the commercial evaluation. Example of Full Cost accounting policies.
These characteristics reinforce one another when production proceeds without adequate capital recovery. Heavy expenditure establishes the obligation. Strong initial output can consume the best recovery opportunity at inadequate margins. Decline reduces subsequent cash generation, and further expenditure adds another obligation to the balance already outstanding.
The issue extends beyond producers using Full Cost Accounting. Changing the financial-reporting method does not, by itself, establish that development expenditure has been recovered competitively. The distinction between reported earnings and demonstrated commercial performance remains.
Synallagi Method
Synallagi addresses that distinction directly. The objective is to recover invested capital within a competitive period defined by North American capital markets. Recognize its cost appropriately against production and earn a sustainable profit. The profitable operation discussed in this paper, capital committed to long-term producing assets is progressively realized through sales as receivables and ultimately cash.
The strongest outcome is a property that continues producing an enhanced profitability after its original investment has been fully recovered. The producer has replenished its financial resources and retains the opportunity to earn high profits from the remaining production. That is the performance sought by a culture of reserves preservation, performance and profitability. The proceeds from oil & gas receipts will always be required to fund the current replacement cost of that boe produced.
The cost must be recognized in determining earnings. Inadequate recognition can leave too much expenditure on the balance sheet and present an incomplete account of profitability. Integrity requires officers and directors to make the relationship between expenditure, cost recognition and cash recovery understandable. Shareholders must be able to determine whether the business is generating the resources needed for renewal or repeatedly asking them to replace what operations failed to recover.
Synallagi capital allocation operates at the product-pricing and Management Accounting level. It determines the recovery requirement per BOE, using outstanding capital, expected production within the selected recovery period, additional expenditure and the required return. Actual operating costs and actual overhead complete the commercial evaluation. The resulting information supports decisions at the well, property and individual producer’s Joint Operating Committee interest.
This commercial standard operates alongside the applicable financial-reporting requirements. Its purpose is to establish whether production meets the financial obligations of the business when the decision to produce is made.
Under Synallagi price maker strategy, profitable production proceeds. Production that fails the commercial standard is shut-in or suspended while corrective action and preservation alternatives are evaluated. Where the deficiency is confined to one well, the response can be directed to that well while profitable production elsewhere continues. The proposed benefits of this discipline are discussed here.
Objectivity is equally necessary inside the producer. If the financial evaluation indicates that a well should be shut in, the people responsible must understand the costs, production assumptions and recovery requirements behind that conclusion. They must be able to trace the result to its source and establish that the same methods have been applied consistently across relevant wells, properties and Joint Operating Committee interests. That consistency must extend across the industry through standardized methods applied to each producer’s actual circumstances. A producer can then make its own shut-in decision with confidence that its evaluation reflects a common commercial standard and that differences in reported profitability arise from underlying performance rather than inconsistent accounting methods.
“Muddle Through” leaves each new production and investment cycle to carry unresolved deficiencies from the past. Synallagi makes those deficiencies visible and gives commercial evaluation authority over the next decision. Officers and directors remain responsible for acting on the information. Continued expenditure is an investment decision whose success must be demonstrated through recovery, profitability and the financial capacity it leaves behind.


