Consider This... Hayek on Prices Part I
Introducing our new series of papers entitled "Consider This..."
The intellectual collision between the Keynesian framework and Hayekian thought remains a compelling chapter of the late 20th century. Following 1945, the consensus leaned toward the former, yet Hayek's perspective on spontaneous order eventually found its footing. This resurgence was most visible during the 1980s, when leaders like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher utilized his principles to achieve noted economic outcomes. Nevertheless, the allure of fiscal expansion often leads modern administrations, such as the one under President Biden, to return to significant budgetary and monetary expansion. Hayek’s receipt of the 1974 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences also helped restore his academic profile.
Of note, historical accounts place both economists at Cambridge University throughout the Second World War.
Friedrich Hayek was in Cambridge during the Second World War because the London School of Economics had been evacuated there. During the Blitz, Hayek and John Maynard Keynes reportedly shared fire-watch duty on the rooftops of King’s College, watching for incendiary bombs. This episode is well documented in Hayek biographies and Cambridge histories.
One nuance is worth emphasizing. It is an oversimplification to say that “Keynes said government was the answer.” Keynes advocated government intervention when aggregate demand was insufficient, but he did not advocate comprehensive state planning of production. Likewise, Hayek did not argue for the absence of government; he accepted important roles for the rule of law, monetary stability, competition policy, and a social safety net. The enduring debate between the two traditions is less about government versus markets than about where each works best and where each reaches its limits.
What Keynes and Hayek advocated for may not have been consistent with what ambitious politicians implemented. We’ve seen a strong move towards the left in the past 50 to 60 years. What Hayek said about the two prominent systems of government was appropriate. “Socialism is simple and seductive, capitalism is complex and subtle.”
The Price System: Market prices act as an incredibly subtle communication system. Prices signal scarcity or abundance and utility without requiring central coordination.
Counter-Intuitive Order: It seems absurd to the "naive mind" that decentralization generates better order than a deliberate plan.
Energy producers must now look to the price system as the mechanism for navigating the fundamental transition from scarcity to abundance brought about by shale. People, Ideas & Objects price maker strategy in Synallagi provides the necessary framework for this production discipline. If it’s profitable it produces, providing an application of the most fair, equitable and reasonable production discipline available.
The purpose of this Consider This… paper is to examine Professor Friedrich Hayek’s seminal September 1945 paper, The Use of Knowledge in Society, through the perspective of People, Ideas & Objects Synallagi price maker strategy. Although written more than eighty years ago, Hayek’s observations remain remarkably relevant to the challenges confronting North American oil & gas in 2026.
Hayek writes:
We must look at the price system as such a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real function—a function which, of course, fulfills less perfectly as prices grow more rigid. (Even when quoted prices have become quite rigid, however, the forces which would operate through changes in price still operate to a considerable extent through changes in the other terms of the contract.) The most significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action. In abbreviated form, by a kind of symbol, only the most essential information is passed on, and passed on only to those concerned. It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might watch the hands of a few dials, in order to adjust their activities to changes of which they may never know more than is reflected in the price movement. pp. 526 - 527.
An obvious question follows from Hayek’s discussion of the price system. What would have happened had North American oil & gas producers adopted our Synallagi price maker strategy over the past several decades?
Surprisingly, the impact on consumers would likely have been relatively modest. The greatest difference would have been experienced by producers, their investors, the service industry, and the broader economy.
People, Ideas & Objects have documented more than $5.0 trillion in lost natural gas revenues during the 21st century. These losses represent value that was never realized by North American producers because commodity prices failed to reflect the full economic value of the resource. This value destruction is measurable and well documented, yet it has produced remarkably little structural change. Rather than addressing the underlying market mechanisms responsible for these losses, the industry has largely continued operating under the same assumptions that created them.
This observation is consistent with Friedrich Hayek’s explanation of the price system. Hayek argued that prices communicate dispersed knowledge throughout an economy. No individual needs to understand every variable affecting supply and demand because the price itself communicates the information necessary for rational decision-making.
The Synallagi price maker strategy extends this principle. A profitable commodity price becomes the signal that communicates everything the producer needs to know. It reflects operating costs, capital recovery, transportation constraints, consumer demand, global supply, infrastructure limitations, investment requirements, and competitive conditions. Rather than attempting to manage each of these variables independently, producers need only respond to the information embodied in a profitable market price.
Profitability therefore becomes the coordinating mechanism that transforms dispersed knowledge into disciplined economic behaviour. This discipline extends beyond the producer.
Oil and gas is a primary industry, but its capabilities depend almost entirely upon its secondary and tertiary industries. Drilling contractors, engineering firms, equipment manufacturers, construction companies, software providers, and countless specialized service organizations collectively provide the industry’s productive capacity. Without this service industry, there would be no practical oil & gas industry.
For more than six decades, however, producers have relied upon what has become known as capital discipline. During periods of depressed commodity prices, capital expenditures are reduced in an effort to preserve corporate cash. While understandable from the perspective of an individual producer, the broader consequences are substantial.
Capital discipline is a blunt instrument. It often requires years before meaningful adjustments occur. More importantly, it systematically reduces the productive capacity and technical capabilities of the industry itself. And the burden of the downturn is transferred directly to the service industry.
When producers cancel capital programs, demand for drilling, completions, engineering, construction, and field services contracts immediately. The service industry experience dramatic declines in revenue, often compounded by demands for significant price concessions in order to retain work. Equipment is retired, experienced personnel leave the industry, innovation slows, and specialized capabilities are lost. The bust portion of the industry’s boom-and-bust cycle is effectively transferred from producers to the service sector.
The documented loss of more than $5.0 trillion in natural gas revenues illustrates an even broader economic principle. Somewhere between the point of production and the final consumer, someone will recognize the full market value of the commodity. Someone will recover the costs, earn a profit, and supply consumers at a price they are willing to pay.
If producers fail to capture that value, others inevitably will.
The value may be realized by downstream processors, exporters, marketers, utilities, industrial consumers, or other participants further along the value chain. Alternatively, consumers themselves may benefit through commodity prices that remain below their long-term economic value. Regardless of who ultimately captures the benefit, the value does not disappear. It simply leaves the upstream producer and the industries that depend upon it to be captured by others.
People, Ideas & Objects attribute much of this value destruction to the industry’s failure to transition from a business model based upon resource scarcity to one capable of managing the abundance created by shale. Abundance requires a fundamentally different production strategy. Rather than maximizing production volumes, producers must maximize the profitable value realized from each unit of production. Synallagi provides the accounting, operational, and marketplace framework necessary to support that transition and long term management.
Had producers consistently accounted for the full economic cost of production and limited production to profitable production, substantially more of this value would have remained within the industry. Investors would have realized stronger returns. The service industry would have maintained their technical capacities and capabilities. Innovation would have been continuously funded. Productive capacity would have been preserved instead of repeatedly dismantled and rebuilt during successive downturns.
The central lesson is straightforward. Commodity prices should communicate profitability, and profitability should govern production. When prices fail to support profitable production, the appropriate response is not to increase production in the hope that markets will eventually rebalance. The appropriate response is to preserve the resource, preserve capital, and produce only when production creates genuine economic value.
Only profitable production should be produced—everywhere and always. Synallagi lists the benefits to a producer firm of our price maker strategy as follows.
■ Maximized Profitability: Producers maximize profits when losses from unprofitable wells or properties no longer dilute the gains from profitable ones. It’s common sense to limit one's losses.
■ Strategic Reserve Management: Holding reserves until they can be produced profitably means avoiding the incremental costs associated with losses from unprofitable production. Reserves are not obligations to produce at any price. They are assets to be managed prudently.
■ Cost Reduction: Keeping oil & gas as reserves reduces production, transportation, processing, storage and administrative costs tied to excess, unprofitable output.
■ Variable Overhead Costs: Overhead costs are fully covered when profitably produced. That cash incurred is therefore returned within 60 days to the producers. Any shut-in production will not incur overhead as all Joint Operating Committee costs are turned variable in Synallagi.
■ Synnefa.ai Our Cloud Administration & Accounting for Oil & Gas: Shared administrative and accounting infrastructure costs of software and services based on the Cloud distribution model are tangibly lower.
■ Market Stability: Removing unprofitable production allows commodity markets to find the marginal cost, establishing fair prices for all production. Eliminating industries' boom / bust cycle. Markets provide one thing, and only one thing, a price.
■ Reserves Valuations: Market prices accurately reflect the value of producers petroleum reserves. Higher commodity prices expand the volumes of proven recoverable reserves and fulfill officers and directors fiduciary duty to safeguard assets.
■ Innovation Opportunities: While unprofitable properties are shut in, producers can innovatively explore ways to increase production volumes, reduce costs, or expand reserves. To return the well or property to profitable production.
■ Replacement Value: The realized market price of oil & gas must reflect the current market’s costs of exploration and development. That is the cost of a replacement volume of energy produced today.
■ Production Discipline: Using profitability as the criterion for production decisions is the only fair and reasonable method of instilling production discipline. Producers that continue to produce unprofitably will continue to incur losses and have difficulty competing in North American capital markets.
■ Alleged Capital Discipline: Producers claim by cutting spending on drilling and completions is their method of resolving low prices. Capital discipline is at best a dull, blunt instrument. As we see today, it is the willing destruction of productive capacity. What it also does is shift the bust of the boom / bust cycle to the service industry to suffer exclusively.
■ Innovation as a Foundation: Higher commodity prices finance greater innovative activity.
■ Effectively Eliminating the Boom / Bust Cycle: Dynamic changes to the producers production profile ensure they remain profitable and are aware when industry overbuilding has begun.
■ Commodity Values Realization: Each barrel of oil equivalent (boe) delivers the equivalent of 10,000 to 25,000 man-hours of labor to the consumer. This represents an irreplaceable value proposition, priced in January 2026 as high as $0.006 per labor hour, yet sourced from a finite supply. It is our responsibility to future generations to ensure this vital resource is not squandered. We must demonstrate that all production was profitable and that we passed on a robust, prosperous, profitable and viable industry to future generations. Price makers only bring on new production when it is profitable.
■ Consumers will use the Products Price to Make Decisions: Consumer decisions based on profitable prices will stabilize the demand side of the market.
■ Independent Decisions: Our price maker strategy is built on making independent business decisions, using actual, factual financial information at the property level. This is sound business practice, not collusion, which renders any such allegations moot.
■ Profitable Operations: Conceptually, profitable operations would provide a producer with all the financial resources they need to conduct their business. Providing leadership with the independence to set their own direction. End the systemic dilution of their shareholders interests to fund capital expenditures and build value.
■ Achieves North American Swing Producer Status: Oil & gas are now both global commodities subject to the supply / demand dynamics of these markets. Shale and heavy oil are unquestionably the most costly produced anywhere in the world. The role of swing producer is to add or remove production as required to stabilize prices adequate for its markets to provide for profitable operations.
Artificial Intelligence creates an opportunity to rethink long-held assumptions about how industries organize, compete, and innovate. It encourages us to move beyond established patterns of thinking and to reconsider whether existing organizational structures continue to serve their intended purpose.
North American oil & gas has long embraced a collegial culture. Cooperation, consensus, and professional relationships are viewed as virtues, reflecting an industry that seeks to distinguish itself from the crude notion of individuals competing over scarce resources. This philosophy has shaped not only oil & gas but many North American institutions.
The question, however, is whether this collegiality has gradually evolved into something less constructive. Has it become a closed culture in which opportunities are implicitly reserved for a select few? Has competition itself become viewed with suspicion? More importantly, has the pursuit of competitive advantage through superior knowledge become socially discouraged rather than celebrated?
Friedrich Hayek raised precisely this concern in The Use of Knowledge in Society (1945):
It is a curious fact that this sort of knowledge should today be generally regarded with a kind of contempt, and that anyone who by such knowledge gains an advantage over somebody better equipped with theoretical or technical knowledge is thought to have acted almost disreputably. To gain an advantage from better knowledge of facilities of communication or transport is sometimes regarded as almost dishonest, although it is quite as important that society make use of the best opportunities in this respect as in using the latest scientific discoveries. This prejudice has in a considerable measure affected the attitude toward commerce in general compared with that toward production. Even economists who regard themselves as definitely above the crude materialist fallacies of the past constantly commit the same mistake where activities directed toward the acquisition of such practical knowledge are concerned—apparently because in their scheme of things all such knowledge is supposed to be ‘given.’ The common idea now seems to be that all such knowledge should as a matter of course be readily at the command of everybody, and the reproach of irrationality leveled against the existing economic order is frequently based on the fact that it is not so available. This view disregards the fact that the method by which such knowledge can be made as widely available as possible is precisely the problem to which we have to find an answer. (p. 522)
Hayek’s observation remains remarkably relevant. The competitive advantage of an organization is rarely determined solely by superior scientific or technical knowledge. More often, it arises from possessing better operational, commercial, organizational, and financial knowledge—and, more importantly, from organizing that knowledge so it can be acted upon quickly and effectively.
Artificial Intelligence substantially expands that opportunity. Rather than replacing human expertise, it enables organizations to discover relationships, identify opportunities, and coordinate information at a scale previously unattainable. The challenge is no longer acquiring knowledge alone. The challenge is constructing organizations capable of making that knowledge available to the people responsible for making decisions.
That challenge in terms of delivery of the financial knowledge lies at the heart of Synallagi. And knowledge is provided through the price system.
Vision without action is merely a dream. Action without vision just passes the time. Vision with action can change the world.
Joel A. Barker
From Friedrich Hayek’s The Use of Knowledge in Society (1945):
It is, perhaps, worth stressing that economic problems arise always and only as a consequence of change. So long as things continue as before, or at least as they were expected to, there arise no new problems requiring a decision, no need to form a new plan. The belief that changes, or at least day-to-day adjustments, have become less important in modern times implies the contention that economic problems also have become less important. This belief in the decreasing importance of change is, for that reason, usually held by the same people who argue that the importance of economic considerations has been driven into the background by the growing importance of technological knowledge.
Is it true that, with the elaborate apparatus of modern production, economic decisions are required only at long intervals, as when a new factory is to be erected or a new process to be introduced? Is it true that, once a plant has been built, the rest is all more or less mechanical, determined by the character of the plant, and leaving little to be changed in adapting to the ever-changing circumstances of the moment?
Hayek’s central concern was not simply the existence of knowledge, but how dispersed, practical knowledge could be organized, communicated, and made useful for economic decision-making. That challenge remains largely unresolved within North American oil & gas. Engineers and geologists possess extraordinary scientific and technical expertise, yet they are rarely supported by actual, factual, standardized, and objective accounting information that enables them to evaluate the financial consequences of their operational decisions.
Synallagi addresses this deficiency by integrating standardized financial information directly into operational decision-making. Engineers and geologists would have immediate access to consistent financial statements prepared according to industry-wide standards, enabling them to analyze the economic performance of their properties from both scientific and business perspectives. Rather than relying upon fragmented information distributed across multiple organizational silos, they would possess a unified operational and financial view of every property under their responsibility.
Supported by our user community and their service provider organizations, they would be able to investigate cost structures, evaluate alternatives, optimize operational performance, and continually improve resource preservation, performance, and profitability. Synallagi Business Operations Management module provides the operational framework for these decisions, while the Marketplace Interface enables participants to engage the broader marketplace, deploying both organizational and market capabilities to achieve profitable outcomes.
Viewed from this perspective, Synallagi is not merely an Enterprise Resource Planning system. It is an organizational architecture for making Hayek’s dispersed knowledge actionable. It transforms information into coordinated decision-making by placing objective accounting information alongside engineering and geological expertise, thereby allowing both forms of knowledge to contribute simultaneously to operational success. Organizational knowledge and speed will be two of the primary elements of an oil & gas investments success.
