The China Syndrome
In a recent post we highlighted the EIA’s revised energy supply forecast. The chart from that post shows a 1 million barrel per day reduction in current production volumes. Econbrowser is now publishing anlysis of the EIA’s energy demand forecast, focusing on the impact that China will have in the marketplace.
Oil demand does not grow linearly with GDP. Rather, the bulk of oil demand growth occurs in the two decades during which societies typically acquire motor vehicles, after which per capita oil demand flattens. For example, per capita oil consumption in the United States is today lower than it was in 1979, even though per capita income has increased substantially since.That is not to say that the U.S. demand for energy has dropped. The focus on motor vehicles alone, which is what Kopits reviews, would therefore limit the potential demand from China to just that form of consumption. If we are to gain an understanding of the volume of potential demand from China, motor vehicles will be a portion of that demand, but not the sole source of the demand increase. Now the scary part of the analysis. Comparing the per capita increases in energy use of Japan (1960 - 1973) and Korea (1976 - 1996) and using either of those trajectories in China’s situation shows...
In any event, without delving deeper, we might expect China's steady state demand for oil could prove not less than that of more advanced Asian nations. Based on the experience of Korea and Japan, China's current population would be expected to consume approximately 55 mbpd at steady state (when per capita consumption plateaus), or nearly 2/3 of current global oil production, were the supply available.One might argue that this is an unreasonable amount of energy consumption. It imputes systemic gridlock throughout China, and therefore would define the upper limit of what is possible. Nonetheless the volume of energy demand will be substantial. In this next quotation Kopits argues that the EIA’s forecast demand is similarly too low.
By contrast, the EIA sees China's oil consumption at only 10 mbpd for 2015, a growth rate of approximately 2.7% from current levels, and at only 16 mbpd by 2030. Is this consistent with a country whose vehicle sales are up 56% in the first five months of the year? Where sales of Audi's are up 77% and those of BMW have doubled compared to the first five months of last year? Is China truly going to be satisfied, as the EIA would have it, with less than 1/5th of the per capita oil consumption of Korea in 2030, even though they should be similar by that time?and
The differences in views about China's oil demand outlook have enormous policy implications. If the EIA is right, and China will forget how to grow, then pressures on the oil supply will be modest. On the other hand, if China is to develop like other countries in Asia, the pressure on the oil supply will be crushing, with oil shocks, recessions, and war all conceivable outcomes. The energy--as well as the economic and security--policy differences between the two scenarios are like night and day.I don’t think it has to be that way. Call me an optimist but I think that whatever China, the U.S. and all others need in terms of energy, it is possible to supply them at prices that reflect that demand. The costs associated with the exploration and production will be substantially higher then what they are today. The easy stuff is gone, that is something that we can all agree on. The prices and volumes of production are unknown at this time, with demand growth from China, the oil and gas business has moved into a different era of operations. We know that a commodity like oil or gas is affected by the demand from China no matter where the source of production is.
Today’s oil and gas firms, particularly the large Independents and International Oil Companies are having difficulty generating value. The cost structures have caught up to the commodities prices and the performance of these bureaucratic firms is diminishing rapidly. If we look forward to 2030 we can assume that the way these firms are managed today will be history. No one would establish a firm today to operate in the fashion of the bureaucracy in 2030.
What we do know about 2030 is that the industry will be using advanced systems to manage their operations. It is also reasonable to assume that the Joint Operating Committee (JOC) will be the key organizational construct of the innovative producer. The use of both the technology and the JOC will be decided upon today. Approaching issues that are as broad in scope as the supply and demand of energy, that present this level of opportunity, can not be approached in the same old bureaucratic fashion. We need to pursue a definitive course of action, by developing the Draft Specification of People, Ideas & Objects.
Society is put in peril when world oil production declines. There is evidence that the world's oil production has declined. Therefore the world needs to have the energy industry expand its production. To do so requires that we reorganize to enhance the division of labor and specialization within the industry. As has been proven, this reorganization could achieve far greater oil and gas production. Management of the industry is conflicted in expanding the output of the industry. The less they do, the higher the oil and gas prices and the better they appear to perform. This managerial conflict must be addressed and the performance of the industry unleashed. To do so requires the current management of the industry to fund People, Ideas & Objects and build the systems as defined in the Draft Specification. Please join me here.
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