This One's Nuclear, Part II
On October 11, 2023, in a post entitled “This One’s Nuclear” I discussed my concern regarding natural gas prices in North America, post 2009s financial crisis. How a fundamental breakdown in pricing from the traditional six-to-one oil pricing had initially fallen to the high teens and low twenties. And since 2023 it has fallen further to the high twenties and low thirties as a factor of oil’s pricing. How this contrasts with the development of LNG markets around the world and the effect they had on Australia's natural gas pricing. Australia, the U.S. and Qatar have approximately equal shares of LNG export capacity. Australian producers experience direct pricing from foreign markets for their natural gas, and by regulation, a percentage of that price for their domestic markets. Asking why natural gas traded at such low prices in North America when the market situation was the same? With a total of at least 340.47 TCF produced in North America and the size of the differential in realized producer prices vs. Asian and Netherlands prices. The magnitude of North American producers' lost revenue from not realizing these “global” natural gas prices I suggested was valued in the mid single-digit trillions of dollars.
Due to officers' and directors' inaction this value has slipped out of the rightful owners' hands and was not monetized in their favor The rightful owners being shareholders of the producer firms and others such as the Texas Railroad Commission. Why not, and where is this money? Was it corruption or were officers and directors unaware of the opportunities? I’m not ready to answer how trillions of dollars were mishandled. All the while I was trying to convey to them the loss and other means of value irretrievably lost by not developing the Preliminary Specification. Which offers them a means to mitigate and capture this value in the future.
Producers believe they’ve responded to investor demands for enhanced returns. They’ve begun to return some dividends however that appears to be at the cost of the service industry. Continuing their habit of cutting the flow of funds to the service industry when cash demand elsewhere is increasing. Since 2015 when investors became wise to producers' accounting methods, they stopped supporting such nonsense. The service industry has been the primary means producers used to extract the cash needed to pay their investors. Either through the reduction of activity, enforcement of discounts or extension of accounts payable up to 18 months. These have hollowed out the service industry's capital structure, forcing them to sell their horsepower to other industries. Service industry providers cut up their equipment for scrap metal to pay the bills to stay in business. The erosion of field capacity as a result of producer actions has been dramatic. Operating at 30% of prior capacity, the service industry is unmotivated and unwilling to sacrifice more capital to producers. Would a profitable oil & gas industry allow this to happen? Never!
Regarding LNG, we have a situation at one producer that shows sunshine is the most powerful disinfectant. Chesapeake Energy Corporation disclosed in a third quarter 2023 press release the following information.
LNG Update
On its continued path to Be LNG Ready, the company entered into a Heads of Agreement (HOA) with Vitol Inc. (Vitol). Under the agreement, Chesapeake will supply natural gas sufficient to produce up to 1.0 mtpa of LNG which, post liquefaction, would be purchased by Vitol at a price indexed to JKM beginning in 2028 for a period of 15 years.
Some terms to better define this agreement. HOA or Heads of Agreement is a letter agreement setting forth the general terms and conditions of the agreement that will follow. 1.0 mtpa (million tonnes per annum) of LNG is approximately equivalent to 46 BCF delivered per annum. Or, on average 126 MMCF / day. Chesapeake in 2023 had 3.495 BCF/day production capacity. This contract represents 3.6% of Chesapeake’s current production. JKM is the Japan-Korea Marker price Chesapeake will realize.
This same type of activity occurs in about half of the producers we follow. In some instances these contracts superseded my October 11, 2023 blog post and were currently in development throughout the industry. The individual contracts reflect they are priced based on Japan-Korea Marker or Netherlands prices and netted back for transportation and liquefaction.
My argument was, and is, that current LNG export capacity is 13.9 bcf / day or 13.5% of U.S. dry production. LNG is a major market development for North American producers. For all intents and purposes we’ll assume that in 2016, the LNG marketplace was zero in terms of demand. Why then would producers, knowing about the Preliminary Specifications decentralized production models price maker strategy, and natural gas and oil following “price maker” characteristics as we describe, allow prices to remain so depressed throughout the continent after 2016 and up to today? In my opinion there is no reason. LNG was the opportunity to rehabilitate natural gas prices which collapsed during the financial crisis in 2009. An issue that manifested itself in several trillions of dollars in waste over that period of time. That this was not done is inexcusable when there was a solution available in the marketplace from 2012 that deals exactly with chronic natural gas overproduction. This solution being the Preliminary Specification.
- Since 2009 natural gas prices have collapsed and their pricing structure fundamentally broke down due to chronic and systemic overproduction.
- With its decentralized production model and price maker strategy, the Preliminary Specification has been available since 2012. It does however disintermediate the oil & gas industry which is counter to officers and directors' interests and personal financial health.
- 2015 Investors protest, demanding returns. Consequently, producers tighten the service sector to source these funds, which chokes that industry's growth and development. Leading to service industry operational capacity of 30%.
- 2016 a large market in the form of LNG exports opens up, which brings about the opportunity to re-establish natural gas prices on their heating value of 6 to 1 in terms of oil.
- 2021 Producer officers and directors capitulate on shale and state it will never be commercial and announce they’ll shift their organizations' focus to clean energy.
- 2023 Producer officers and directors return from clean energy failures to declare shale demands that consolidation is the only solution.
When action is required to remedy a situation officers and directors have been doing nothing for 14 years. When investors suspend their support, officers and directors do nothing for 8 years. When markets begin to form officers and directors have done nothing to capture them for 7 years. Using the LNG export market to rehabilitate natural gas prices was possible using the Preliminary Specifications decentralized production model. When officers and directors want to redirect the organization's focus to non-performing and unaccountable industries, it is implemented immediately. Declaration of shales' uncommercial nature is done in complete harmony across the industry and is completed immediately. Officers and directors believe consolidation is their solution, implemented across the industry and accomplished instantly.
Are these leaders who have not dealt with appropriate business development over the past two decades looking for exits to escape the crisis they've created? Through consolidation they wash their hands and escape with no one remembering their names or what they did. We may see officers and directors of other producers quit during the next few months. Exit at the top, or at what appears to be the top. This is the scenario that provides them with the most favorable opportunity, and lets the chips fall where they may.
When I mention the words Preliminary Specification, leadership cringes at the thought of difficult work and facing the music. Officers and directors being acutely focused on the inane cost control of pinching pennies from the service industry. Unaware of the long term damage they did to their critical secondary industry. As trillions of dollars went to waste through chronic overproduction, producers have refused to listen to anyone, including their shareholders, since at least 2015. Which is quickly approaching a decade of ignorance towards the fact they don’t support them.
- An uncapitalized and unmotivated service industry operating at 30% capacity. Used and abused by producer firms for decades, it now needs active philanthropic rehabilitation by the primary industry that needs them. This may involve an incremental cost to producers of hundreds of billions of dollars due to the level of damage incurred.
- Investors who will not support oil & gas producers.
- Deliverability of oil & gas in North America becomes a heightened concern when geopolitical events indicate energy independence is the wise strategy to pursue. Where the inability to deploy appropriate levels of field equipment may cause shale's enhanced decline curve to become an issue.
- Producers' internal work-in-progress inventories have been left to atrophy or actively cannibalized by many producers to survive the protracted nature of both oil & gas commodity price collapses.
- Leadership's continued capitulation of responsibility and exit would be a betrayal of their fiduciary duty. Without this leadership, the industry will not resolve itself. Without any alternative in place before they leave, the industry will languish.
What has become clear to many is that the strategy of “muddle through” will be in place until these retirements are announced. Is industry leadership leaving before 2024? I’ve repeatedly asked what the leadership vision outside of “muddle through” was. We can still ask that question, however we preface it by asking where is the leadership? Either through consolidation or resigning from the producer, these next few months may have some surprises. Officers and directors abdicating their responsibilities to leave the industry at this time is the most irresponsible thing that could happen to the industry. History has also shown that management does this when difficulties become untenable.
When science experiments and industry groupthink overwhelmed producer officers and directors, business was neglected. Besides, everything was profitable, we were told. When constructive criticism and alternatives are ignored only internal discussions were accepted due to “oil & gas being so complicated.” Other business alternatives could be disregarded. This culture is systemic and catastrophic.
In support of People, Ideas & Objects, I suggest that the Preliminary Specification does not have an unconstrained vision. North American oil & gas exploration and production must be treated as a business. The Preliminary Specification recognizes a culture based on the Joint Operating Committee, which is the unique operational method of organization in oil & gas. It also recognizes six other market-supporting institutions in our Organizational Constructs. Defining a culture that allows everyone to intuitively understand the correct and appropriate direction to take in the industry. Profitability is the only objective worth pursuing everywhere and always. In a world without profits, we can clearly see the destruction and damage caused by today's oil & gas producers' officers and directors.