These Are Not the Earnings We're Looking For, Part LX
As the bureaucrats best friend ever, the reality is at times I have to be cruel to be kind, it’s what good friends do. The Exxon and Apache litigations we noted in our March 2, 2021 blog post should precipitate action by each and every bureaucrat at each and every producer. They don’t need to hear the otherwise anonymous knock at their door. By funding the Preliminary Specification they’ll have the ability to tell the Judge they’ve mitigated these issues. Implying that they now understand their error, are aware of the problems that it caused and have implemented the solution to those issues. And therefore can claim “issue mitigated, nothing litigated.” The stark reality of my 2020 review of the producers financial statements is that the momentum and velocity of these issues we’ve been discussing here at People, Ideas & Objects are terminal to the oil and gas industry. There is no other way to describe it other than to say that the industry is not a viable going concern under the current business model. Certainly the recent increases in oil prices have everyone excited, however the performance of the producers will not and can not change, the bureaucrats business model for oil and gas is not based on generating incremental value. It is based partially on the increase in commodity prices to carry the stock price higher. That is how the bureaucrats rely on the oil and gas business to increase in value. There is no other way in which the bureaucrats that are now responsible for the producer can build any value. It is a pure commodity play and you would do as well, or even better by just investing in the commodities markets themselves.
Like so many aspects of the producers performance, things are not as they’re claimed to be. Free cash flow for our sample of producers for 2020 was $2.85 billion. To put that in perspective, these producers maintained property, plant and equipment of $406 billion and annual revenues of $151.6 billion. The argument will be that 2020 was the year of covid and the producers should be cut some slack. And I would respond to that by saying I agree, however, the larger point that I’m making here is that oil and gas in North America is not a viable business in good times or bad, as it should be. Whether there is a reason for the poor performance or not. The reason that it was a bad year is because the producers continued to overproduce oil until such time as the prices turned to negative $40. They then continued to suffer through March and April with prices that were below $20. Why? They had the means within themselves to shut-in production and were indeed being forced to do so. Recall how they claimed up to that point that they could not shut-in oil and gas as it would cause irreparable damage to the formation? I wonder why we don’t hear what the consequences of those damaged formations are today? The fact that there is no damage is not newsworthy. Why did they not take enough oil off the market to continue to rehabilitate the price over the $20 threshold in March and April? There has been an inventory overhang depressing prices for about four decades by my estimate. By the second quarter our sample of producers were reducing 1.467 mm boe / day from their production profile. And why has it been that at the beginning of 2021 did our sample of producers report production volumes that were lower by 944 thousand boe / day over December 31, 2020 when OPEC+ were carrying well over 7 mm boe off the market throughout 2020 and to date in 2021? Saudi Arabia also cut an incremental 1 mm boe / day in late 2020? The fact of the matter is that others were doing more than their fair share to get the price of oil to $48.42 at the 2020s year end. And those of our sample producers were recording losses on North American production of $60.07 billion dollars due to those low oil prices did? It has been a struggle to survive but sometimes less is more.
Based on our sample of producers their fourth quarter performance eked out a small loss of $3.2 billion dollars and achieved a total loss of $60.07 billion for the full year 2020. Granted the majority of the costs of oil and gas exploration and production for our sample was due to the massive write downs they faced. I guess the reserves value isn’t holding up to the prolific and out of control spending machines that we all know and call "producers." Of the $151 billion in annual revenues $101.5 billion was for depletion and impairments. On a straight mathematical basis, at this rate it would take the producers exactly 4 more years to retire the existing balance of $406 billion in property, plant and equipment. However during the past four years the capital expenditures of our sample of producers were $216.5 billion at the end of four years time. And therefore only bringing the property, plant and equipment accounts value down to 53% of today’s value. People, Ideas & Objects have been suggesting that the amount of property, plant and equipment at $406 billion for these 16 producers is obscene. Working capital is at $11.3 billion and we feel that 65% of property, plant and equipment is better redefined as it qualifies in our opinion as the unrecognized capital costs of past production. If that amount of property, plant and equipment was retired the account would need to be $142 billion demanding that a further $74.4 billion of depletion and impairment be recognized in the next 4 fiscal years.
The reason I brought up the woeful working capital balance was to contrast the amount to capital assets. Retiring the amount of property, plant and equipment as a business will see these costs passed onto the consumer and therefore these assets are replaced with cash. This assumes that producers are charging appropriately profitable prices to cover the full cost of oil and gas exploration and production. That assumes these producers get their act together and instill some form of production discipline based on the market. The only method to do so is People, Ideas & Objects Preliminary Specifications decentralized production models price maker strategy. What these bureaucrats have proven time and again is the inability to understand or manage their inventories. With this cash being generated they can begin to manage the business appropriately. Fund the future capital expenditures and the new, incremental costs that we detailed in our New Cost Structures blog series recently. Pay dividends or pay down debts.
Throughout our discussion, has been our belief that the symptom of low oil and gas prices are reflected in these accounting issues and are derived from cultural distortions in the industry. These issues manifest failings over the past four decades therefore destroyed the financial structure of the industry. Over reported asset values have a commensurate amount of over reported profitability, which leads to excessive inflows of investors seeking to gain access to those profits. That creates overinvestment which in turn creates overproduction that has been chronic over these past four decades, or at least 30 of the last 35 that I can personally recall, creating collapsed commodity prices. 2020 is a year in which I think that I can verify this claim in better context. If we look at the People, Ideas & Objects amount of recommended depletion and impairment for the next four years being $101.5 billion plus $18.6 billion (one quarter of the $74.4 billion noted above) for a total of $120.1 billion. Assuming the revenues from oil and gas sales in the current business model will not be substantially higher than what they were, as there is a historical cycle of chronic overproduction that destroys the prices when they begin to recover. Therefore if we take the average over the last 5 years then we get $206 billion in average annual revenues. That would reflect that these producers would be generating only $86.2 in net revenues after the cost of capital. Woefully inadequate and in my opinion reflects the chronic lack of any fundamental business understanding. Of course these producer bureaucrats expect that as soon as the investors return to see that absolutely nothing has changed in their business model, they’ll jump at the opportunity to invest.
These projections reflect that 58.3% of the costs of the average revenues will be the cost of capital. And these costs will continue to be belittled by the bureaucrats as “just accounting” and “those costs are from the past.” I would remind them that the source of that capital was from the investors pocketbook and to expect they’ll return without respecting this point is quite inappropriate. The time frame of five years, 2020 was the first year, to bring these capital costs into a competitive framework is woefully inadequate as far as I’m concerned. These capital investments need to compete in the greater market for capital. How is technology doing these days. That is where many of the bureaucrats might find their former investors. Who are now satisfied and promises based on nothing won’t satisfy that sting of betrayal. “You’re gonna need a bigger oil and gas price.” Chief Brody, said in the movie Jaws. If anything, 2020 proved the inability of the bureaucracy to act in their own best interests when negative $40 and low oil prices throughout 2020 were acceptable, bureaucrats were paid! Yet these producers were well within their means to correct the situation, yet did nothing! With the motivation now to drill to access cash, and do they ever need cash, what will happen in 2022 to 202X? Rinse, repeat.
Producers will claim those assets in property, plant and equipment reflect the reserves value. If that is the case then write them all off as the only thing they’ve proven is that none of their reserves are capable of being produced profitably in their hands for the past four decades and are therefore useless to society. Yes when looking at the perspective of four decades you must consider the capital costs too. At today’s valuation vs what we believe they should be there needs an additional ($406 - $142) $264 billion in depletion has to be realized. My summaries of the quarterlies only goes back to 2016 which show that our sample of producers have lost $38 billion over the course of 2016 - 2020. How many years do we need to go back and find the “reported” profits of ($264 + $38 in losses) $302 billion to make up this difference, or can we? Our sample of producers represent 9.212 mm boe / day in deliverability, what would the amount of unrecognized capital costs of past production for the North American industry be? $1.275 trillion. What I find amusing about that $302 billion in losses is that it’s almost as big as the number of alleged retained earnings, contributed capital and bank debt of $359.8 billion, imagine that! Without investors and bankers this would have never worked! Yet after this record of destruction, an investors strike since in 2015, with no action taken to rectify or even recognize these issues, these bureaucrats expect investors just to cruise on back to be fleeced once more? Bureaucrats day of reckoning has come, here’s a hint it was 2015.
For many years the disproportionate volume of the property, plant and equipment has been the pride and joy of each and every CEO. Parroting “building the balance sheet” and “putting cash in the ground” as their calling. I have been the lone voice in discussing this point and have paid dearly for the consequences of the ideas that I express in the Preliminary Specification. Ideas that are designed to deal with these and other issues of value erosion by the uncaring bureaucracy. It appears to me that here in 2021 I may have acquired many friends. The SEC has picked this issue up and are investigating the asset valuation issue at ExxonMobil. It is believed that they’re also expanding that to include an investigation of all of the shale producers. Subpoenas have been issued. We noted earlier in this post the fact that Exxon and Apache have pending class action lawsuits that are directly on point about the officers and directors actions regarding asset valuation. Not that I went through to count these actions but there seems to be almost 100 of them. And lastly, every producer that has issued their audited annual report at this time has identified the asset valuation and depletion as a Critical Audit Matter (Key Audit Matter in Canada). Will the auditors be able to issue a Critical Audit Matter for the same reasons in 2021? Asking for a friend? Action by the bureaucrats is demanded and necessary for the sole purpose of saving their souls. I’m only glad to be their very good friend and possibly their best friend ever, and able to help by building the Preliminary Specification. The first thing we need from the current and existing officers and directors is for them to fund our budget.
The Preliminary Specification, our user community and service providers provide for a dynamic, innovative, accountable and profitable oil and gas industry with the most profitable means of oil and gas operations, everywhere and always. Setting the foundation for profitable North American energy independence. People, Ideas & Objects have published a white paper “Profitable, North American Energy Independence -- Through the Commercialization of Shale.” that captures the vision of the Preliminary Specification and our actions. Users are welcome to join me here. Together we can begin to meet the future demands for energy. Anyone can contact me at 713-965-6720 in Houston or 587-735-2302 in Calgary, or email me here.