Until Such Time as...
...I can confirm I've been accepted back into the X community without conditions. Ill be cross posting my X posts back to the blog to ensure the community receives the message.
The unfortunate reality for People, Ideas & Objects is even a small financial gain would improve our outlook. This has consequences for producers, as we have no vested interest, responsibility or obligations to them. Software companies like ours face significant disruption. If we don’t adapt now, we squander resources. We’ve fortuitously positioned ourselves to realize this AI future while resolving oil & gas industry’s greatest business challenge. Who’s ready to join us?
...I can confirm I've been accepted back into the X community without conditions. Ill be cross posting my X posts back to the blog to ensure the community receives the message.
Posted by Paul Cox at 5:30 AM 0 comments
Labels: x
The energy sector is once again engaged in the "break even" debate, intensified by declining oil and gas prices and the sustained reality of systemic overproduction. This situation compels producers to justify their operations despite having “restructured” their cost base through consolidation, creating a financially tenuous position. This analysis suggests that reported "break even" figures for Permian Basin oil and gas production may be significantly understated. People, Ideas & Objects are rightly questioning Reported Breakevens
Key Caveats on Producer Claims (ExxonMobil Example):
They assume optimal conditions: full-field development, long laterals, pad drilling, and integrated infrastructure.
Crucially, they exclude sunk acquisition costs, such as the $65 billion paid for Pioneer Natural Resources.
To illustrate the potential understatement, consider a representative $10 million well (drilling, completion, equipping, and takeaway capacity) on a 15,000-foot lateral. While initial production may be high (e.g., 1,100 boe oil and 900 boe gas), steep decline rates (60–70% in the first year, 30–40% in the second) can drop production to approximately 100 boe/d within a few years, without subsequent interventions.
Several key cost exclusions and problematic assumptions lead to an artificially low breakeven point:
Selective Criteria: Breakeven is often structured for payback within the first two years based on selective cost inclusion.
Excluded Operational Costs: Royalties, operating expenses, and corporate overhead are frequently omitted.
Acreage Bias: Calculations are based on premium acreage and may not represent the average shale well.
Associated Gas Valuation: Associated natural gas is valued at the Henry Hub benchmark, which ignores wide regional differentials. When realized prices approach zero or become negative (e.g., sold/disposed of at –$0.25/Mcf), a significant cost is created in terms of breakeven. If $5.00/Mcf is a profitable price the loss will be $4.50 + $0.25 = $4.75 requiring ($4.75/$0.50) 9.5 profitable natural gas volumes to cover the loss. Material downward adjustments in natural gas reserves are not considered in producers breakeven calculations.
Exclusion of Acquisition Costs: Acquisition premiums are not allocated to individual wells. For example, ExxonMobil's Pioneer acquisition premium amounted to approximately $90,210 per daily boe of production at the time. Allocating a proportionate share of this premium to a new well—factoring in its rapid production decline—would drastically increase the effective capital cost.
Recalculated Breakeven Example:
By integrating a proportionate share of the Pioneer acquisition premium ($41.5 million) into the capital cost of the model well, the total breakeven target for capital alone is estimated to be $129.21 per barrel for the total oil volumes produced (estimated ultimate recovery of 386,946 barrels), assuming the monetary value of natural gas production is a wash. This figure is substantially higher than commonly quoted prices. Peer Comparison of Claimed Breakevens (Late-2025)
Peer Comparison of Claimed Breakevens (Late-2025)
ExxonMobil.
Claimed Breakeven (WTI): $30–35 (Best: high-$20s)
Narrative & Edge: "Manufacturing mode shale." Post-Pioneer scale, integrated infrastructure, lowest unit costs.
Strategic Risk: Diminishing returns if development pace outruns geology.
Chevron.
Claimed Breakeven (WTI): $35–40 (Best: low-$30s)
Narrative & Edge: Capital discipline over growth, optimizing for free cash flow. Conservative spacing, lower decline profile.
Strategic Constraint: Smaller Tier-1 inventory relative to Exxon.
ConocoPhillips.
Claimed Breakeven (WTI): $35–40 (Best: low-$30s)
Narrative & Edge: Portfolio optimizer; Permian competes internally with other basins. Strong execution consistency, disciplined reinvestment rate.
Strategic Constraint: Permian is not a strategic centerpiece, limiting scale efficiencies.
Diamondback Energy.
Claimed Breakeven (WTI): $30–35 (Best: high-$20s)
Narrative & Edge: "Pure-play efficiency leader." Best-in-class well execution, short decision cycles.
Strategic Constraint: No downstream integration, higher volatility exposure, capital access sensitivity.
Skeptical Take: All major producers focus their quoted breakevens on "Tier-1" inventory, neglecting the higher costs and diminishing returns from "Tier-2+" acreage exhaustion. While Exxon benefits from scale, pure-play operators like Diamondback often achieve superior economics on a well-by-well basis.
Executive Summary:
Exxon is positioned to have the lowest-cost shale manufacturing system due to scale.
Diamondback is often considered the best operator in terms of pure execution efficiency.
Chevron is focused on capital stewardship and lower corporate risk.
Conoco is the best portfolio allocator, managing the Permian within a diverse portfolio.
Greater transparency and the inclusion of all relevant costs—particularly acquisition costs and realistic associated gas valuation and volumetric adjustments—are essential for a more accurate assessment of shale profitability and sustainability.
In Conclusion:
The consistent failure of producers to address their poor financial performance is striking. People, Ideas & Objects has observed producers, over decades, pivot from one excuse to another, with the only constant being the coordinated delivery of their message.
As we've documented, they have demonstrated an inability to generate profit. Significant losses stemming from a lack of genuine profitability have impacted an industry soon to be crucial in supplying the energy that fuels our progress. This responsibility has been evident, yet deliberately ignored. The officers and directors of these producer firms—the only ones with the authority, resources, and duty to act—have consistently failed to do so.
Consequently, People, Ideas & Objects offers a material value proposition, repeatedly validated by the inaction of producer officers and directors. The established history shows their decade-plus inability to effectively respond to investors. What we see as a positive sign is that the need for change is widely recognized, and the multi-decade adherence to the current status quo is proving fatal to their current administration.
Posted by Paul Cox at 5:30 AM 0 comments
Labels: Value-Proposition
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Labels: Artificial Intelligence
On December 29, 2005 I wrote the following as the first post of this blog.
Hello,I want to invite everyone to this new blog to discuss the role of innovation in oil and gas, a topic that is complex, is being addressed globally, and might possibly be one of the most important corporate issues throughout the business world. That issue being how do we continue to fuel the global economy?The purpose of this blog is going to be threefold,
- discuss the methods of organization of oil and gas firms, and specifically the possibility of replacing the hierarchy or bureaucracy with the industry standard Joint Operating Committee (JOC).
- debate the attributes and elements of innovation in oil and gas.
- explore the impact of today's information technologies, and their role in making energy firms more innovative and accountable.
I would welcome any and all comments from readers and encourage a lively debate through this fascinating new medium of blogging.Thank youPaul CoxPeople, Ideas & Objects
Posted by Paul Cox at 5:30 AM 0 comments
An article on oilprice.com offers a timely snapshot of current sentiment in the Permian. Exxon, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips are now positioning their post-consolidation performance as proof of a new operating model. The passage that drew my attention is noted in my references annotations:
Production climbed 400,000 bpd year-over-year even with WTI dipping below $60. Rig counts fell 15%, yet output still increased. The Permian isn’t following the old rules because its operators aren’t playing the old game.
The narrative is familiar: a shift “from wildcatters to industrialists,” with legacy shale developers displaced by super majors armed with scale, laboratories, and shareholder discipline. The majors highlight lighter proppants, AI-directed laterals, multi-well simultaneous fracs, and steady break evens in the $30–$40 range. Their messaging frames the Permian as a low-cost, long-lived franchise—hardly the conduct of firms preparing for decline.
I remain unconvinced.
Our long-standing critique at People, Ideas & Objects is that the industry continues to confuse technical execution with running a business. The commentary celebrates field-level efficiencies while ignoring the commercial realities that determine whether these operations create economic value. The super majors once dismissed shale as a short-cycle anomaly, then declared it fundamentally uneconomic, and then pivoted to “clean energy transition” narratives. Now they’ve returned with the latest story line as a consolidation strategy. At least for now...
The numbers don’t add up. The article acknowledges that the acquired producers carried roughly $80/boe break evens. These companies were purchased in the public markets—often at premiums of roughly 10%. That implies an entry cost closer to $88/boe. Even allowing for higher volumes, a 400,000 bpd uplift is insufficient to credibly compress break evens to $30–$40. The arithmetic does not reconcile. Yet these claims are presented as though cost structure simply resets upon consolidation.
As we noted recently, break even costs embed losses—un-recovered costs between realized revenues and break-even—back into the reserve base. Under current pricing, this dynamic pushes roughly an additional $30/bbl into the break even cost structure for every incremental barrel produced. Those costs must ultimately be recovered within the life of the reserves to avoid uneconomic outcomes and stranded investment.
Shale amplifies this problem. High initial volumes, steep decline curves, significant drilling and completion costs, and recurring redevelopment requirements compound the accumulation of capital that must be recovered later. Production front-loads the barrels but not the full cost. Remaining reserves then require new capital—new laterals, new fracs, new infrastructure—adding layers of un-recovered costs that linger until the Ceiling Test forces a reckoning. The SEC’s Ceiling Test exists precisely to ensure that booked reserve value does not exceed actual economic value. Its purpose is to strip un-commercial barrels off the balance sheet.
This is why I struggle with the celebratory tone around Permian “industrialization.” Technical gains are real, but they do not override the underlying commercial model. Until the industry manages itself as a business—not merely an engineering challenge—the structural economics will continue to be misrepresented, deferred, or pushed onto an ever-growing reserve base that ultimately cannot support them.
The majors can consolidate operators. They cannot consolidate losses.
Posted by Paul Cox at 11:32 AM 0 comments
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Posted by Paul Cox at 5:30 AM 0 comments
Posted by Paul Cox at 5:30 AM 0 comments
Stabilizing” Commodities 101 - equipment, or those working the poorest land, that are driven out. The most capable farmers on the best land do not have to restrict their production. On the contrary, if the fall in price has been symptomatic of a lower average cost of production, reflected through an increased supply, then the driving out of the marginal farmers on the marginal land enables the good farmers on the good land to expand their production. So there may be, in the long run, no reduction what ever in the output of that commodity. And the product is then produced and sold at a permanently lower price." (Henry Hazlitt, Walter Block, Economics In One Lesson)
Posted by Paul Cox at 5:30 AM 0 comments
“Exxon remains confident of its ability to generate profits … and has increased production to 4.7 million boe/d.”“Remaining confident” is hardly a compelling forward posture. Meanwhile, global overproduction concerns are escalating. Floating storage is rising. Tanker inventories are expanding. The persistent weakness in crude since 2022—despite the temporary $100+ window—underscores a structural imbalance. Yes, the gas-to-oil ratio dropping to ~13:1 is a bright spot, but it hardly offsets the broader fundamentals.
Posted by Paul Cox at 5:30 AM 0 comments
Labels: Earnings