Cost Behaviours, Part I
Stabilizing” Commodities 101 - equipment, or those working the poorest land, that are driven out. The most capable farmers on the best land do not have to restrict their production. On the contrary, if the fall in price has been symptomatic of a lower average cost of production, reflected through an increased supply, then the driving out of the marginal farmers on the marginal land enables the good farmers on the good land to expand their production. So there may be, in the long run, no reduction what ever in the output of that commodity. And the product is then produced and sold at a permanently lower price." (Henry Hazlitt, Walter Block, Economics In One Lesson)
In contrast, startups and midsize operators possess substantial flexibility. Capital-cost behaviors become quasi-variable in several ways. A primary misconception is the industry's current treatment of “breakeven.” Within oil & gas, breakeven is widely misinterpreted as the point of operating profitability. The actual definition is far more rigorous: the cost of property, plant, and equipment associated with a property divided by its proven reserves, which then establishes the per-barrel price required above operating cost to retire the capital invested in finding, developing, and producing those reserves.
Breakeven, properly understood, is the price point at which the producer should shut-in the property. At that point the asset should be transferred to the inventory of innovative work-in-progress to expand reserves, reduce operating costs, enhance productivity, or otherwise improve the economics before returning to production.
Industry behavior demonstrates disregard for this discipline. Firms routinely sell production below breakeven—and even below full operating cost—under the justification that “the market provides what it provides.” This ignores the fact that producers collectively are the dominant force shaping the market.
The question becomes: who actually cares about breakeven? At present, the answer is no one. The perceived inability to drive change has suppressed any strategic response. The Preliminary Specification provides a pathway out of this impasse.
If we assume—strictly for framing—that the cumulative revenue losses this century also approximate $4.7 trillion of natural gas sales below breakeven, the implication is severe. Those losses would be transferred forward into future breakeven calculations, elevating the price required for profitable production to levels that classify producers as the highest-cost operators in the market. Alternatively, these properties become effectively impaired—incapable of ever recovering the capital invested. Production sold below breakeven does not retire capital; it increases the capital burden that must be absorbed by the remaining reserves.
This is why both profit and loss generate cash flow in a capital-intensive industry. Cash flow, in practice, is largely the return of prior investment. In oil & gas this effect is amplified: producers manage cash for up to sixty days on behalf of all Joint Operating Committee participants, and as a primary industry they collect the revenues that ultimately fund the entire service and tertiary ecosystem. If cash is king, this business model elevates producers to another tier altogether.
Yet, for decades producers have required ongoing investor funding simply to meet annual capital-expenditure budgets. This is the long-term result of performance degradation dating back to the 1986 price collapse. The industry was gutted, and the cultural scars remain. The operational mindset became survival—taking whatever price the market delivered, deferring structural change, and continuing as long as cash flow stayed positive.
This raises the central strategic question: is the industry still operating in the same survival mode that emerged after the 1986 crash? After a decade without capital-structure support, no demonstrated capacity for structural change, and a lingering dependence on diminishing cash flow, the evidence suggests an industry unaware of what it must do to sustain itself—let alone generate competitive, market-driven returns.
The underlying issue remains unresolved: producers must recognize their cost structure for what it is, not what they hope it to be. Until then, they will continue to operate on the margins of viability, rationalizing incremental deterioration while believing they look strong—at least to themselves.
Tomorrow we’ll discuss the value of these properties in the hands of those who may be interested in purchasing them. How the acquisition and divestiture market pricing method used in the past remains the method used today. And why startup and midsized producers would be fools to play that game.
