Change, Part VI - Capital
In my view, the core problem causing this damage is a terminal disease. The practice of "building balance sheets" and "putting cash in the ground" has created a lasting legacy and culture that will ultimately be fatal. Performance accounting never stood a chance; the focus has always been, and will remain, on reserves. This pervasive culture was clear to me in the mid-1980s when Imperial Oil (Exxon in Canada) acquired Sulpetro for $750 million, seemingly based on the value of its reserves.
However, the company I remember was never that size and had declared bankruptcy just months prior. What did Exxon believe? That these assets could be rehabilitated and made profitable? Why didn't they devise a better strategy to acquire these assets from the Court at a much lower valuation, one based on their financial performance, which had driven Sulpetro to bankruptcy? Did Exxon not realize these assets were underperforming? While effort and capital could undoubtedly improve their performance, aside from a larger balance sheet, what was truly gained? Are all reserves, regardless of origin, worth the same value?
Therefore, it's crucial to question the basis of asset valuation: is it a) a perceived maximum price based on the worth of X reserves at Y prices, or b) a value derived from the assets' financial performance in capital markets? In oil and gas, option A has historically determined asset prices, with a market quickly forming around Exxon's valuation. This led to a gradual price inflation experienced across the rest of the industry. Consequently, the asset values on the rest of the balance sheet, the capital expenditures, eventually had to keep pace. These higher valuations were then supported by increased reserve volumes, such as shale, and an influx of investor capital.
Shale exaggerates this, expanding assets and earnings unprecedentedly. Producers are suddenly trading in reserve volumes they could never have imagined, driving down the capital cost per barrel of shale and allowing the industry's disease of building balance sheets and reporting even higher earnings to go unchecked. The good times had truly arrived. Shale also brought about a short time horizon where steep decline curves forced producers to seek substantially more money from investors to keep operations running. But if initial revenues weren't recovering the capital cost and generating a return on those assets, how will more investment be recovered? Or does this ever end? Discovering this made investors realize that money only ever goes in the ground. Balance sheets are bloated well out of proportion in property, plant and equipment. People, Ideas & Objects recommend a pro-forma adjustment to move a minimum of 70% of property, plant and equipment to depletion to better reflect the firm's position.
For decades, producers in North American oil and gas were growing and profitable. What was actually happening in the industry was a slow erosion of performance, where simply spending money was profitable. Over time, industry competitiveness plummeted to what may be as low as 30% of what is commercially viable. How can I make such seemingly ludicrous claims? What do producers have after a decade of no support for their capital structures? A prosperous and healthy service industry? Far from it. A viable plan and vision for the future with a motivated, fully staffed workforce for the task ahead? No. A broad and deep financial foundation to leverage and meet tomorrow's challenges?
Today, cash flows can sustain producer organizations, which is only about 10% of what's needed. Producers are primary industry participants and must understand their responsibilities in maintaining the financial health and prosperity of their secondary and tertiary industries. This is urgently needed, and today's cash flows will not suffice. They will not even approach the amount of work required in the industry today. Its arrival, with its speed, velocity, and complexity, is completely inverse to producers' organizational capacities. Accounting, administration, and ERP are not competitive advantages for producers, but we wish them well in their attempts to implement these changes. What I know of oil and gas administration and accounting makes me glad I was ostracized from it for proposing the Preliminary Specification. Producers are frozen solid, incapable of making decisions or pursuing any action or direction. Good luck with their highly acclaimed "muddle through" strategy.
In terms of our current situation, consider what capital markets are offering. Dynamic companies are innovating with business models that yield from previously unrecognized resources. Last week, Elon stated he could use the processing power of parked Teslas as an AI facility, not just today's largest facility of a Gigawatt, but one of twelve Gigawatts. Drilling and producing are old news from a bygone era. No one is interested in the performance of oil and gas, and no one trusts its producers. Not because of what happened 10 years ago, but because of what hasn't happened since.
