The Cost of Inaction, Part III Culpability
Investors voiced their dissatisfaction in 2015, citing concerns over performance and accountability, yet producers have made no changes. In a healthy and profitable industry, profits should easily cover debt, dividends, and capital requirements. While investment is needed, there are multiple capital sources; not every company lines up on Wall Street for more money each year. The primary goal is to make money, and despite efforts to educate oil and gas leadership, they have ignored their investors' message.
The strategy of "waiting out" investor demands for accountability, under the assumption that investors "understood" the industry's decline curves and would eventually be forced to invest, was both sophisticated and dangerously unpredictable. This has led to an unprecedented environment where steep decline curves are experienced, even though prolific shale makes up the majority of the industry's deliverability.
In 1991, I began pursuing the application of Information Technologies to solve business issues in oil and gas. My team and I developed a business plan to raise private capital, and in 1992, we signed a joint development agreement with Oracle. This venture failed in 1997 for reasons I only understood in the 21st century, when both Oracle and IBM exited the industry after failing to attract producer interest in developing ERP systems. What Oracle, IBM, and subsequently People, Ideas & Objects learned is that there is no desire to establish accounting systems that would bring about appropriate levels of accountability in oil and gas. IBM was the last to leave in 2005, leaving only People, Ideas & Objects as potential "new" providers in the ERP market. It was far easier to discredit a startup than a multinational tech firm.
Our conclusion of "designed unaccountability" is supported by the lack of ERP market entrants. SAP had a strong uptake in many of the consolidated producers five years ago. The lack of any issues being resolved proves our argument that they are the bureaucracy. People, Ideas & Objects have faced adversarial treatment for two decades, as documented here. We believe there's more to this. ERP is one aspect of accountability; accounting is the other. Neither has been prioritized in producers' budgets. It's one thing to question why the logic of making money through the Preliminary Specification hasn't been implemented, or why we've failed to follow through for two decades. But why has there been no internal change in either ERP or accounting? Budgets have been slashed to prevent accountability from being determined. And why, after a decade, has no one listened to their investors?
This is not merely a disappointing record. When we consider the $4.7 trillion in natural gas losses, we see that decades of unaccountability and inaction have led to atrophy. Today's expectation is that the business will need to be saved by investors, who are expected to pour in capital despite no changes or improvements in accountability. This is more than we can quantify or qualify, other than deliberately abusive.
Chicken Little began this campaign in October 2023 to highlight and seek solutions for the natural gas revenue losses incurred by North American producers. For almost two years, I was ridiculed for stating such "ridiculous things" while those incurring the losses belittled and ignored the issue. To put this in perspective, these losses should have been the first issue raised and resolved in every boardroom since 2009. Natural gas prices shifting from a 6:1 to a 50:1 ratio with oil is unprecedented. The only visible action was that it provoked boards of directors to silence the messenger—the one with the solution, People, Ideas & Objects.
As we know, shale began the deterioration in natural gas prices in 2009. If producers were aware of the Preliminary Specification as a solution in August 2012, why has there been no change in the accounting and ERP budget to accommodate this? The problem exists, is semi-permanent, and demands action due to its material nature and increasing magnitude. Investors demanded accountability and performance in 2015. After being confronted with the actual, factual $4.7 trillion in losses, only LNG contract litigation and ad hominem attacks followed.
This raises critical questions regarding the industry's resistance to adopting a proposed solution. While a fear of operational change could be a factor, it does not fully account for the sustained financial losses and the unresponsiveness to investor demands. Consequently, the possibility of corporate culpability emerges as a significant consideration in explaining this prolonged inaction. An inaction that has left the industry with a tragic financial consequence it will never recover from.