Friday, August 08, 2025

Hyper-specialization, Artificial Intelligence & Intellectual Property - Podcast #17

 I have some reservations about publishing this podcast, as it fails to fully convey the core argument of the accompanying paper. The central thesis is this: to significantly improve both the productivity and quality of work within the oil and gas industry, we must fundamentally reorganize ourselves around the principles of specialization and division of labor.

This transformation is currently constrained by two primary structural limitations. First, individual producers lack sufficient operational throughput to deconstruct their workflows further without encountering diminishing returns. Achieving material productivity gains would therefore require the aggregation of work across multiple producers, enabling the deployment of hyper-specialized capabilities.

Second, expanding operational processes to their optimal levels introduces overwhelming complexity in terms of coordination and control. Managing the flow of data and information at that scale rapidly exceeds the capacity of conventional organizational structures and human oversight.

The productivity potential of hyper-specialization is not in dispute. Its benefits include exponential improvements in output, precision, and organizational velocity. However, realizing this potential requires a system that can manage such complexity without collapsing under it. Human managers alone are inadequate to fulfill the role of coordinating high-volume, high-speed workflows among hyper-specialized agents.

The Preliminary Specification addresses this challenge through a triadic framework:

  1. Intellectual Property – IP must define and assign the rights to specific work domains. This enables clear delineation of responsibilities and prevents the chaos that would arise from unregulated competition for work.

  2. Contractual Structures – These must bind individuals and firms to their areas of specialization, ensuring accountability and coordination.

  3. Artificial Intelligence – AI systems are required to act as the “traffic cops,” managing throughput, enforcing workflows, and maintaining system-wide coordination among authorized participants.

Without these elements working in concert—IP rights, enforceable contracts, and intelligent automation—we will remain constrained by the limitations of our current organizational structures and be unable to achieve the performance step-change the industry requires. The paper being discussed today is:

Hyper-Specialization in Today’s AI & IP Enabled Workforce: 
Strategic Implications and Operational Consequences 
for the Oil & Gas Sector

Other than these points the podcast is a little rough around the edges but the content is well portrayed. 


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Tuesday, August 05, 2025

Podcast # 16, Innovative Organizational Excellence

 On February 10, 2025, People, Ideas & Objects released the paper titled:

Innovative Organizational Excellence: How Elon Musk and Visionary Leaders Build High Performance Enterprises—Strategies for Emulating Their Success Within Our User Community.


In today’s podcast, there are a few rambling moments at the start—nothing to worry about. Despite this, I’m reluctant to re-record it because, once it gets on track, it delivers valuable insights on what our user community and service providers need to focus on to evolve into the forward-thinking organizations that the oil & gas industry urgently requires.


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Monday, August 04, 2025

Arbitrage Strategy Part VI, Our Value Proposition

In a recent blog post, we discussed OPEC’s revised capital expenditure estimates for global oil and gas, projecting $6.3 trillion needed for North America over the next 25 years. People, Ideas & Objects propose doubling this to $12.6 trillion, factoring in the severe damage to the service industry, reduced producer capacity, and persistent unprofitability. Here, we outline the value proposition of our Preliminary Specification, delivered through People, Ideas & Objects, our user community, and service providers, for North American producers. Our solution generates an additional $5.7 trillion in profits beyond the $12.6 trillion in capital costs, totalling $18.3 trillion in value.

Financing Capital Expenditures

Historically, producers relied heavily on external capital. Our Preliminary Specification introduces a price-maker strategy, providing each Joint Operating Committee with timely, accurate financial reporting compliant with SEC standards (and other frameworks). Capital costs are included in production costs where profitable properties continue operations, rapidly returning capital to producers for reinvestment. We advocate for a 30-month capital turnover to compete in North American capital markets, moving away from outdated goals like “building balance sheets” or “putting cash in the ground.”

Industry Challenges

The industry’s capital demands far exceed available investor or government funds. The only viable solution is earning these funds through profitability. However, a pervasive “muddle through” culture, coupled with decades of prioritizing spending over performance, has reduced industry efficiency to roughly 25% of a profitable operation’s potential. Ignoring investor demands for a decade further highlights a disconnect from the need to establish performance and profitability.

By implementing our Preliminary Specification, North American producers can address these challenges, achieve sustainable profitability, and meet the industry’s immense capital needs.

Addressing Chronic Unprofitability

We’ve long argued that only profitable operations can resolve the industry’s systemic difficulties. Spending investor money without returns is never sustainable. Profitable operations require recognizing all exploration and production costs accurately and ensuring commodity prices cover marginal costs. Currently, consumers cover operating costs, while investors subsidize capital costs—a flawed business model.

Price-Maker Strategy

Our decentralized production model utilizes a price-maker strategy to ensure profitability. This is achieved by generating detailed financial statements for each individual property, allowing for the immediate shut-in of any unprofitable assets. This preserves valuable reserves for future production at higher prices and maximizes overall corporate profits.

Recent industry actions suggest a growing, albeit delayed, appreciation for this approach. For example, ARC Resources recently elected to shut-in approximately 60,000 boe/d of dry gas production, citing unsustainably low prices. As CFO Terry Bibby stated, “We just refuse to waste the resource when we don’t have to wait that long to make a better rate of return.” This decision, prompted by an AECO price of just $0.76/GJ in July, validates the core principle we have advocated for since 2012.

However, such actions are irrational and reactive rather than strategic. The fundamental issue is that without the analytical framework to determine profitability at the property level, producers cannot proactively manage their assets. If the industry adopted this granular approach universally, natural gas prices would stabilize above the marginal cost of production, preventing the catastrophic value destruction seen this century, which has resulted in an estimated $4.7 trillion of lost revenue.

While ARC’s decision is a step in the right direction, it is an extreme measure born of necessity. The scale of the problem, evidenced by a record-high oil-to-gas price ratio of 124:1 in Alberta this July, demands a systemic change. The industry must move beyond intermittent and reactive commitments to a disciplined, data-driven strategy that unlocks the true value of its assets. Only People, Ideas & Objects Preliminary Specification can provide this. 

Two Different Perspectives

The oil and gas industry is at a crossroads, defined by two distinct operational philosophies. The first is the prevailing engineering-centric view, which treats profitability as a technical problem to be solved through innovation at the wellhead. The second is a business-centric model, which posits that profitability is a function of disciplined financial management applied across the entire asset base.

The current engineering-driven approach focuses on adopting new technologies to incrementally increase production. While effective on a micro-level—improving output from a handful of wells—this strategy fails to address the systemic issue of unprofitable production across the continent's ~853,000 wells. Corporate culture often reinforces this narrow view, dismissing comprehensive financial solutions as secondary to technical innovation.

People, Ideas & Objects propose a paradigm shift toward a business-management solution. This involves implementing a system that provides actual, variable overhead and depletion costs for every property on a monthly basis. This granular financial data allows for a clear-eyed analysis of what is truly profitable.

The strategic implication is profound. By identifying and shutting in unprofitable properties, the industry can systematically remove marginal production from the market. This would naturally align commodity prices with the true marginal cost of replacement barrels, benefiting all production and restoring a sustainable business model.

The industry can no longer afford to fund what have effectively become science experiments. With investors withdrawing, capital must be generated internally. The recent admission by Exxon that consolidation has not yielded the expected financial benefits is yet another signal that the industry's traditional strategies are failing. The choice is clear: continue with a limited, well-by-well approach or adopt a comprehensive business framework that ensures the profitability of the entire enterprise. The Preliminary Specification does both. 

A Comment About Production Discipline 

People, Ideas & Objects price-maker strategy establishes the only fair and reasonable method of production discipline in the oil and gas industry. Producers adopting this strategy will maximize profitability and enhance capital market appeal. Details of that value includes:
■ Maximized Profitability: Producers maximize profits when losses from unprofitable properties no longer dilute the gains from profitable ones. It’s common sense to limit one's losses. 
Strategic Reserve Management: Holding reserves until they can be produced profitably means avoiding the incremental costs associated with losses from unprofitable production.
Cost Reduction: Keeping oil & gas as reserves reduces production and storage costs tied to excess, unprofitable output.
Market Stability: Removing unprofitable production allows commodity markets to find the marginal cost, establishing fair prices for all production. Eliminating industries' boom / bust cycle.
Reserves Valuations: Market prices accurately reflect the value of producers petroleum reserves. Expanding the volumes of proven recoverable reserves and fulfilling officers and directors fiduciary duty to safeguard assets.
Innovation Opportunities: While unprofitable properties are shut in, producers can innovatively explore ways to increase production volumes, reduce costs, or expand reserves. To return the property to profitable production.
Replacement Value: The realized market price of oil & gas must reflect the current market’s costs of exploration and development. It is the cost of a replacement volume of energy produced today.
Production Discipline: Using profitability as the criterion for production decisions is the only fair and reasonable method of production discipline.
Innovation as a Foundation: Higher commodity prices finance greater innovative activity.
Effectively Eliminating the Boom / Bust Cycle: Dynamic changes to the producers production profile ensure they remain profitable and are aware when industry overbuilding has begun. 
Consumers will use the Products Price to Make Decisions: Consumer decisions based on price will stabilize the demand side of the market.
This market-driven approach mirrors a healthy economy, where prices guide production and consumption. Critics have falsely accused our price-maker strategy of promoting collusion. In reality, independent decisions based on accurate, property-level financial data—as enabled by our strategy—contrast sharply with the industry’s current practices, which could be seen as collusive.

Industry consolidation concentrates control among fewer players, limiting responsiveness to market signals. For instance, despite calls for increased production, consolidated producers resist expansion. In contrast, the Preliminary Specification fosters an environment where startups and small producers thrive, empowering dynamic, innovative, accountable, and profitable companies to rebuild the industry from the failures of consolidation.

People, Ideas & Objects Preliminary Specification is designed for all producers. Establishing the environment for start up and small producers to be established once again. We are seeking to enable dynamic, innovative, accountable and profitable producers to rebuild the industry from the failed remains of what these consolidated producers created. 

Arbitrage Strategy Update: The Revised Value Proposition 
$18.3 trillion is the amount needed to be raised over the next 25 years. About $800 billion per year for 25 years. In last Monday’s blogpost some of this money was designated as sunk costs, remediating damages the industry has experienced in oil & gas and the service industry. This raised a number of questions with regards to our arbitrage strategy being less opportune than what may have been stated before. I don’t believe that to be the case and for the following reasons, I would identify this as nothing but good news for Arbitrage Strategy investors. 

Our Arbitrage Strategy sees two groups diametrically opposed to one another. Existing oil & gas producers. And those who wish to invest in oil & gas, however are hesitant due to their experience showing a lack of trust and profitability have severed any hope of working together. Oil & gas producer officers and directors seem to be occupying the boardroom more in protest than any fiduciary duty. Believing they are the ones who have built substantial value and are unappreciated. Waiting for the time when the rest of the world catches up with their self perception. A surreal situation is made even more comical with each passing quarter as their financial performance deteriorates further and their artistic interpretation of that performance becomes more abstract and bold. 

The Arbitrage Strategy uses these producers for their inherent strength in the market today, their desperate need for cash. Selling large amounts of properties and reserves as repackaged “non-operated” properties. Investors can reenter the oil & gas industry directly without the influence of the producers management or governance. They’re novated into the Joint Operating Committees and have the past producer to operate them in the field for the short term. In the mid to long term it’s assumed the Preliminary Specification will be available where the administration, accounting, engineering and geological elements of an exploration and production based producer will be in place to manage it for them. 

The benefits of this are many and it first of all gets them back in the game. Animal spirits in the general economy are raging and energy is seen as a critical component to the 4th Industrial Revolution. These investors know the oil & gas business and how to make money in the business. Owning the reserves which they’ll theoretically purchase at the lowest prices ever, they’ll realize any price increases in all of those reserves. And when the prices rise reserves are reclassified from possible or probable to proven as they become commercially viable. Giving the Arbitrage Investors a substantial kick in their investment value. Immediate revenue should cover the operation and if quality is attained, maybe cash flow positive. 

A common misconception regarding the Arbitrage Strategy lies in the perceived risk of acquiring assets during a period of depressed oil and gas prices. However, it is critical to distinguish between market-based valuation and book-based accounting. Arbitrage investors are purchasing properties at prevailing market prices—prices that reflect current conditions and forward expectations. In contrast, producers must reconcile these transactions against their carrying values, which are often inflated by historical capital expenditures now deemed sunk costs.

These sunk costs—though real for the producers—do not translate into transactional value. They are not priced into the sale; they are embedded in the producer’s financial legacy, not the asset’s market worth. As a result, the Arbitrage Strategy effectively transfers the burden of sunk costs back to the producer, while enabling investors to capture the upside unencumbered.

This asymmetry in cost structure produces a unique arbitrage opportunity:
  • Producers require higher commodity prices to justify their sunk cost burden and maintain solvency.
  • Arbitrage investors, by contrast, carry none of those historical liabilities, yet benefit from the same market price realization.
To illustrate: if two producers each deliver one barrel of oil per day to the market—one having invested $100,000 to do so, the other $200,000—the market assigns equal value to both barrels. The market does not reward inefficiency; it clears at price, not at cost.

This is the essence of the Arbitrage Strategy: capturing market-based returns while remaining structurally insulated from legacy inefficiencies.

A Study in Contrasts

Has there ever been a greater contrast between what an industry has to offer? There is the failed, dilapidated and increasingly poorly functioning. Unable to even grasp the most basic of business concepts such as “free on board” or why their investors left? And there is the potential, entering a familiar industry without the baggage or legacy damage conducted by those who chose or pretend not to know better. An industry which is fundamental to our society’s competitive future. Realizing the value of what is possibly the greatest endowment of wealth, shale oil & gas reservoirs. 

It will be drudgery for the officers and directors of existing producers if they don’t begin to change their positions. Will they allow themselves to be dragged grudgingly from one court room to another for the crime of being obstinate. Or will they get with the program and aggressively market their properties, pay down debt and return the rest to shareholders. Or continue to sit there blinking mindlessly at their desks and looking out the window. What will they do?

A clean slate is available for the investors who use the “Arbitrage Strategy.” The same goes for those who work in oil & gas. Our user community and service providers for the accounting and administrative functions of the new industry. And new dynamic, innovative, accountable and profitable oil & gas producers for engineers and geologists. Investors have already shown a willingness to invest on the basis of the arbitrage strategy, Carlyle and Citadel alone have put in $3 billion. What’s old is gone and what we build will never be enough for what will be expected. People need to come and they need to bring ideas by the hundreds, more than they’ve ever thought of. 

Friday, August 01, 2025

Catalysts for Cultural Change - Podcast # 15

 The quality of our podcasts continues to surpass expectations. This week’s two episodes, covering papers we released on January 20, 2025, are particularly aligned in theme and purpose—each highlighting a core leadership role in rebuilding oil and gas through the lens of the Preliminary Specification.

Tuesday’s episode focused on the leadership required from engineers and geologists. Today’s episode shifts to address the expectations of new investors, engineers, and geologists regarding administration and accounting within this reimagined industry framework and needs of the Preliminary Specification. 

Catalysts for Cultural Change: 
The Leadership Role of 
People, Ideas & Objects 
User Community

If there was a flaw in today’s episode, it escaped me. We’re beginning to dial in the right cadence, tone, and format—and the quality of the supporting technology is becoming a real asset.

If these two podcasts don’t motivate you—given the state of the broader U.S. economy and industry—you’re probably close to your retirement date.

This latest paper also outlines our user community’s compensation plan, detailing short-, medium-, and long-term value-generating components: hourly compensation, bonus structures, licensing arrangements, and proprietorship opportunities.

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Thursday, July 31, 2025

Crypto vs. Profitable Production Rights

 It’s unclear whether this development represents a setback for the industry and an opportunity for us—or vice versa. People, Ideas & Objects had structured a prospective revenue model around the concept of Profitable Production Rights. However, with the recent passage of the Clarity Act by the U.S. Congress, that approach has been rendered unviable. The regulatory requirements—specifically, the obligation to release the Preliminary Specification as open source software as a condition for eligibility—are incompatible with our strategic objectives. Additional compliance obligations further compound the impracticality of participation under this framework.

Given that no participants in oil & gas—or in oil & gas ERP, for that matter—are generating financial returns, we find it untenable to suggest we could offer one to external investors under current conditions. People, Ideas & Objects will operate as a commercial enterprise once our software, user community, and supporting service providers are fully deployed. However, the path to that point now lacks a defined funding mechanism. It is evident that our revenue model must be intrinsically tied to oil & gas production itself, which remains the only meaningful source of financial liquidity in the industry.

Open source software remains a strategic conflict area between us and the industry—a dynamic that has persisted for decades. In an industry dominated by a small number of producers, there is a well-established pattern: engage with the project to the point of exhaustion, then appropriate the open source output for their own purposes. Open source may be sustainable in broad-based, consumer-facing software ecosystems; it is categorically unsuitable for a niche, capital-intensive ERP platform in oil & gas.

At present, we have neither a revenue model nor an avenue to acquire the necessary capital. That said, we never received proceeds from Profitable Production Rights, which, in hindsight, may be fortunate. Going forward, the challenge is to identify an alternative strategy—one that aligns with the realities of the industry. We remain firm in our view: the only viable funding source for the development of the Preliminary Specification is the revenue generated from oil & gas production itself.

Tuesday, July 29, 2025

Episode Fourteen: Reconstructing Oil & Gas

Today marks the release of our fourteenth podcast episode. I’m pleased with how the discussion unfolded. Aside from a minor technical glitch at the start and a misstatement referring to “operations” instead of “overhead” being capitalized, we continue to work through the bugs and improve with each episode.

This discussion centers on our January 20, 2025 White Paper:
Reconstructing Oil & Gas: Enabling Engineers and Geologists to be This Century’s Pioneers and Lead the Industry’s Future
The paper was released in anticipation of renewed “animal spirits” following the inauguration of the Trump administration. It outlines how engineers and geologists can take the lead in rebuilding North America’s oil and gas sector.

Following that, we published the Arbitrage Strategy, which sees hedge funds now returning to the industry and investing directly in multibillion-dollar investments in oil & gas properties. These assets will require sustained exploration and production programs—providing a welcome pathway for new startup producers and a long-term capital re-engagement with the industry.

Importantly, these investors have no interest in existing producers. The current operators have demonstrated they neither understand what is required to achieve profitability nor possess the will to do so. Instead, the focus must shift to new entrants—firms with business models that move beyond the drill-and-produce status quo.

Central to enabling this transition is the Preliminary Specification. Investors are solely interested in producers who can remain competitive within North American capital markets. The industry’s current strategic position is untenable. Overcoming these challenges requires a new class of producer—one that is dynamic, innovative, accountable, and profitable.
People, Ideas & Objects, along with our user community and service providers, is designed to provide the accounting and administration for that producer.

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Monday, July 28, 2025

OPEC estimates of Capital Requirement’s

 A revised estimate of capital expenditures necessary to meet global oil & gas demand for the next 25 years has been debated recently. 

The world needs $18.2 trillion ($14.9 allocated to upstream) in new oil and gas investments in the period until 2050 in order to secure a sufficient supply. This is what OPEC warned in the 2025 edition of its World Oil Outlook. Yet the International Energy Agency continues to believe oil demand growth is going to peak before 2030, suggesting there is no such need for investments. Are both talking up their respective book?

In this instance I’ll be taking the optimistic OPEC forecast for demand and base this discussion on that assumption. They also projecting demand to increase in that period of time to:

According to OPEC, global oil demand will reach 123 million barrels daily in 2050. That would be up from a projected 105 million barrels daily this year, per OPEC, or 104.4 million barrels daily per the International Energy Agency. p. 61

One of the reasons for going with the optimistic demand projections is. Energy is the source of economic growth and the means in which we gain our standard of living. The most powerful economy will always be the largest consumer of energy in all its forms. With hundreds of millions more Chinese joining the middle class, this ensures 123 million barrels of oil / day is the better estimate of the two. 

In absolute terms, the global economy is expected to more than double in size, increasing from $171 trillion in 2024 to $358 trillion in 2050 (in 2021 PPP). p. 35

Efficient use of energy will be the means in which most of the incremental economic growth is achieved. This efficiency will need to contrast the decline curve that is ever present in the industry. A decline curve that becomes material in its consequences over the course of 25 years. And a steep decline curve North American producers have subjected North Americans to. Leaving one with the feeling the numbers accuracy at this point may be relatively close. 

To reliably supply markets, against the backdrop of rising demand, as well as to offset natural decline in mature fields, global cumulative investments of $18.2 trillion are required over the 2025–2050 period (all in US$2025). 
The bulk of the required investment, $14.9 trillion, or $574 billion per annum (p.a.) on average, is for the upstream sector. The downstream and midstream sectors require another $2 trillion and $1.3 trillion, respectively. The challenge of meeting these investment requirements is huge, and any shortfall in meeting these needs risks market stability and energy security. p. 161

It appears in the following graph North America is approximately 40% of the total capital expenditures. Making it necessary for producers to raise $6.3 trillion of those funds. And there are other considerations here. Over the course of the next 25 years is a projection of what’s required in an ideal situation. Producers are not making money and are in jeopardy of diminished deliverability due to shale’s dependence coming into play. The service industry's role in meeting the market demand here is nowhere close to meeting expectations. They too have lost all faith, trust and belief in the producer officers and directors.



This reality presents a critical two-fold question, beginning with the state of the service industry. How much additional capital is needed to rehabilitate it? During the COVID-19 pandemic, investors in drilling and service equipment watched as operators cut their assets into scrap metal simply to pay the bills. Producers compounded the damage by extending payment terms to 18 months, leading to a catastrophic loss of capacity. In essence, the producers broke the service industry. They showed no respect for their partners' efforts then and continue to operate with the same mindset today.


Consequently, the prevailing attitude in the service sector is: "They broke it, they can fix it." The sentiment is that producers must have more "skin in the game" before they will show any respect. This leads to our first question: What is the amount of incremental capital needed to rebuild the oil and gas service industry? And if the producers won't provide it, then who will?


The second part of the question is even more challenging: Where does this money come from? It is reasonable to frame this future rebuilding cost as an unrecognized and long-overdue debt that producers owe the service sector. This liability must be added to the significant losses producers are expected to incur in the coming years. Yet, they have no money, and no one is willing to invest in or lend to them. They have consistently failed to generate profit and have ignored their investors' demands for financial discipline for over a decade. It is difficult to decide which is worse: that your investors walked out on you, or that you did nothing about it for ten years.


While it is true that only People, Ideas & Objects have been consistently offering a solution throughout this period, the fundamental issue remains. The source for the trillions of dollars needed appears to be mythical and magical.


In other words, there is a financial hole in this industry as wide and as deep as one can imagine. It can only be filled with money, none of which will be productive in the sense that an investor in either oil and gas or the service industry would be entitled to earn a return. Who, then, will pay the freight on filling this hole, and what is its true size?


Consider that since 2007, the North American natural gas sector has lost $4.6 trillion in potential revenue. The officers and directors of producer firms allowed natural gas prices to collapse from their traditional 6:1 heating-value equivalency with oil to ratios as low as 50:1 in 2024. On what planet is such value destruction acceptable? Is this staggering loss part of the financial hole we just discussed, or is it merely the icing on the cake? I believe it is the icing, the ice cream, and the cake itself.


Given this context, perhaps we should double OPEC's capital requirement estimate for North American oil and gas. To meet the challenges of the next 25 years, it is more likely that $12.6 trillion will be needed, not $6.3 trillion. Someone should ask the industry's officers and directors what they think the number should be. And as a follow-up, ask them precisely where they plan to get that money. After ignoring everyone's advice for the better part of a decade, it is only fair to assume they must have a brilliant plan in place.

Friday, July 25, 2025

Podcast # 13, Our Preliminary Specification Executive Summary

 Another podcast to summarize and inform. Still a few bugs to work out but nothing major standing in our way. 

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Number 13

Our Index of Podcasts 

Wednesday, July 23, 2025

Blinded by Science: The Business Cost of Oil & Gas Orthodoxy

McKinsey & Company’s recent article, “Shale’s Bold New Era: What it Means and How to Succeed,” marks a return to their traditional playbook—analyzing companies, profitability, and industry fundamentals. Their foray back into oil and gas business analysis, stepping away for a moment from climate, clean energy, and DEI discourses, is a notable shift, but their grasp appears unsteady. While McKinsey may find its footing again over time, this piece doesn’t demonstrate the acuity or originality the sector needs. At People, Ideas & Objects, we’ve never wavered in our commitment to profitability and its systemic absence in oil and gas, nor lost focus on the solutions required to restore it.

What emerges from McKinsey’s approach, however, isn’t a rigorous business critique—it’s the perspective of oil and gas engineers and geologists, who serve as the industry’s key decision-makers. Their worldview, dominated by technical and scientific priorities, discounts—or outright dismisses—the business disciplines of accounting, administration, and organizational design as secondary, even parasitic. In their minds, only technical expertise creates value, and the industry has been steered by their pursuit of technical (rather than commercial) objectives for decades.


This mindset has endowed the industry with a strange duality: a mystical faith in science as the ultimate value-driver, paired with a stubborn detachment from business realities. The sector functions less as a business than as a perpetual science fair, ever seeking the next technological breakthrough, even as commercial sustainability and profitability deteriorate. For decades, “advancing the science” has resulted in shrinking resources and missed opportunities—especially as actual profits have dried up, and the industry’s ability to conduct meaningful experimentation has dwindled. The notion that science alone will deliver returns has left the entire sector diminished and ill-equipped for today’s competitive landscape.


McKinsey’s article unintentionally captures this internal culture of exclusion and defensiveness. Their language is revealing: “there will be no silver bullet for organizational redesign in the new era,” and success will come only to operators “who understand the value centers of their portfolio and build organizations to deliver efficiency at scale.” These value centers, they say, range from field development to commercial operations, each requiring specific capabilities—a vision that, ironically, ignores how effective software, disintermediation, and modern business models are reshaping industries everywhere else.


In adopting this scientific worldview, McKinsey aligns itself with those inside the sector who are hostile to change—especially anything challenging the traditional roles and hierarchies. Disintermediation and new models based on efficiency and accountability don’t fit their script. A prime example: the mishandling of LNG contracts, where most export deals were set at domestic Henry Hub prices ($2.50), while buyers resold the gas at up to $50 in foreign markets. This colossal misstep, worth hundreds of billions, exposes the absence of business acumen at the executive level, yet the response is to seek greater “control over market paths” and blame midstream operators—whose role is merely to deliver product, not negotiate prices. Decades of unexplored value (with LNG contracts lasting years into the future) cannot be blamed on midstream; the problem traces directly to strategic failures at the top.


The real cost? Roughly $4.7 trillion in lost natural gas revenues in North America from 2009 to 2024, the result of a leadership class determined to treat business disciplines as expendable and accounting as irrelevant. Budgets for administration and effective ERP systems could have sustained investment, innovation, and dividends—yet starved, these “non-technical” functions were regarded as unnecessary. Reserve reports—rather than real-time business data—became the governing metric.


In truth, sustaining the business would have preserved value and prevented the collapse of natural gas pricing ratios from a 6:1 to 50:1 oil-gas equivalence. On a true comparative basis, North American gas volumes should have generated nearly $6.9 trillion leaving $2.3 trillion of actual natural gas revenues realized. Which is proof in a way that all the value is generated by engineers and geologists. 


People, Ideas & Objects exist to correct these structural failures—to place business, not just science, at the heart of the industry’s value creation. Until that happens, these businesses losses, not opportunity cost—in profit, innovation, and long-term sustainability—will remain staggering.

Tuesday, July 22, 2025

Partnership Accounting, Podcast # 12

Our Partnership Accounting module is an essential complement to the Accounting Voucher module, specifically addressing the complexities introduced when People, Ideas & Objects uses the Joint Operating Committee as the key organizational construct. Nothing in the producer firm is unchanged when we make this change.

I’m finding these podcasts valuable for the initial introduction to our content. Opening a window as to what, how and why the Preliminary Specification is different. And a comprehensive summary for those who already have a good grasp of our product. 

I’ve once again included the url for the Accounting Voucher module and Podcast Index. 

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