Arbitrage Strategy, Part V, Conclusion
In our April 7, 2025 paper, “Oil & Gas Arbitrage: The Market Finds a Way,” and throughout this series, we pose critical questions about the oil and gas industry’s trajectory. Can the current leadership address its financial, operational, and political challenges? Is the Preliminary Specification the essential first step to organizing a resolution? How much time remains before control slips away—or has that already begun?
The consequences are stark:
- Bloated assets that are worth little or negative value as they demand cash to produce.
- Bloated assets represent a dollar for dollar equivalent in bloated profitability.
- Are also represented today in shareholders equity that in almost all cases would be negative if asset values were appropriately restated.
- Therefore leaving producers with debt that is leveraged in logarithmic measures.
- Decades of structural working capital deficiencies, and poorly performing cash flow metrics incapable of maintaining basic business operations.
- Assets that are incapable of performing competitively to generate adequate free cashflow and profit.
- Leading to declining productivity as admitted in Saturday’s May 17, 2025 WSJ.
- Producers blame their investors' demands for dividends.
- Unaware that profitable operations provide a producer with independence and control of their direction.
- Severely deprecated and diminished industrial capacity in its secondary industries. Actively pursuing business opportunities outside of North America and in other industries.
- Investors and bankers abandoned the producer's capital structures a decade ago due to their lack of understanding why profits are necessary.
- Which is worse, having investors abandon the producers for cause, or producers doing nothing about investor concerns for over a decade.
- Acceptance or action by officers and directors to resolve the issue directly. Involves their admission of responsibility and culpability.
Officers and Directors Trajectory
The oil and gas industry’s dysfunction is deeply cultural and systemic. We can either attempt to reform this broken culture or reject it entirely, rebuilding with the vision of People, Ideas & Objects’ Preliminary Specification. Engaging with the current culture ensures its survival, fueled by higher commodity prices that only amplify its excesses and rewards the entitled. This business model is obsolete, has utterly failed, and will continue to fail—believing otherwise is delusional.As investors demanded change in 2015, they must now lead the industry’s reconstruction through our Arbitrage Strategy. This is a daunting task, with asset values tied to the present value of projected reserves, as determined by reservoir engineers’ industry cost averages, not historical company figures. Producers’ scientists rely on these valuations to prop up balance sheet asset values, but these assets underperform and require significant revaluation to reflect their true worth. Cash-strapped producers are beginning what may become a broader liquidation, where real asset prices will emerge. See here.
Investors, skilled at profiting from such opportunities, face assets with undefined management and operational frameworks. The Preliminary Specification is the only viable solution, but it requires funding for development. Given the oil and gas ERP market’s historical challenges, I am not issuing equity or debt, as I cannot deliver the Preliminary Specification profitably to shareholders. Our value proposition benefits producers, and if they deem it undesirable, I accept that. However, funding for development must ultimately come from oil and gas production in some form.
Replacement Value of the Incremental Barrel
What must dictate the price of oil & gas commodities is the high costs needed to bring the incremental barrel of oil equivalent to the market. North American producers have the highest cost production and fill the role of swing producers. Any legacy property with the ability to bring about lower cost production will benefit profitably until such time as that production has exhausted itself. Nonetheless the producers are faced with the high cost of exploring and developing oil & gas production and that replacement cost is the real cost of oil & gas on that market.Where else is it expected that producers will be able to acquire the financial resources necessary to sustain their production profile if the appropriate “replacement cost profits” are not derived from current production. If they’re relegated to maintaining a utility styled return on the properties investment, in an industry with an inherent steep cost inflation, investors will forever be at the behest of producers looking for further capital spending.
An inherent characteristic of the economic “price maker” is that they’ll only bring on new production that’s profitable. What has happened in the process of dividing the producer in two, as our overall hypothesis suggests. Where exploration and production are handled by scientists. And the business is operated with regard to corporate accounting, tax and regulatory requirements by accounting. Two disparate worlds where neither is fully aware of the other's value. As a result, what has driven the interest, vision and direction of the industry since the early 1990s. Has been the pursuit of science in terms of what is the most interesting and fascinating science to be involved in. For example, conventional production has withered to small percentages of the production profile. In natural gas it’s at 21% of the total US production. Despite its cost and deliverability being far more profitable than shale. “Business” is a foreign concept to oil & gas producers, officers and directors.
What we’ve also seen throughout the past three decades is characteristic of the Keystone Kops. Industry testing unproved hypotheses only to abandon them to the next great thing. SAGD, heavy oil, unconventional until the declaration that shale will never be commercial and clean energy is the future, to a 180 degree return to shale. And as of last Saturday's WSJ, peak shale is here. Never taking a moment to consider what could be done to iterate and innovate through various means and methods to make these areas profitable.
This on top of poorly considered talking points such as drill baby drill when they knew they’ve all but destroyed the service industry. And when the U.S. president opens the door for them they say that’s not really what they want. It certainly is not the leadership anyone would want, but it’s the leadership we have. They’ve proven incapable of anything but lies and excuses. And make no effort to change their ways.
Conclusion
People, Ideas & Objects propose this Arbitrage Strategy to shift oil and gas from its stagnant “muddle through” culture to a dynamic, innovative, accountable, and profitable one, guided by the vision of our Preliminary Specification.As Milton Friedman noted:
Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.Or Henry Kissinger
By the time the threat can no longer be denied or minimized, the scope for action will have constricted or the cost of confronting the problem may have grown exorbitant. Misuse time, and limits will begin to impose themselves. Even the best of the remaining choices will be complex to execute, with reduced rewards for success and graver risks in failure. (Henry Kissinger, Leadership)People, Ideas & Objects believe North American oil and gas is 80–85% of the way to an existential economic, operational and political crisis. Waiting for it to fully unfold risks catastrophe beyond our current imagination.
The culprits—producer officers and directors—are paralyzed by their culpability and predictable inaction. Their failure has pushed the industry, including its secondary and tertiary sectors, to the brink, necessitating urgent rehabilitation of capacities and capabilities and overall industry rebuilding.
Our Preliminary Specification offers a vision for rebuilding the industry around reserves preservation, performance, and profitability, ensuring producers achieve the most dynamic, innovative, accountable and profitable operations. Time for debating alternatives has run out. We’ve laid out a framework where every individual and industry organization can contribute to this rebuilding process.
Delaying action by even six months risks irreparable damage. Consolidation won’t solve this, and trust in current leadership has eroded to the point where there’s no longer any expectations of current officers and directors. A “remove and replace” approach, aligned with the Preliminary Specification, must begin immediately—reconciling with the existing culture would be futile.
Success in averting this crisis depends on everyone finding a role in our vision of a rebuilt industry and acting now to build that. If our funding is secured but others remain passive, expecting People, Ideas & Objects to single-handedly deliver, failure is certain. Starting later, amid chaos, will also make rebuilding more difficult. Our funding decisions must be made within six months. If actions are delayed due to a continued lack of urgency, I fear we’ll lose focus when people are consumed by industry related firefighting.