"That Jarring Gong," Part VIII
When OPEC, as announced, returns 2 million BOE/day to the market in 2025, the potential losses for North America could be substantial if they do not compensate for this increased production. We can make some assumptions based on the recent behavior of natural gas prices. In the short term, producers' alleged voluntary production cuts totaling approximately 5% led to a 91% price increase. This raises the question: will officers and directors aim for a new low in oil prices, perhaps even below the negative $37 record? We also have this century's record of overproduction of natural gas and the $4.1 trillion revenue loss we documented in late 2023. Matching that may be a worthwhile target.
North American producers are high-cost, swing producers, with the obligation to ensure "real" profitability in their oil & gas production. In contrast, the Middle East's conventional reserves benefit from much lower capital costs and significantly higher daily well productivity. Their investments are profitable based on vastly different economics compared to North America. Middle Eastern conventional fields can sustain high production levels for decades, exemplified by Saudi Arabia's Ghawar field, which has been the world's largest since 1948 and whose capital costs were retired long ago. Meanwhile, North American producers face substantial capital costs that are yet to be expended.
Before any forward progress can be made, accountability for past actions and the industry's failures must be addressed. People, Ideas & Objects foresee a convergence of several aggravating factors making the conflicts and contradictions in 2025 difficult for the "muddle through" crowd to manage.
2025
Replacement Costs
As with natural gas production, People, Ideas & Objects contend that the replacement cost of each barrel of oil in North America is around $150. Consequently, natural gas, on a 6-to-1 basis, should command a price of $25. These figures are what I derived from the financial statements of the producers; I didn’t spend the money. It has always been our claim that oil and gas have been unprofitable. Comparing these replacement cost values to their selling prices clearly illustrates the industry's destitute state today. These are the replacement cost values that we believe oil and gas should sell for. They represent the costs for oil and gas sold today, which must generate the financial resources to replace the commodity. This is the minimum necessary in my opinion, as it doesn’t contribute to the expansion of reserves, only replacement. It will cover the costs of exploration and production, but not discovery.
The State of Affairs
What condition is the North American oil and gas industry in? It could be that it's in the eye of the beholder. In my view, it’s in absolute shambles. I don't think any other industry has managed to carry itself this far without being forced to take radical, remedial action and rebuild itself. It being one of the most capital-intensive industries in the business world, it therefore generates ample cash flow to continue basic operations. Fumes have fueled the service industry and suppliers. Producers, as a primary industry, have played every game on those honest, hardworking people who were subject to their mischief.
There used to be a willing supply of investors who believed the financial statements that producers were issuing. Financial statements that, for all intents and purposes, have not changed in any form or fashion since investors realized they were being deceived in 2015 and suspended all further equity investments. "Muddle through" has not been able to remedy the shortfall in terms of what investors brought to the table and to keep the appearance of prosperity continuing. The best example and most dire consequence of this “muddle through” approach is the impact on the service industry.
Who Needs the Service Industry?
Field operational capacity has plummeted to 30% of what was available before 2015. There was a brief resurgence, pushing capacity to 50% between 2017 and 2020. This was when producers discovered the true meaning of accounts payable, and the service industry worked for free. Not paying bills for 18 months is not standard business practice, but that’s what North American producers did. Then COVID-19 hit, exacerbating the situation and leaving the service industry in desperate need of help. Unwilling to part with any primary revenues they controlled, producers abandoned the service industry to fend for themselves. Cutting up equipment for scrap metal and selling horsepower to other industries became necessary, though unprofitable. Service industry investors watched in amazement as producers failed to realize the long-term consequences of their actions. Producers fooled the investors in the service industry for sure. I wonder how they'll fool them next time?
Nothing has been done to mitigate the damage from investors walking away from supporting the industry. Nothing has been done to mitigate the damage to the service industry. Oil and gas producers remain insulated and isolated from immediate cash needs. However, the second half of 2024 reveals a troubling trend in the oil and gas industry: capitulation is running through the service industry. The writing on the wall has the distinct producer grammar, font, and writing style. This history since 2015, when new investor dollars to oil and gas producers were cut off, shows that producers passed down this burden to the service industry. Let's call that the service industry's short and mid-term history. Producers' long-term history reflects a boom and bust mentality that detrimentally affects the service industry.
The capitulation within the service industry is evident. It's not about the loss of the capital structure of service firms, which were damaged beyond recognition post-2020. The capitulation I’m seeing is that the industry has never been truly prosperous for operators. Any money made in good years is quickly eroded during bust years. The capitulation I’m seeing is of the going concern.
The producers' solution to the problem of the day: consolidation is causing the concern I believe. The number of customers, in terms of oil and gas producers in your geographical area, is dwindling. A 300-mile drive in every direction may contain only ten producers, soon to be fewer. Dealing with producers who knew everything about your billing practices and doled out work on the basis of throwing bits of food to the hungriest competitors was already difficult. Now, there'll be markedly fewer producers. One supplier will gain the business of the consolidator, while another loses it. The culture of treating service industry providers as "greedy and lazy," only taking a producer's cash, reflects a lack of business knowledge regarding "free on board," "building balance sheets," and "putting cash in the ground." This foolishness stems from a culture beginning in the seventies that hasn't accepted a single challenging argument. You reap what you sow, gentlemen. Repeated warnings of this day’s arrival if action was not taken. And now in 2024, actions are being taken by others.
The Endowment of Shale
There is no question that shale is the abundant energy source needed to drive the economic and political needs of the 21st century for North America. However, many issues are associated with this new resource. As with all oil and gas, the easy and least expensive reserves are gone. What remains will require more effort and ingenuity with each incremental barrel. In a rapidly increasing cost environment, wouldn't it be prudent to have good control and understanding of how and where real profitability is earned? The innovation and drive leaving the service industry is, therefore, a tragedy of unique proportions. But I repeat myself.
The production and reserves are prolific, but the decline in deliverability is quick and unforgiving in shale, measured in months, not decades. Measured on a logarithmic scale, they point straight down when they turn. It's not an overall reserves issue of concern; there are ample petroleum reserves remaining to be sourced. However, it demands the same volume of capital that was used to complete the first wells. Whether you extend and frac the lateral, drill and frac a new one, or simply re-frac the old lateral at different positions, each of these operations costs millions of dollars and will expose as much production as the initial drilling did, for the same period of time. The issue is that the service industry and the necessary capital are not as they were. With capacity at 30%, any guess is probably appropriate regarding the quality of their capabilities.
If, as claimed by OPEC and proven in last year's calculations by People, Ideas & Objects, there were $4.1 trillion in natural gas revenue losses, oil production may face additional short-term overproduction of both commodities throughout 2025. Prices may be severely affected on the downside, further eroding the service industry due to lost time and declining revenues of producers from both volume and price declines. Stating this shows it's a fundamental principle in business that a firm would do what is necessary not to experience price and production volume decline concurrently. At the hands of producer officers and directors, this 2025 prediction seems accurate and therefore futile.
What the service industry realized in the immediate post-COVID period, when producers were not paying their bills, was not only the cutting up of equipment or selling of horsepower but also the loss of labor needed to drill a lateral for a shale well. These workers left to find steady employment in other industries, where they are probably now firmly entrenched. How they come back to an industry with less equipment, investors burnt by producers, and the capitulation of the brain trust and entrepreneurial drive remains uncertain. Excuses, blaming, and the creative generation of scapegoats by officers and directors should be seen as cause and effect.
If you read the Preliminary Specification completed in August 2012, it details my concerns for the industry if chronic oil and gas overproduction continued. The discussion centered around the fact that these commodities are price makers, not price takers, as officers and directors assumed. It clearly indicated that overproduction was causing prices to fall below the marginal price. If producer officers and directors had been open to criticism and had not ostracized me from the industry, this could have been effectively avoided. In retrospect, it's obvious that these are general business principles beyond their comprehension.
The Post-it note, pen, telephone, receptionist's time, and receptions square footage are all capital items found in property, plant, and equipment in every oil and gas producer. My offer still stands: if any producer wants to refute my claims, I’ll conduct an audit of their overhead costs to determine the truth, and I'll do the audit for free. Hardly anything is capital in oil and gas. PennWest is no longer a firm because when the SEC investigated, they found it was capitalizing operating costs. Such is the passion for avoiding any cost ever hitting the income statement.
Overstated assets generate equal amounts of overstated profitability. Overstated profitability draws in overinvestment from investors looking to capture those profits, leading to overbuilding the productive capacity of the industry which results in overproduction, which is fatal to pricing in a price-maker product. These arguments precipitated my drive to begin this journey back in 1991. Sparked by a Calgary Herald newspaper article that I can't reproduce due to copyright. On page 33 of the July 26, 1986 issue, there are two related articles: "OPEC Minister Can See Economic Destruction" and "Return to Glory Days Unlikely." These articles responded to the initial overproduction-induced oil price collapse from $30 to $10. The issue was known and understood globally at that time. The consequences were well-documented, and the long-term economic destruction was predicted. It’s 2024, and after a valiant effort by investors to defy gravity and keep the industry afloat, what has been made of North American oil & gas.
Conclusion
2025 may be the year when officers and directors begin to realize the damage they've done. They'll need to formulate new viable scapegoats for themselves and find a way to cover their exit out the back. This has gone on too long and the damage will soon take on a permanence that will roll over our economic and political performance. It was unnecessary and will be unnecessary tomorrow.