This One's Nuclear
In 2009 natural gas prices in North America began to change on a barrel of oil equivalent (BOE) basis. Switching from its traditional “heating value equivalent” of six units to one barrel of oil pricing. Until January 2023 this restructured price varied between the high teens and low twenties in terms of oil prices. A 300 to 400% increase in natural gas price factors realized before 2009. Representing a fundamental breakdown in natural gas pricing in North America, and only in North America. In August 2012 People, Ideas & Objects published our Preliminary Specification. Included within that was our decentralized production models price maker strategy. This would help to restore the natural gas market back to a six to one heating value basis. And to suggest that oil prices since 2009 have been spectacular as to what caused the factor to expand would be incorrect. No one has earned real profitability in North American oil and gas markets. Particularly considering the high costs of shale development. A fact that even oil & gas producers' officers and directors agreed upon when justifying their excursions to the clean energy frontier. Stating “shale will never be commercial” etc.
During this time, LNG is being developed in the Gulf of Mexico, Australia and Qatar. This has done little to move continental natural gas prices in North America to global natural gas prices. January 2023 notes that natural gas prices have further deteriorated in North America. This is evidently as strong as in 2009. Pricing appears to have moved down further into the high twenties to low thirties per barrel of oil equivalent.
In 2021 and 2022, we were provided with viable scapegoats from these officers and directors that small producers were overproducing to pay their interest costs. Therefore they had to consolidate their operations to deal with the issue. The result of consolidation appears to show that the smaller producers, as reasonably assumed, were not responsible for the further breakdown in prices. Were there other unidentified issues consolidation did not address? I will continue with my systemic chronic overproduction theory. Producers that know better due to the publication of the Preliminary Specification yet appear mentally constrained by their “muddle through” strategy.
There is an obstinence and perseverance in the officers and directors class of North American oil & gas producers. The destruction of natural gas prices has been ongoing for 14 years, and the value that's been destroyed has been tragic. Rough calculations between 2009 and 2023 show trillions of dollars wasted. Wasted is the appropriate word to describe the actions of the officers and directors since they had every opportunity to deal with the issue. No one in the industry would disagree with this analysis. It is obvious and in plain sight everywhere you look. The officers and directors' only comment is that they've "muddled through” and will continue today.
In their defense producers will assert that natural gas is a by-product of oil production. The Permian is a field with significant associated gas volumes. This is typical of the “muddle through” strategy in which any viable scapegoat will suffice to prevent further thinking or action on any of their issues. Issues are not challenges. They only generate excuses to avoid action. What is clearly evident is that no thought has been put into this issue's resolution. LNG has expanded the export market however, Australia and Qatar are also leaders in this area and have no shale gas. Acceptance through “muddle through” has seen the United States produce 259.83 TCF of shale gas between September 2009 and September 2023. Canada's shale and conventional production numbers for the same period were 80.64 TCF. This is for a total of 340.47 TCF of gas volumes during the restructured pricing period. This does not include U.S. conventional natural gas volumes.
The severity of the pricing differential's tragic consequences is evident in September 2023. EIA reports prices for September 18, 2023. At Henry Hub prices were $2.77 (32 to 1 unit of oil), East Asian prices were $14.63 (6 to 1 unit of oil), Netherlands $12.61 (7 to 1 unit of oil). Observe how foreign countries have maintained the traditional heating value of natural gas prices. Assume that North American natural gas production does not have a differential between Henry Hub and East Asian prices. What would the value of natural gas produced in this period be? Interested parties could calculate the difference. The answer is in the mid single digit trillions of dollars. I cannot grasp the scope and scale of the destruction caused. 262 TCF shale gas volumes have been produced in the United States. Remaining reserves are estimated at 625 TCF. Would this be considered a wasteful use of an irreplaceable resource? Or am I mistaken in thinking this is a business?
History has some interesting lessons regarding oil & gas development in this past century. The following are quotations from Professor Richard Langlois' recent book “The Corporation and the Twentieth Century, The History of American Business Enterprise.”
Professor Langlois is correct in this assertion. I would add that the inefficiency of the hierarchy during the 20th century was offset by the tremendous mechanical leverage experienced first by coal, and later by oil & gas. Without that leverage would the hierarchy have been able to destroy market-based systems? With the decreasing trajectory of energy leverage, due to the time and effort over the past century to explore its full value, has this laid bare the hierarchy's inability to perform?
I often wonder how those oilfield pictures came about. Where wells were literally stacked upon one another. If someone was producing, you just moved a few feet next to them and started drilling yourself. That was how the industry started.
And
Overproduction and collapsed commodity prices are inherent parts of industries' culture and heritage. Historically attempts to deal with overproduction have failed in every way. And it is assumed to be an unresolvable problem. However, what is clear is the connection between overproduction and collapsed prices. There is a culture today that suggests the “market” will somehow magically deal with any production a producer produces. Unaware that prices are the only information markets provide to market participants, and that producers are market participants. The price taker mindset is what oil & gas producers operate under. The Preliminary Specification institutes production discipline based on price-maker characteristics. Only when prices are high enough to generate “real” profitable production will incremental production be added to supply. This production discipline is further supported by the capital markets' lack of support for any producer not maximizing profitability. If a producer wants to continue producing unprofitably, they’ll have no support for their capital structure. Investors tell producers' officers and directors this today. And it is reasonable to imply that a “real” profitable operation will provide an officer and director with all the financial resources they could dream of. Yet they continue to ignore reality through their chorus of “muddle through.”
When a fundamental change occurs in the underlying oil & gas business. With the shift from conventional to unconventional drilling, oil & gas is moving from scarcity to abundance. To one of higher costs, massive reserves exposure, high deliverability and steep decline curves. There is a change that needs to be addressed in the business as a result of such a significant, dynamic change. Unaddressed, the business could suffer consequences that could eventually lead to larger problems. The Preliminary Specification was published in August 2012. Three years after the decline in natural gas prices due to overproduction and three years before the same issue became prevalent in oil.
Australia, Qatar and the United States are 1, 2 and 3 in LNG export leaders. The United States leads. Australia was the first to expand its LNG capabilities to deliver gas to Asian customers. Due to some massive conventional natural gas discoveries prior to the shale era in North America. 75% of their production is conventional. I am unaware of what percentage of their natural gas production is associated gas. However, I would not expect it to be materially different from the United States. It is interesting to note that Australian producers realize the netback price on LNG exports. And there is a regulated price on the domestic market that is approximately 60% of the export price.
To describe this next issue I’ll mix the maritime term of Free on Board (FOB) and the common oil & gas term of netback pricing. Netback pricing is used in the U.S. for most gas sales based on the Henry Hub sales price. Any production in the country is therefore priced according to what it costs to get that gas to that port. Transport costs etc. are deducted from the Henry Hub price to determine the local production price. This is not a hard and fast rule as contracts are subject to negotiation. Maritime Free on Board indicates the seller is responsible for shipping costs and title transfers to the customer at the destination port. In an LNG shipment situation a natural gas producer in the United States shipping gas to an Asian customer would realize the Asian price noted above of $14.63 and incur the costs of refrigeration and shipping the LNG (approximately $5 - $6 / MCF). Although $8 to $9 does not seem significant, the Asian price has been as high as $55 in the past year.
What’s behind “muddle through?" Is it cultural laziness, or as we’ve seen in every corner of our lives today outright corruption? You have a situation that has been evident since 2009. A solution since 2012. Many trillions of dollars in waste and lost commerce. A destroyed oil & gas business with no support for the capital structure and a service industry that doesn't trust producers. You have an eerily parallel business environment in Australia where producers realize the netback price of their Asian sales prices. And by regulation, they must sell domestically at a discount to the LNG export price. You have convenient excuses, blaming and viable scapegoats being tossed about in full harmony every time questions are asked. None of these hold up under scrutiny and are replaced by equally faulty and absurd talking points. What actions over this period could we point to to determine the source of this issue? My argument is, if Henry Hub was receiving $2.77 and Asia was paying $14.63, where is this money? There is no reason for North American producers to not have received it.
Losing your shareholders' trust and faith in 2015 would have been terminal for any business if not for oil & gas's capital intensive nature. What we have seen instead is the officers and directors' stern denial of any and all requests for remedial actions. Accounting shenanigans and other issues of the past are only enhanced by their lack of transparency, accountability and unacceptability. Producers record most of their costs outside of royalties and operations as capital. Inflating the balance sheet has the same effect on earnings when overcapitalization leads to over reported earnings. Then over reported earnings attract more investors and overinvestment occurs, leading to overproduction. This has carried on for more than four decades and extinguished all the value that was built in the industry before and invested subsequently. I have suggested that their poor accounting is supported by ERP systems that officers and directors have placed on starvation and second hand shoestring diets. Where no development has been made in decades, and the reason for the shrill response to People, Ideas & Objects.
The one action I think we can point to of the officers and directors in the past years that identifies exactly what it was that motivated the “muddle through” to continue was: Their abandonment of shale, the claim it would never be commercial and their unanimous deep dive into clean energy without any shareholder resolution or discussion prior to these decisions. In ExxonMobil's case, they created a boardroom battle that "Engine No. 1" was unhappy with their environmental record and Exxon accommodated them immediately. Under the premise Exxon listens to their shareholders. In 2022 Exxon reported that over 70% of their shareholders voted against this position. Today, with oil prices higher, officers and directors are back in the oil & gas business. And expect us to follow their non-plans and non-visions.
What was this diversion about? Pursuit of the land of the absolutely unaccountable clean energy business under the guise of proving to teenagers they were clean energy warriors? Taking others' oil & gas revenues, built by others, and absconding with them for unauthorized, unaccountable spending? But they’re saving the planet! Destroying the careers of oil & gas workers by saying clean energy was the future and you’re yesterday’s news. It's absurd to take shale's advanced technologies and say they’ll never be commercially viable. Without a moment's thought about how to change the business to make it viable. Indirectly telling the service industry not to invest in equipment, staff or training. We don’t want it or need it unless you have a never-commercially viable and never-will-be-commercially viable solar panel. I can certainly criticize these for being some of the dumbest, hypocritical business moves I’ve seen. No question. The industry-wide unanimity between these officers and directors and their actions is disturbing. These officers and directors are so well practiced at getting on the same page about excuses, blaming, viable scapegoats, fundamental and unauthorized changes in the direction of the business. Which brings us to the question of this post. Is this leadership unaware or corrupt? There are significant financial losses of resources and cash in natural gas between Henry Hub, Asian and European markets. Where are these dollars today?
Some may argue that my argument should not apply to all natural gas volumes. And only applies to LNG export volumes. However in the Australian example, even with regulation they realize a large percentage of the export price on domestic sales. These are not prices that resemble what the North American producer accepts. The validity of my argument is the differential between North American producers' realized prices and what we could suggest is a price closer to the traditional heating value price of 6 to 1. During the period from 2009 to today, LNG may or may not have been available for some of that period.
The value from North American natural gas production has not materialized. People, Ideas & Objects Preliminary Specification solves this well-identified problem. An issue that has resulted in absolute destruction. In this case, what’s its value and where is this money? Why hasn't anything been done about it? As a result of discussing and resolving these issues, I have been vilified and ostracized from the industry. Would it be fair if anyone wishing to innovate within oil & gas was forced to suffer decades of persecution before these officers and directors finally approved of their ideas? How will an innovative industry replace the damage caused by these officers and directors when they’re so easily able to stop anyone? Is the elimination of initiative and innovation one of the highest costs? Given the destruction they've caused, is this heavy-handed treatment by those unaware or culpable appropriate? What is the reason for its continuation? The process of turning this around will take time and effort. People, Ideas & Objects are decades ahead of anyone else in solving the issue, but that does not mean we should waste time.