OCI Petroleum Lease Marketplace, Part V
More on Capabilities
What follows is a general discussion of the Marketplace Interface in the Petroleum Lease Marketplace module. It is intended to provide some understanding of the Marketplace Interface's ability to enable a user to engage with other elements of the market. This will build the producer firms land and asset base.
It was during the Preliminary Research Report that we first applied Professors Anthony Giddens and Wanda Orlikowski's Structuration research to the Joint Operating Committee. Professor Giddens Structuration Theory states that people, organizations and society must move together or fail. Professor Orlikowski’s Model of Structuration states that technology is a part of society and both defines and constrains action. Therefore when we look at the two possible organizational types of architecture for Petroleum Leases we see the Marketplace and the file cabinet. But seriously, the choice is that stark and the contrast is that dramatic. To match the organization, the people and societal definitions and constraints, the marketplace is the ideal architecture. To therefore designate a module within the Preliminary Specification as the Petroleum Lease Marketplace, it builds on this simple architecture. From Professor Richard Langlois' “Modularity in Technology, Organization and Society.”
Modularity is a very general set of principles for managing complexity. By breaking up a complex system into discrete pieces - which can then communicate with one another only through standardized interfaces within a standardized architecture - one can eliminate what would otherwise be an unmanageable spaghetti tangle of systemic interconnections. p. 1
This next quote is critical. It's a chicken and egg problem however. I don’t know if we are taking elements of the technology and mapping them to the organization, or taking the marketplace and mapping it to the technology. Both are undergoing significant changes in the Petroleum Lease Marketplace.
What is new is the application of the idea of modularity not only to technological design but also to organizational design. Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) go so far as to assert that modularity in the design of products leads to - or at least ought to lead to modularity in the design of the organizations that produce such products. p. 1
Lastly, users need a window to see the marketplace. In the Petroleum Lease Marketplace, is our “Marketplace Interface," consider a user examining a Unit that they are a member of the Joint Operating Committee within the Marketplace Interface. During viewing, contextual tiles with agreements, leases, and other information appear. If the user wants to click on those and query the information it is there as well as historical accounting data. If users from another firm view the property, they can be seen and engaged in a collaboration. Immediately contextual tiles of information about the individual are available to you, and any previous correspondence and outstanding matters appear. Meanwhile you click on the newly drilled well that you heard was performing beyond expectations to get an update of its actual production. You also notice that the adjoining lands have just been posted for bid by a producer firm who is not a member of your Joint Operating Committee. You can call on the other producers in the Unit and share a recorded video meeting within the Petroleum Lease Marketplace. This will initiate a plan to deal with it.
Professor Richard Langlois in his 1992 paper “Modularity in Technology” defines what capabilities are in a corporate setting.
This is the basic modularization of the market economy. It accords well with the modularization G. B. Richardson (1972) suggested in offering the concept of economic capabilities. By capabilities Richardson means "knowledge, experience, and skills" (1972, p. 888), a notion related to what Jensen and Meckling (1992) call "specific knowledge and to what Hayek (1945) called "knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place." For the most part, Richardson argues, firms will tend to specialize in activities requiring similar capabilities, that is, "in activities for which their capabilities offer some comparative advantage" (Richardson 1972, p. 888). p. 27
Recently we discussed the Petroleum Lease Marketplace "Marketplace Interface." We hopefully saw with the brief description of how the system could provide a window on the Petroleum Lease Marketplace and how that contrasts with the current rows and rows of file cabinets. Application of the firm's capabilities within that “Marketplace Interface” will be how the producer and Joint Operating Committee will build its firm and earn its profits. Or as Hayek says about capabilities, how much “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place” is not being acted upon in your firm today?
There will be significant changes in the transition from file cabinets to People, Ideas & Objects Preliminary Specification. These changes imply that there will be a cost and part of these costs will be software development. Professor Langlois calls these “Dynamic Transaction Costs”
Over time, capabilities change as firms and markets learn, which implies a kind of information or knowledge cost - the cost of transferring the firm's capabilities to the market or vice-versa. These "dynamic" governance costs are the costs of persuading, negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching others. They arise in the face of change, notably technological and organizational innovation. In effect, they are the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them. p. 99
Who said it's not the destination, but the path? That is what software development is about, the path. We have a rough idea of where we are heading and what it might look like. However, without the involvement of the user in the development of these systems it would all be pointless. User involvement is critical to People, Ideas & Objects success and quality. The Preliminary Specification is only a starting point. Our user community can take it and build upon it as they and the industry desire and need. Over time as the organization and markets change, so will the software. And the capabilities of the marketplace and the firms will develop as a result. From Professor Richard Langlois “Transaction Cost Economics in Real Time.”
"F.A. Hayek (1945, p. 523) once wrote that 'economic problems arise always and only in consequence of change.' My argument is the flip-side: as change diminishes, economic problems recede. Specifically, as learning takes place within a stable environment, transaction costs diminish. As Carl Dahlman (1979) points out, all transaction costs are at base information costs. And, with time and learning, contracting parties gain information about one another's behavior. More importantly, the transacting parties will with time develop or hit upon institutional arrangements that mitigate the sources of transaction costs." p. 104
There is a distinct market capability available in the Petroleum Lease Marketplace of the Preliminary Specification. A capability that is not reflected in the Research & Capabilities module, a capability that resides in the “Marketplace Interface.” A capability that provides the innovative oil and gas producer with the ability to participate in the dynamic marketplace of oil and gas leases, lands and properties. If the Research & Capabilities module handles the earth science and engineering aspect of the producers competitive advantage, it is the Petroleum Lease Marketplace that handles the Land and Asset Base attributes of the producers competitive advantage.
As we have discussed here many times, the amount of engineering and earth science effort for each barrel of oil or gas produced will continue to expand as time passes. Naturally therefore the volume of activity associated with oil and gas will increase as well. This implies that the number of P&NG leases and agreements will increase as will the number of Joint Operating Committees producers participate in. The Petroleum Lease Marketplace is the means to participate, make sense of and build your land and asset base from. It is reasonable to assume that this may require a multiple of legal, administrative and negotiating resources on your behalf to achieve these outcomes. The "Marketplace Interface" becomes the first place to source the skills, knowledge and experience you need.
Although one can find versions of the idea in Smith, Marshall, and elsewhere, the modern discussion of the capabilities of organization probably begins with Edith Penrose (1959), who suggested viewing the firm as a 'pool of resources'. Among the writers who have used and developed this idea are G.B. Richardson (1972), Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982), and David Teece (1980, 1982). To all these authors, the firm is a pool not of tangible but of intangible resources. Capabilities, in the end, are a matter of knowledge. Because of the nature of specialization and the limits to cognition, organizations as well as individuals are limited in what they know how to do effectively. Put the other way, organizations possess a pool of more-or-less embodied 'how to' knowledge useful for particular classes of activities. pp. 105 - 106.
It will be through the “pool” of knowledgeable providers supporting the innovative oil and gas producers. The “Marketplace Interface” will enable these providers to engage with producers and build their firm. These will be the Land people, the administrators and those that support the negotiations and transactions involved in land deals. Traditionally these people have been employed by individual producers. However, with the “Marketplace Interface” there will be a need for these services provided by the marketplace. That will be one of the changes during the Preliminary Specification development.
But often - and especially when innovation is involved - the links among firms are of a more complex sort, involving everything from informal swaps of information (von Hippel, 1989) to joint ventures and other formal collaborative arrangements (Mowery, 1989). All firms must rely on the capabilities owned by others, especially to the extent those capabilities are dissimilar to those the firm possesses. p. 108
Now that there is a marketplace established for the knowledge, skills and experience of the resources used in the Petroleum Lease Marketplace, we can begin to approach that marketplace from the point of view of its specialization and division of labor. Most of the work that is done within a producer firm for Land administration etc. is done for timeliness and accuracy. Due to the scope and scale of the individual producers' volume of lease and land activity. Efficiencies from the analysis of the division of labor and specialization may not have been available. With the development of the “Marketplace Interface” of the Petroleum Lease Marketplace the opportunity to conduct that analysis during the Preliminary Specification is provided.
It was autonomous innovation that Adam Smith had in mind when he argued that the division of labor enhanced innovation: each operative, by seeking ways to make his or her lot easier, would discover improved methods of performing the particular operation (Smith, 1976, I.i8, p. 20). The improvement he had in mind were such that they improved the efficiency of a particular stage without any implication for the operation of other stages. Autonomous innovation of this sort may even further the division of labor to the extent that it involves the cutting up of a task into two or more separate operation. Instead of being differentiating in this way, however, an innovation may be integrating, in the sense that the new way of doing things - a new machine, say - performs in one step what had previously needed two or more steps (Robertson and Alston, 1992). More generally, a systemic innovation may require small modifications of the way work is performed at each of a number of stages, and would thus require coordination among those stages. pp. 116 - 117
In today’s market we have powerful tools that alleviate repetitive nature of lower level work. Two of those tools are computers and globalization. Our analysis of the marketplace should use these tools to the fullest extent to focus our attention on innovation. If we look at the Petroleum Lease Marketplace “Marketplace Interface” from this perspective there is much work to be done, and a significant opportunity to provide real value for all producers. Having a Petroleum Lease Marketplace that provides the producer and Joint Operating Committee with the ability to focus their capability on building their land and asset base would be a worthwhile objective for this module. It is one half of an innovative oil and gas producer's competitive advantage.
Designing and implementing a marketplace that organized these capabilities efficiently and effectively would not be difficult. Ensuring that our user community was supported through their learning and development of enhanced and innovative capabilities would.
A market form of organization is capable of learning and creating new capabilities, often in a self reinforcing and synergistic way. Marshall describes just such a system when he talks about the benefits of localized industry. p. 120
To review what we have with the Petroleum Lease Marketplace "Marketplace Interface". Using the People, Ideas & Objects Marketplace Interface, the user can access an environment that's accessible to producers and Joint Operating Committees. There they will find a rich market environment where they can resource the skills, knowledge and experience they need to secure and manage their Petroleum and Natural Gas lease and land base. Given that marketplaces have time to develop and grow, with its own market supporting institutions, it will take on its own characteristics and efficiencies. Enabling the innovative oil and gas producer to leverage the marketplaces capabilities and focus on their core competitive advantages.
Making this transition to where the producers and Joint Operating Committees capabilities are sourced from the marketplace will take time, incur unique costs and involve many iterations. These “Dynamic Transaction Costs” as Professor Richard Langlois calls them are necessary as the transfer of capabilities from the firm to the market occurs. One should be aware of the reasons for this transition. And the reasoning is that we are moving the industry from the “High Throughput Production Model” to the “Decentralized Production Model.” This provides the producer with the capability to shut-in production, and then have the associated costs of production and overhead not incurred.
One might think that, as governance costs diminish in the long run, the boundaries of the firm would be determined solely by capabilities. But capabilities also change over time as firms - and markets - learn. The classical presumption was that the firm's capabilities would diffuse completely to the market in the long run, leading to complete vertical disintegration. This reinforces the point that capabilities are more than a matter of production costs in the neoclassical sense and, more importantly, suggest that the notion of a firm's capabilities implies a kind of information or knowledge cost - the cost of transferring the firm's capability to the market (other firms) or vice versa. These costs are a neglected kind of governance cost, which I call 'dynamic' governance costs. These are the costs of transferring capabilities: the costs of persuading, negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching others. These costs arise in the face of change, notably technological and organizational innovation. They are in effect the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them. pp. 123 - 124
As one can imagine, this marketplace would be dynamic. The need for a dedicated software developer to identify and support not only the innovative oil and gas producers and Joint Operating Committee, but also those changes occurring in the marketplace vendors and suppliers, would be critical. That is the role of People, Ideas & Objects. From Professor Richard Langlois “Vanishing Hand, the Changing Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism.”
"The basic argument - the vanishing hand hypothesis - is as follows. Driven by increases in population and income and by the reduction of technological and legal barriers to trade, the Smithian process of the division of labor always tends to lead to finer specialization of function and increased coordination through markets, much as Allyn Young (1928) claimed long ago. But the components of that process - technology, organization, and institutions - change at different rates." p. 3
Let's assume you are a vendor involved in the Petroleum Lease Marketplace. You want to participate in the People, Ideas & Objects Preliminary Specification to expand your business. To include your firm in the “Marketplace Interface” would require you to use some of the interfaces we developed in the Resource Marketplace module. This discussion is about how the vendor would interact within the “Marketplace Interface” and engage with the producers and Joint Operating Committees that were looking for your products and services.
First we should mention who will make the changes we expect to see in the “Marketplace Interface” of the Petroleum Lease Marketplace. Resistance to People, Ideas & Objects by current bureaucracies is strong. They have a comfortable system that keeps them firmly in control and do not foresee the need for change. So how do these marketplace changes come about? And how does a marketplace like this come about? The answer is simple and reflected in this next quote from Professor Richard Langlois paper "The Vanishing Hand: Industrial Capitalism's Changing Dynamics."
"Ruttan Hayami (1984) have proposed a theory of institutional change that is relevant to my story of organizational and institutional change. As they see it, changes in relative scarcities, typically driven by changes in technology, create a demand for institutional change by dangling new sources of economic rent before the eyes of potential institutional innovators. Whether change occurs will depend on whether those in a position to generate it - or to block it - can be suitably persuaded. Since persuasion typically involves the direct or indirect sharing of the available rents, the probability of change increases as the rents increase. And the more an institutional or organization system becomes misaligned with economic realities, the more the rents of realignment increase." pp. 36 - 37
Is the profit opportunity of being an innovative oil and gas producer more appealing than today's methods? And will those that operate in the “Marketplace Interface” find increased profits by providing services that innovative producers want and need? If either of those situations are the case then the profits will motivate the changes within the marketplaces described within the Preliminary Specification. (Please review the Preamble to the Preliminary Specification.)
In terms of the interfaces that will help vendors who provide lease and land services to innovative oil and gas producers the first would be the “Vendor / Supplier Contact Database.” This provides the basic information needed for the oil and gas producer or Joint Operating Committee to have on the vendor. Think of it as a rich contact database maintained by the vendor. There is a second aspect of this database that provides a secondary or tertiary level of data to the producer. This is when the producer engages the firm. This includes access to the vendors' staffing profiles, calendars and scheduling information and enables the producer and vendor to establish further elements of their working relationship. (Query the “Vendor / Supplier Bidding / Commitment Manager” in the Resource Marketplace module for further information on the extent of these interactions.)
The second interface that would help the vendor in operating within the “Marketplace Interface” of the Petroleum Lease Marketplace would be the “Gap Filling Interface.” Recall this is the interface that is used by producers and vendors to communicate the need to have a “Gap Filled.” The gap being a situation where the division of labor could be expanded by providing a further service that is not currently offered. The expansion of the division of labor is done through filling gaps. And if producers and vendors identify and communicate needs and services that are in need of filling, or demand for updated services, the opportunity for the service to meet the demand will occur quickly. The reason for this is that we live in a time and a place where the service and the need may be located thousands of miles away from each other, or even just next door, and may never know that either exists. The “Gap Filling Interface” eliminates time and distance of these needs.
The third interface that provides value to the vendors in the “Marketplace Interface” of the Petroleum Lease Marketplace is the “Actionable Information Interface.” Although somewhat similar to the “Gap Filling Interface” it fills a different role. If a vendor has undertaken a strategic and competitive investment over the next five years that would fundamentally change their service offering. They would publish this information in the “Actionable Information Interface.” This would inform the producers and Joint Operating Committees of the prospective changes in the marketplace and allow them to engage the vendors on what they need. This being a collaborative interface, vendors could engage the market to help define their market offering in the mid term. Most of this information is available to the prudent Google-enabled researcher today. Nevertheless, the aggregate value of the information would be a unique window on the marketplace offerings and market direction in the "Actionable Information Interface." One might question why you would publish such sensitive information? I would remind readers that publication is how you earn copyright.