The Issue, Part I
Eighteen months ago officers and directors of the producer firms were stating their unilateral shift in the direction towards clean energy. Harmonizing on the talking point that “shale will never be commercial.” Europe has taught us that listening to teenagers' apocalyptic pronouncements about the seasonal changes in the weather, and divesting of oil & gas, is dangerous. With regards to the officers and directors of the producer firms you have to ask yourself a few questions about their actions in the directions they take. What should we think now of this seasonal change in the officers and directors vision of the future? What are these people motivated by? What do they think about when they get up in the morning? Is this what passes for innovation? What direction will the wind be blowing in a few months? What characteristic other than revenue does shale provide that has attracted these officers and directors. I don’t think any of these questions have answers that involve oil & gas or that imply the officers and directors are thinking logically now.
Producer officers and directors seem fundamentally incapable of grasping basic business concepts. Cultural inertia causes them to continue to assume that whatever they produce in terms of cash be used for either dividends, capital expenditures or reducing bank debt. It is inconceivable to them that they achieve “real” profitable operations and the generation of cash to satisfy all three of these, all of the time. They have at their disposal all the authority, responsibility, resources and albeit diminished capacity and capabilities to conduct themselves in a manner that would provide them with all of the resources they could ever imagine. If only all those other people would stop picking on them.
A Polish broadcast during WWII.
“All is lost that is not saved by active effort”
Winston S. Churchill
Triumph and Tragedy, 1953
Introduction
The issue that I am finding in early 2023 is the cultural regression that appears to be occurring in oil & gas producers. Any progress that may have been achieved in terms of the investors desire to change the methods of management of the officers and directors. Quickly regresses back to the cultural norms when a hint of normalcy appears on the horizon for them. The need to change becomes less of an issue when they believe “muddle through” has been proven effective once again.
The need to shift away from this mythical, magical world that oil & gas operates in today is a necessity. The inability to look out the window to see the scope and scale of the damage and destruction authored through this disastrous management is perplexing.
They have no field level capacities or capability to maintain the level of production they’ve obtained for the mid to long term. Drilling rig investors had to watch their new drilling rigs cut up for scrap metal to feed the staff after they were financially destroyed by the producer officers and directors. Where is their motivation to do that again?
Producers have cannibalized their own internal processes through the attrition diet of an ongoing, almost eight year withdrawal by their investors. Nonetheless the cupboards are bare with no work in progress and no internal capacity or capability to deal with what their production profile will demand of them in order for it to be sustained.
Their capital structures are unsupported. What could be worse than the abandonment by your investors. Absolutely nothing, and should have prompted immediate remedial management actions to rectify what the investors' concerns are. That was in 2015.
Shale has four distinct characteristics that demand a different approach than what the current producer's culture is capable of. It is costly, prolific in terms of the reserves discovered, initial production volumes are dramatic and their steep decline curve demands costly reworks in as little as 18 months to maintain production volumes.
In this oil & gas culture where everything is capitalized and each petroleum reserve is allocated an equal share of the capital cost no matter when it will be produced, where many of those costs will not be recognized until decades later and after many costly reworks. What will be the dynamic at play in their current method of accounting and potential production declines? It’s quite easy to see that it will be “building bigger, even more beautiful balance sheets,” “putting more cash in the ground” and specious profitability for the long term. “Muddle through.”
Over Investment Leads to Overproduction
These material consequences of overproduction started in the natural gas marketplace in 2009. Shale gas reserves were being exposed to the marketplace and the decline in natural gas prices were precipitous. Price structures were eventually damaged in a comprehensive fashion where natural gas has since traded anywhere between 9.74 to 1 and 28.04 to 1 of oil prices as opposed to its traditional heating value equivalent of 6 to 1. Closing out 2022 at 18.2 to 1. How this was allowed to happen, what efforts have been taken to rectify the situation, and why has nothing been done for 14 years? The answer was during the early days, the oil side of the business was healthy enough to carry both sides of the business. Which was true, oil prices were high enough until December 2014. During 2010, the application of shale technologies moved from natural gas to oil. Causing the same overproduction to soon begin on that side of the business. Creating difficulties on both sides of the producer firm, an issue that had never happened before.
The technical economic classifications of price makers and price takers are as follows. From Investopedia.
What Is a Price Maker?
A price maker is an entity, such as a firm, with a monopoly that gives it the power to influence the price it charges as the goods it produces does not have perfect substitutes. A price maker within monopolistic competition produces goods that are differentiated in some way from its competitors' products. The price maker is also a profit-maximizer because it will increase output only as long as its marginal revenue is greater than its marginal cost. In other words, as long as it is producing a profit.
What substitutes are there for oil and natural gas? Can hydro power lubricate your engine or power Elon Musk's rocket to Mars? Will nuclear power provide the chemicals that oil and gas can? What size jerry-can can you use to carry electricity from wind or solar? Clearly there are no substitutes to oil and natural gas. And although in the hands of the bureaucrats oil and gas has not been a profit maximizer, that does not mean that it can’t be, or shouldn’t be.
The Preliminary Specifications decentralized production models price maker strategy enables producers to produce only profitable production, everywhere and always, by establishing profitability as the only fair and reasonable means of production allocation. Another characteristic of price makers is that small changes in production volumes lead to large changes in price. We’ve seen this with the actions of OPEC+ and the Alberta government’s implementation of mandatory production cuts. If oil and gas commodities aren’t price makers then they would be price takers as the producers assume. So what are the characteristics of a price taker? Again from Investopedia.
What Is a Price-Taker?
A price-taker is an individual or company that must accept prevailing prices in a market, lacking the market share to influence market price on its own. All economic participants are considered to be price-takers in a market of perfect competition or one in which all companies sell an identical product, there are no barriers to entry or exit, every company has a relatively small market share, and all buyers have full information of the market. This holds true for producers and consumers of goods and services and for buyers and sellers in debt and equity markets.
The comparison to the bottled water market is appropriate here. New producers would be offered the same price as established providers despite the supply, demand and inventory in the market. And the ability to charge a premium during shortages would not be possible as consumers would switch to drink tap water, juice, soft drinks etc.
Investors are concerned that shale reservoirs have created a shift in the dynamics of the oil and gas producers. Asking if shale will ever become commercial under the current business model used by these producers? Noting “shale reserves are a rapidly depleting asset.” Which accurately captures the entire scope of the problem. They can now see the assets and profitability of the producers have been overreported. The cash that fueled the industry was never internally generated. And without investors supporting the producers with annual cash infusions, the industry is not viable. Even though their working capital balances are at critically low and negative levels producers refuse to listen to anything from outside their organizations.
● Markets provide only one thing, information in the form of price. If you can produce a profit at that price then produce. Producers have overproduced into the commodity markets for thirty out of the past thirty six years (2022), despite prices indicating otherwise.
● Refusal to listen to their investors is consistent with the treatment People, Ideas & Objects have experienced over the past number of years since we introduced the Preliminary Specification as our solution to the industry's difficulties. The one exception is their feigned belief in shifting to clean energy investments. A world where accountability will be measured on how effective they’re saving the planet. They appeared to listen to their investors and went into action the following morning.
There is a litany of excuses that were used to assuage investors' concerns. Excuses such as “waiting for a cold winter,” “markets to rebalance,” “capital discipline,” “reducing costs through innovations,” “we’re profitable,” “Artificial Intelligence and the cloud,” “capital discipline” again, to its “OPEC’s or the investors fault,” “have to ensure alternatives don’t become viable,” “natural gas is a by-product,” “it’s the pipeline companies fault,” the “governments fault” these last two somewhat exclusively in Canada. Isn't it ironic that these same officers and directors were claiming to ensure that oil & gas prices didn’t rise too high to allow alternatives to get a foothold. Now they are the ones, in unauthorized fashion, to be responsible for destroying the oil & gas industry and taking its revenues towards “clean energy.” Premier quality individuals! We also find that “market rebalancing” is a particularly vile excuse as it has no basis in fact, and is only the willful destruction of the industries production profile to meet demand.
It is People, Ideas & Objects belief that through a fundamental accounting change that occurred in the late 1970s. When the SEC regulated producers to use Full Cost accounting and its associated ceiling test. A methodology determining what the capital assets recorded in property, plant and equipment should not exceed. This enabled producers to compare the value of their balance sheets property, plant and equipment account to equal, with some adjustments, the present value of their reserves as specified in the independent reserves report times the current commodity prices as the upper limit. If their balance sheet assets value exceeded their reserves “value” then they would be subject to the ceiling test write down to correct any asset overvaluation.
The perspective in oil & gas of the ceiling test was that it became the target to be achieved by each and every producer each year, not the limit. As represented in the “build balance sheets” and “put cash in the ground” calling of the officers and directors. To suggest as People, Ideas & Objects do that the most competitive producer would seek to reduce property, plant and equipment account (competitively reducing their overall cost of production) as quickly as possible became heresy and was refuted with their typical obstinance and attacks upon us.
What was quickly discovered in the high interest rate environment of the 1980s was that interest was a key attribute of the assets value and therefore interest expenses were and are capitalized. Someone then asked about overhead with the resulting policies in which today we see approximately 85% of all overhead, including the excessive, creative, executive compensation, in the industry capitalized to property, plant and equipment. Slowly the culture of the industry became a spending frenzy fuelled by what came to be each producer's annual share offering. Fueled by specious profits that included revenues less royalties, operations and a sliver of the capital costs associated with the years reserves production over the total reserves. When this formula is applied to the high cost, prolific and steep decline curve of shale; the overproduction and specious reporting became evident to all.
This culture has grown over these past four decades to know no difference in terms of what and how the industry generates or destroys value. The belief that drilling wells releases oil and gas reserves which are tremendously valuable. Until People, Ideas & Objects began arguing that “real” financial profitability was necessary, the industry did not care whatsoever about profits, it was about cash flow, not profits, and we were bellitted for our belief in profits. We believe oil and gas reserves are of little to no value if they can’t be produced profitably and profitably considering an appropriate financial accounting of all of the exploration and production costs, including capital, in a capital intensive industry. Where the costs of the product passed to the consumer in a capital intensive industry will be predominantly capital in nature and competitive in the North American capital markets.
As of the end of 2022 we estimate that the amount of capital costs recorded on the balance sheets of North American producers will be approximately $1.5 trillion. Largely comprised of the high cost shale drilling that has dominated the past decade. U.S. shale based natural gas volumes produced from the period January 1, 2000 to November 30, 2022 total 262 TCF. The proven natural gas reserves estimate as of January 1, 2022 is 625.4 TCF. Representing a remaining 23.43 years of natural gas production at the average production rate of the past three years. Are we half way through the period of time in which shale gas will be with us? That is highly doubtful and only representative of what is known today. The question I want to ask is what will we have left to represent those shale gas reserves at the end of the next 23.43 years. It would seem that the cumulative shale gas production of 262 TCF didn’t generate anything of value outside the creative, excessive, executive compensation of the officers and directors of the producer firms. Who else has prospered?
In terms of oil reserves we also know that no proven reserves exist at negative commodity prices. As with natural gas, shale oil has been prosperous for officers and directors and they have “muddled through” handsomely. As with People, Ideas & Objects focus on value, shale will take significant efforts to make something of the remaining reserves and to rebuild a viable industry. Something that is well beyond the efforts and imagination of the current administration as evidenced by their inability to act, recognize the issue, take responsibility, lack of focus, business understanding and tendency to walk off the stage to other industries. We’ve also learned over the past decades that we should listen better to what these people are telling us. When they say they’re “building balance sheets” and “putting cash in the ground” we should accept that and not expect otherwise. They were telling us exactly what it was they were doing. Just as today they’ve stated that “shale will never be commercial.” Therefore why try when they can make clean energy all that it can be! Has there ever been a better time for change?