Ode to the Demise of the Commodity Price Proxy
Last year I took the opportunity to lay out the difficulties and detail the outright crisis the producer bureaucrats were facing in the near future as a result of their “management.” I know they appreciate the work I do so I thought that I’d update them to accommodate the changes in the market and the status of each of these crises. It’s a difficult job, some say I do it well but the important thing is I enjoy it. Anyway, the “muddle through” and “putting cash in the ground” business model has the feature of cost control as the sole means to provide evidence of bureaucrats' hard work and value being (de)generated in the industry. As we’ve seen. Underlying all of these crises was our documentation of their cost control efforts weren’t as much cost control, as they were cost deferrals. We identified a variety of costs, instead let's call them a mountain of costs that were going to be incremental to the standard costs that producers had come to know and love. Maybe we’ll need the bureaucrats more, they may think. These costs need to be added to the difficulties of the role of the producer of “drilling wells” and I assert that they had a secondary role of paying off the environmental lobbyists from picketing their facilities and head offices. Where do you think all that money comes from to sustain the environmentalists' attacks on the pipeline companies? My point is that the producers were concerned with drilling their precious reserves and expected “others” to do everything else and deliver it to them on a silver platter. While they collected the revenues of a primary industry for distribution amongst their elite group. I’m not suggesting that this is not going to continue to work in the future but it certainly has stopped working now hasn’t it.
Oil and gas has been around since 1859. With many facilities having been built and substantial oil and gas being discovered and produced since that time. Many of these properties are no longer material or marginal for the initiating producer and their prospects are dim. Abandoning the property is the recommended approach based on the policies of the more senior producers. Producers therefore have been able to sell the property to new producers who generally have been able to create value from them and at the same time the original producers were able to absolve themselves of the reclamation cost obligations. Recently the Alberta government intervened in a proposed sale of Shell’s three sour gas facilities to what was then a start-up oil and gas producer. Stating there was difficulty in seeing how the startup could pay for the reclamation cost obligations. What the Alberta government didn’t understand at the time was there's little they could do when the cleanest of clean energy producers is trying to renounce themselves from their “dirty” oil and gas assets. Pieridae Energy Limited’s acquisition of the facilities was completed in October 2021. Industry wide reclamation costs are the looming, accelerating and unknown amount of new costs that producers are needing to face as the retirement of conventional oil and gas assets accelerate.
The next category of costs that need to be considered are the rebuilding costs of the infrastructure that has been built over the past decades. Much of it is operational beyond its usable life and with either additional investment to bring these facilities up to today’s requirements or to rebuild their replacements. These rebuilding and refurbishing costs will need to be added to the list of new and escalating costs that are incremental to those that were previously realized.
The question that needs to be asked therefore is: are today's oil and gas infrastructure the infrastructure that we should expect will take the industry to the level of enduring, profitable energy independence? Estimates that the industry will demand $20 - $40 trillion in incremental capital costs in the next 25 years are what are generally agreed upon. These include the categories of capital costs for reclamation, refurbishing and rebuilding in those estimates. In today’s bureaucratic business model it will be the investor that fronts this money to the producer in exchange for the promises of roses and champagne. And let's not forget the paper they’ll receive in the form of “balance sheets.” Banks will want to be getting in on that value generating action too. Alternatively, People, Ideas & Objects, our user community and their service providers propose the Preliminary Specification. Which will cycle the capital costs through the producers on a frequent basis and pass these capital costs, in a capital intensive industry, on to the consumer in the price of the commodities. That way the cash will come back quickly to the producer and the reuse of that capital, cycled through repeatedly on a frequent basis will provide the means to fund these demands. The need for $20 to $40 trillion is unnecessary when $1 trillion turned over 20 to 40 times is just as good. The alternative is investors can sit back with today’s bureaucrats and cherish their paper empire of a well built $40 trillion balance sheet account of property, plant and equipment for a few decades before that cash is ever seen again. I’ve been highlighting this ridiculous business practice for well over a decade and the bureaucrats have done nothing to deal with this, therefore they’re unable to read or don’t like the sarcasm, it could be that it's a difficult concept for them or that it interferes with their personal cash flow. We should ask the investors and bankers.
We also itemized the major crisis the producers were facing in the looming short to long term. Anyone of these crises would individually have focused the energy of the producer bureaucrats in a concerted effort to resolve their impact. However, that is not the objective of “muddle through,” and its approach continues to ignore these. I’ll highlight them here to see how we’ve done and determine if there are new crises that need to be added.
Crisis # 1
Chronic Overproduction
This is the issue that has caused the producers all the difficulties these past four decades. It is the primary issue that the Preliminary Specification resolves. The second among many issues it resolves is the development of a culture of innovation throughout North American oil and gas producers. One that will work with the speed of the innovation that occurs in the service industry. Recently we noted that overproduction was listed as the third reason for the great depression. Businesses and industries learned not to overproduce and create the difficulties of the great depression again, or what we’ve seen in the chronic liquidation of value in North American oil and gas. The accounting that hides the overproduction via the industry principles of “building balance sheets” and “putting cash in the ground.” It is the misinterpretation of the SEC’s late 1970’s requirement to use full cost accounting that has created this and bureaucrats continue to feign ignorance of the issue, history and facts. In summary, what the SEC states is the producer must not exceed the present value of their independently evaluated petroleum reserves in the assets listed in property, plant and equipment on the balance sheet. Replacing the financial statements purpose of reporting performance to assessing value. Nowhere does it state what the minimum asset balance must be. Tell me of any other business in the world who’s primary objective is to “build their balance sheets?” Simply, overreported asset values create commensurate over reported profits. Excess profitability will attract investors to capture those profits. Excess investment leads to overbuilding of capacities leading to overproduction of the oil and gas commodities. Overproduction is best represented as unprofitable production however this accounting hides the fact that none of the production is or has been profitable. It is designed to “build balance sheets,” not assess performance.
Crisis # 2
Virus
Implications from Covid are self-evident at this point. Although personally I find the whole situation frustrating. Professionally I don’t think I could have asked for more.
Crisis # 3
Debt and rising interest rates.
When the asset balances of the producer firm are bloated beyond reason we see two implications that are clearly evident in North American producers. No cash or working capital. A capital structure that is as large as the bloated asset value. Most of the capital structure, due to the losses realized in the past seven years, has eliminated the shareholders interest. Leaving producers with a disproportionate asset value supporting highly leveraged debts. The past two decades of low interest rates have allowed easy access to banks providing excess debt leverage to individuals and businesses of all types. None more so than North American producers based on the independent shale reserve evaluations. What is potentially seen as a global debt crisis may be playing out in the next few years and the immediate implication will be higher interest rates on these unmanageable producer debt loads.
Crisis # 4
OPEC+ surplus capacity.
Suggesting at the time of initially writing this scenario that OPEC+ would once again drop the price. However it now appears that the scale of damage realized in North American oil and gas is far greater than expected. OPEC+ is realizing real value through the higher oil prices when North American producers are locked into hedging contracts that deplete their cash when commodity prices climb. This being one of the many bureaucratic costs of losing the financial, operational and political frameworks of the industry.
Crisis # 5
Capacities and capabilities.
Once the financial difficulties are realized the natural follow on consequences of what a business experiences are it’s diminished capacity and capabilities. That shale is falling into this class of difficulties is something that I had not considered at the time of initially writing these. Recall the summary declaration by the producers that shale was not commercial and they were hence moving to clean energy. Here again I feel the bureaucrats are 100% wrong. We can easily accuse them of never doing the hard work, and certainly never trying. My focus on raising this before was the financial devastation in the service industry at the hands of these bureaucrats. This would lead to the inability of the service industry to meet the high water marks of what they were able to achieve in prior years. The evidence of this is clear and it is a serious demarcation of what the producers could previously rely on. We noted recently that at today’s 25% level of prior activity levels the service industry is already demanding record prices for their services. The rebuilding of the service industry to its appropriate level will need to be done by the producers themselves and done as a result of their gracious benevolence. The cardinal rule being invoked is, you broke it, you fix it.
Crisis # 6
Insurance
This is an interesting issue. I thought I had an area of concern that appealed directly to the officers and directors of the oil and gas producers personal pocket books. What we affectionately call bureaucrats. It hasn’t worked out that way and I have to say they dodged what I thought was a bullet headed straight for them. The admission I’m not always right may be surprising to some, however. The point was with the desperate condition of the share values of the producers at the time. Shareholder litigation may begin on the basis of their ignoring the obvious refusal to do anything. Their refusal in light of the warnings emanating from this blog and the exit of their investors. Insurance companies seeing the culpability of the bureaucrats would suspend their coverage if the bureaucrat continued to work at that firm. Triggering an exit from these firms. The past issue is past and did not materialize due to the fact that most of the shares of the producers have rallied as they’re seen as a proxy on the prices of the commodities.
Sitting in the catbird seat these bureaucrats are reveling in their victory. I suggest their new issue is that shares are high with the potential of decline. I believe there's a risk of this insurance issue coming back into play again. What if the producers are experiencing the financial difficulties that I describe. The concept of the producer share price is a proxy on the price of the commodities implies that it can generate value based on the price increase. If management, who are unresponsive to business realities such as these issues and their investors, yet are willing to hedge their risk so that prior disasters aren’t manifesting again (negative $40 oil) are willing to lock-in what are marginal outcomes which do nothing but sustain bureaucrats in their standard of living, being the lifestyle of the rich and famous. Would this continue to maintain the theory of the commodity price proxy?
Crisis # 7
Joe Biden.
Who would have thought sleepy Joe would make Justin Trudeau look lucid and off the recreational drugs.
Do we see the requisite capacity and capabilities inherent in these producer firms to make the necessary changes to achieve enduring, profitable, energy independence for the long term? Or was the classic management excuse of not all the data was available to them? Will the data be available soon? What excuse is there for this inaction? Particularly when 1929 was almost a century ago and all other industries were able to see and read the causes and implications of overproduction then. I highlighted an article in the Calgary Herald from July 26, 1986 entitled “OPEC minister can see economic destruction.” This article dealt with the 1986 oil price collapse and overproduction of North American producers. That a solution in the form of the Preliminary Specification, our user community and their service provider organizations was prepared in August 2012 that wasn’t to the bureaucrats advantage or liking, but what alternatives have been prepared and what's available now? That is other than the bureaucrats $5.00 solution. Their investors and bankers began exiting the industry in disgust in 2015, actions that are considered the most critical and terminal decisions made towards a firm. Most would agree with the crisis and costs on this list and there would be many more that could be added. If we look at the speed at which the bureaucrats have approached the fact of their investors exit in 2015 and the list of things they’d like to see management undertake. We’ll no doubt see the effectiveness of “muddle through” once again. Yet with all of this, they’ll be trying to figure out where exactly they dug those holes to put the coffee cans full of cash in.
On the other hand we have no shortage of work to do. Much needs to be done in the next few years. The Preliminary Specification needs to be built. The engineering and geological explicit knowledge needs to be captured as Intellectual Property and developed. New oil and gas firms need to be formed, capitalized and organized. Assets need to be transferred to these new producers in innovative, strategic and tactical ways. In this process we’ll all be helping the current producers to travel faster down their chosen journey to clean energy by disposing of dirty oil. This transition to the Preliminary Specification is something that must be done to deal with the financial difficulties the industry is plagued with from the current administration. This also needs to be done as preparation for the future. And to learn from the experience of this transition as we’ll be faced repeatedly with situations that share this same scope and scale of change in the near future of this business. We’ll therefore be somewhat prepared and experienced in challenges of this nature. Please review our Production Rights to see how everyone can participate in making this new oil and gas industry happen. An industry where it will be less important who you know, but what you know and what you're capable of delivering, what the value proposition is that you’re offering? We know we can, and we know how to make money in this business.
Those interested in joining our user community are People, Ideas & Objects priority and focus. The Preliminary Specification, our user community and their service provider organizations provide for a dynamic, innovative, accountable and profitable oil and gas industry with the most profitable means of oil and gas operations, everywhere and always. Setting the foundation for profitable North American energy independence, everywhere and always. In addition, our software organizes the Intellectual Property of the exploration and production processes owned by the engineers and geologists. Enabling them to monetize their IP for a new oil & gas industry to begin with a means to be dynamic, innovative and performance oriented. Providing a new investment opportunity for those who see a bright future in the industry. A place where their administrative, accounting, exploration and production can be handled for the 21st century. People, Ideas & Objects have joined TBD and can be reached there. Anyone can contact me at 713-965-6720 in Houston or 587-735-2302 in Calgary, or email me here.