Cannibals Do What Cannibals Do
People, Ideas & Objects have been harping about cash and working capital throughout our time discussing the oil and gas producer bureaucrats mismanagement. Their solution has always been to have investors arrive annually with new funds for their capital budgets. Turning spending into their most prized competitive advantage. This was carried on for decades and became a cultural expectation and “what we do around here.” As a result the dependence on reliable outside capital sources eliminated the need to a) run a profitable operation and b) manage cash. Eventually what has happened is the principle of “building balance sheets” and “putting cash in the ground” demanded that accounting assume four fallacies that conspired to make producers wholly dependent on these outside sources of annual capital infusions for their existence. What would and should have been obviously a circuitous and unsustainable method of non-commercial production and operation remained unnoticed. Until the outside capital sources were removed. Even today bureaucrats feign obliviousness to the reason why their cash vaporizes. Or are they justifying this disappearance on their objective to just “put cash in the ground?” Culture is the reason that People, Ideas & Objects are rebuilding the industry brick by brick, and stick by stick. To eliminate this destructive culture in any other way is next to impossible.
The four fallacies consist of the price taker assumption, capitalization policies, extended depletion schedules based on petroleum reserves and the objective of never reporting a bad quarter. Taking these one at a time, the price taker assumption is that markets are magically mythical beings that are able to take all of the production that is provided, no matter what. The consequences of doing so are irrelevant in terms of the producer's specific production profile, and the head in the sand opinion that there are no consequences. In our White Paper we noted the following effect of this attitude and assumption.
Producing below the breakeven point is the point where unprofitability begins. Producing below the breakeven point for one producer, in an industry who’s commodities are price makers, will have the effect where the price of the commodities will be dropped below the breakeven price for all producers. When all producers continue to produce below the breakeven price for four decades you have an exhaustion of the value from the industry on an annual and wholesale basis. Times were only “good” when investors were willing.
These four fallacies led to the myth making machine coming up with an accounting concept of pure wizardry. Producer bureaucrats were always able to maintain production, profitably, in an environment of declining commodity prices. Who remembers when oil was dropping from >$90 in 2013 to $36 in 2016. That each decline was matched by the declaration of the producer bureaucrats that the threshold of profitability was then miraculously $10 lower than their last declaration of profitability. The accounting innovation that enabled this is unknown to me and I’m still looking for it. What I’m seemingly unable to comprehend is how they’re able to revise historical cost accounting that saw producers' costs of $80 suddenly become $20 in three years time.
What we’ve discovered so far is that these are not costs as we normally understand accounting costs to be. They’re “recycle costs,” the term used in the industry. They are a result of polling the service industry representatives as to what the cost to drill and frac would be if they slashed their prices to the bare minimum in a depressed $36 oil price market. The fact that the cost of 100% of their production was historical was not relevant to this conversation. You’ll recall none of the financial statements contain these specious profit quotations, these recycle cost quotes were only uttered to the press by the producers CEO’s. To be forgotten or denied when asked about them later. The Preliminary Specification was published in August 2012 and contains the decentralized production models Price Maker Strategy. These concepts were known throughout this period. Maybe the Internet didn’t have the ability to reach the rarified air of the bureaucracy at that time? Or, why do anything when you can just have investors inject the capital each year to keep the party going?
The second aspect of the vanishing cash is the fact that as many costs as possible are capitalized to property, plant and equipment or “building balance sheets.” Interest and overhead have become extreme in terms of their total costs that are attached to these capital assets. This appears to be an inert action that has no consequences to bureaucrats who have no understanding of the follow on repercussions of their actions. The immediate impact is that producers claim overreported profitability when most of the costs are deferred to subsequent periods that extend beyond decades. And as we’ve noted, overreported profits lead to overinvestment by investors seeking to gain access to those profits which eventually leads to overinvestment that brings about the overproduction. When the commodity prices are price makers then chronic overproduction leads to collapsed commodity prices and the destruction of value. This didn’t need to be documented in the Preliminary Specification as it's a basic business principle that extends back at least one century.
The third and fourth point in documenting our accounting based cash crash of the North American producers. Works hand in hand with the second item of overcapitalization and fourth of never recognizing a bad quarter. This is the extended depletion schedules based on reserve life indexes. A principle of accounting is to match the costs to their revenues. To do so on an accurate and timely basis. These have been tossed in the bin in oil and gas. For example our sample of producers in 2020 depleted their capital assets over a simple arithmetic basis of exactly 4.0 years. The factor they’re using for 2021 is 9.75 years as of the third quarter. What you do is forget about consistency and just plug in a number for depletion which will ensure that profitability is reported. People, Ideas & Objects believe that it would be the most competitive producer that had depleted the greatest amount of their capital assets. Contrary to the build bigger, better, beautiful, balance sheets principle. A producer should look to compete in the North American market for capital. Returning capital over a ten year period is inconsistent with the types of returns that other industries are providing investors with. Lastly it is our assumption that a capital intensive industry would have large components of capital being passed to the consumer in the prices being charged.
The fourth fallacy is that accounting is a fixed determination of profitability is the myth that bureaucrats will hold dear to their last dying days. That the variance of how profits are reported can be distorted is not something they’ll accept as an argument or news to them. This is the engineering and geological science based understanding of profits. Profits are profits. If the company has been reporting profits they are profitable from the accounting basis and the audit has verified those profits. That profitability is subjective and a perspective that can be flexible is not understood. When they demand the CFO to magically never report a bad, bad is defined as a loss, quarter. They’re assuming their CFO is in financial control of the firm to ensure that profitability will come about. The CFO understands the demand to be flexible. Besides, in the bureaucrats' minds the only thing of value are petroleum reserves because they produce them profitably. If you interfere with that you're considered a fool and will be ostracised. Trust me on this point.
Cash drainage is systemic, chronic and unavoidable in the bureaucratic oil and gas producers. These four methods conspire to destroy the bank balance every day the producers exist. Simple cash management would have identified the situation was untenable long ago. Why this was not the case is the question I have, especially in light of the points being discussed here throughout this blog and the existence of the Preliminary Specification as the solution. This is therefore how the cash disappears.
- Producer costs are incurred in the form of capital, royalties, operations and overhead which include interest.
- Other than royalties and operations all other categories are capitalized.
- Large percentages of overhead.
- Tangible and intangible assets are recorded in an effort to emulate the value of the producer's petroleum reserves as determined by the independent reserve estimate. Reserves are worth nothing if they can’t produce “real” profitability.
- Oil and gas commodities are price makers. Over reported profits have led to overinvestment which enabled over production to collapse prices below the breakeven price. This began as a result of the late 1970s SEC implementation of full cost accounting and manifested itself initially in the 1986 oil price collapse.
- The cash returned to the producer was diminished in the past four decades due to overproduction dropping the commodity price below the breakeven level for all producers and everywhere. By how much is unknown. Cash shortfalls were made up by annual investor infusions.
- Producers are recording minimal percentages of overhead and interest in the current month. These therefore are the only costs, outside of depletion, being returned to producers in the form of cash from the sales of the commodities. Depletion emulates reserves life in what is hoped and understood to be a growing variable. And therefore the reserves life basis does not compete for capital in the North American capital markets.
- Cash goes in, sits for a decade or two in property, plant and equipment, where it is soon joined with the next year's investors' cash and these will grow old together before they’re ever passed on to the consumer and recognized in the price of the commodity. Finally converted to the cash they were when they were once invested, or as we’ve been told all these years of “putting cash in the ground.” Turning over the cash invested on a multi-decade basis in 2021, or at any time is ludicrous and yes, insane.
- If accounting seeks to match costs with revenues. Oil and gas is the reason this principle was discovered and realized in terms of its value.
- Oil and gas bureaucrats seek to match revenues with profits. Match their capital assets with the amount of their petroleum reserves. It didn’t matter if the price of the commodities were too low to produce real profits, they could report profitability by deferring more costs by “putting more cash in the ground” to “build the balance sheet” and increase their profitability. Therefore we should have been listening to them.
Bureaucrats took this situation to extremes in the more recent two quarters of 2021. We noted they were, what we believed to be, harvesting their cash in order to pay the commitments on their hedging contracts. However at the same time their working capital fell to critically low levels in the third quarter, a trend that began in 2015 with the exit of their investors and accelerated in the second quarter of 2021 when the realized losses from hedging became an issue. We’ve published that our suspicion is these hedging losses are now being attempted to be financed by holding on to the shares of their working interest partners production proceeds. We don’t know if that is the case however accounts payable and receivable in the industry are ballooning to untold heights. There is not enough field activity to support this level of accounts payable debt being incurred and it is systemic throughout our producer sample. We noted that Conoco does not have any hedging activity and yet their accounts were ballooning too. And I questioned if Conoco were the only producer that was paying their debts what would that provide them? The fact of the matter is that there’s no other source of cash available to them. Hedging is incurring substantial losses and very rapidly. Just under $17 billion for our sample of producers that’s been incurred for just the second and third quarters.
Bureaucrats have lost control of the operational, financial and political frameworks as we noted in last Friday's post. Today in the process of cannibalizing one anothers production proceeds they’re actively breaking down the legal framework of the industry. When investors, banks and the service industry have all been betrayed, that leaves just the other producers doesn’t it. Will investors be stepping up to provide the financial resources to bail out the bureaucrats? How about the banks?
While bureaucrats show their persistence and diligence in awaiting the inevitable return of their investors and bankers. It’s important to note the efforts they’ve taken in these past six years since their investors began their exit. Please note they left as a result of dissatisfaction with the performance and expected action would be taken to correct it. What’s happened in those six years is absolutely nothing, the same as the past four decades that established such a strong non-performant culture. Although not part of our sample of producer firms. A company that is the largest natural gas producer in the U.S., EQT has the enviable position of proving most of what I’ve claimed in these last two blog posts. For three quarters of the 2021 fiscal year they have negative revenue of $775 million. That’s correct negative revenue and losses of $2.9 billion. Working capital was negative $3.89 billion up or down, I don’t know, from 12/2020 of negative $547 million. Non-GAAP reporting was $1.115 billion in earnings! This is unfortunate and a tragedy but we know the score, muddle along.
On the other hand we have no shortage of work to do. Much needs to be done in the next few years. The Preliminary Specification needs to be built. The engineering and geological explicit knowledge needs to be captured as Intellectual Property and developed. New oil and gas firms need to be formed, capitalized and organized. Assets need to be transferred to these new producers in innovative, strategic and tactical ways. In this process we’ll all be helping the current producers to travel faster down their chosen journey to clean energy by disposing of dirty oil. This transition to the Preliminary Specification is something that must be done to deal with the financial difficulties the industry is plagued with from the current administration. This also needs to be done as preparation for the future. And to learn from the experience of this transition as we’ll be faced repeatedly with situations that share this same scope and scale of change in the near future of this business. We’ll therefore be somewhat prepared and experienced in challenges of this nature. Please review our Production Rights to see how everyone can participate in making this new oil and gas industry happen. An industry where it will be less important who you know, but what you know and what you're capable of delivering, what the value proposition is that you’re offering?
Those interested in joining our user community are People, Ideas & Objects priority and focus. The Preliminary Specification, our user community and their service provider organizations provide for a dynamic, innovative, accountable and profitable oil and gas industry with the most profitable means of oil and gas operations, everywhere and always. Setting the foundation for profitable North American energy independence, everywhere and always. In addition, our software organizes the Intellectual Property of the exploration and production processes owned by the engineers and geologists. Enabling them to monetize their IP for a new oil & gas industry to begin with a means to be dynamic, innovative and performance oriented. Providing a new investment opportunity for those who see a bright future in the industry. A place where their administrative, accounting, exploration and production can be handled for the 21st century. People, Ideas & Objects have joined GETTR and can be reached there. Anyone can contact me at 713-965-6720 in Houston or 587-735-2302 in Calgary, or email me here.