These Are Not the Earnings We're Looking For, Part LXIV
The fourth quarter 2020 earnings of the producers continued the downward trajectory that we’ve seen over the past decade. This downward trajectory is in almost perfect symmetry with the trajectory of care and concern expressed by the bureaucrats involved in this business. How this approach continues with these difficulties with no recognition of the critical issues is beyond me. The belief in the effectiveness of “muddle through” is absolute. There was however an interesting trend that appeared in the fourth quarter. Just before the release of the earnings report there would be an announcement of a merger, divestment or acquisition of material size. These of course were designed to distract from the performance issues presented in the financial statements. Very effective I have to say. And for the first time I can remember in my life I’ve experienced two major producers, Occidental and Pioneer, claim the dog ate their financial reports, would not make their deadline and needed more time. That is they were unable to meet their previously announced deadlines and extended their release an extra week due to the Texas energy crisis. I’ve seen it all now.
All of our sample of producers that have issued audited financial statements have included Critical Audit Matters (CAM). (Definition provided below.) We expect the rest of our sample’s CAM’s will be seen in the annual reports and we expect to see all of them include the same CAM associated with the amount of depletion recognized in 2020. The industry has essentially been put on notice by the SEC that it is investigating Exxon and all the shale producers regarding their valuation of oil and gas reserves / assets. This being the issue that People, Ideas & Objects believes has led to the distortions and disruptions in the financial performance of the industry and a major contributor to what has caused its financial difficulties since 2015. It is an intrinsic part of the bureaucrats culture of “muddle through,” “building balance sheets,” and “putting cash in the ground.” That over reported asset valuations lead to commensurate over reported profits, which attract disproportionate investors which lead to excessive over investment in the industry causing overproduction of oil and gas commodities. These have been taken to obscene valuations and are represented on any and all producer balance sheets by their disproportionate size of property, plant and equipment. It is our belief that audit firms should have been dealing with this issue four decades ago. Their acceptance of the bloating and “building of balance sheets” and the culture of “you have to put cash in the ground” while on their watch makes them culpable and these CAM’s are the beginning of these audit firms house cleaning. A key issue that we’ve resolved within the Preliminary Specification, by our user community and their service provider organizations. Just one of the many issues which this community of software and services were designed to, and indeed, resolve. In addition we establish a solid footing for innovation within the industry.
The Board is issuing this concept release to seek public comment on potential changes to the auditor’s reporting model based on concerns of investors and other financial statement users. Auditors, as a result of the performance of required audit procedures, often have significant information regarding a company’s financial statements and the audit of such financial statements, that is not today reported in the standard auditor’s report to the financial statements users. This information might be useful to investors and other financial statement users and could lead to more efficient markets and improved allocations of capital.
One of the more difficult aspects of the outsized nature of property, plant and equipment is the capitalization of overhead and interest that has occurred since the 1980s. Today the detail regarding interest costs is enhanced even further in 2020s fourth quarters reporting. With most of our sample producers now participating in the full disclosure of the treatment of interest costs. Many also reduced the capitalization of interest to zero in the fourth quarter. The detail of what and how interest costs are handled compared to many of the prior periods is very informative. I however still wonder why we never get any level of detail with respect to overhead costs? Overhead costs are capitalized on average by 85% in the industry. It's as I’ve repeatedly stated this is based on my knowledge and experience only. If any producer bureaucrat wants to educate me on what their specific practice is, I’m open to consideration of their facts. My email address is provided below and I see no harm in their being the first to do so! Although interest rates are very low, bordering on negative at times. The interest costs being incurred are becoming material to the producers for two reasons. 1) The revenues being generated are certainly not what they were, particularly in light of the soon to be incurred costs of rebuilding, refurbishing the infrastructure across the continent, and lets not forget the reclamation costs. All of these and more of the expected incremental costs of oil and gas exploration and production process were detailed in our series entitled New Cost Structures. If it is as we suspect that the valuation of these assets are becoming more suspect throughout the regulatory environment. Precipitating more rapid write downs in the future, leverage will quickly become an issue to the banks.
But the interest paid will become more significant as the rates potentially go higher. The second point on interest rates becoming material is that since the November 3, 2020 election the ten year bond rate has increased by 113.67%. I assume the declared revisions to monetary policy by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, being the democratic party's attitude of who cares about the debt, is having an effect on the market's perception of interest rates. This trend of increased interest rates, on top of the massive and detrimental effect that write downs will have on leverage may need to be sold as a feature in oil & gas and not a bug. People, Ideas & Objects identified the potential of escalating costs of money and bank leverage as potential crisis # 3 in our series New Cost Structures. We should anticipate this feigned attempt at honesty and transparent reporting to dissipate fairly soon as the demand for profits, real or otherwise, and the ability to produce them will require all the CFO’s tools to be on the table. That will demand the capitalization of interest to begin again, and the process of transparency will need to become more ghost-like.
I don’t think at times producer bureaucrats fully comprehend the consequences and implications of the issues that I write about. Except I know they know better. Just for those bureaucrats that like to feign the inability to comprehend the tragic aspect of these CAM’s towards their future. They should ask the following questions, have all of the write downs been satisfied? Is the SEC satisfied now? Why have hundreds of lawsuits, some specifically citing the reported SEC investigation launched against Exxon, been started? Will the SEC look for the one scalp that will establish the example for all of the market to respond to. Just as they did with PennWest in September 2014 with their fraud charges for the ineligibility of capitalizing royalties and operating costs. The SEC has done the single violator example once now, it’s only reasonable that the industry did not take PennWest as an example to clean up their act beyond correcting the capitalization of royalties and operations. Therefore the SEC may feel they have to take the process further and extend their sample beyond just Exxon. The knowledge that subpoenas have been sent to other shale producers reflect only SEC fact finding inquiries at this time. Nonetheless, whatever happens with the SEC, the producer bureaucrats may not want to wait until the knock on the door before action is taken. Remember, “issue mitigated, nothing litigated” as expressed in our January 11, 2021 blog post. In addition their bank leverage is going to be increasing due to the reduction in assets as a result of audit and SEC regulatory actions. As it was quickly learned with the demise of PennWest and the prosecution of fraud of its officers by the SEC, capitalizing royalties and operations needed to be reversed quickly throughout the industry by all of the producers. Over the course of the time that we’ve been analyzing our sample of producers, which has been since the third quarter of 2016, the leverage of producer firms is getting more disproportionate by the day. A trend we see accelerating uncontrollably now. How much longer will the banks tolerate this erosion of their risk profile?
If we take the proceeds from revenues less commodity purchases, transportation and production costs which make up the core of the costs of the producer we come up with the gross profit. These values are never in line, in my opinion, with what a productive, profitable oil and gas industry should be conducting. If we take our sample of producers for the 2020 year. Some may think the 2020 year was exceptional which it was. However these are all variable costs and would be the same percentage of revenues at whatever volume of production. Our sample of producers produced a gross profit of $51.6 billion in the 2020 calendar year. How inadequate the revenues of the producers is reflected in the overall loss of $60.7 billion, as reported based on the specious financial statements that I repeat chronically overreport profitability. This is usually where I’m told oil and gas is all about cash flow.
When considered over the life of the firm. A properly managed enterprise will produce x profit. The amount of that profit is dependent on the management of those assets and should be considered widely variable based on the quality of its management. It is also reasonable to assume that the life of those assets will produce, under an appropriate manager's hands, a similar profitability each and every reporting period. What can happen however is that the assets can be leveraged at any point within their lifetime to generate a reported profitability that boosts the earnings in the short term in order to enhance their position and standing in their community as a good manager. This may have been real valid profitability. Or it could have been specious accounting that did not recognize all of the costs associated with the reality of the situation. This latter situation creates a shortfall in cash that demands the necessity to be augmented in time with outside sources of cash to cover the alleged “profitable” periods that generate no cash. Over time, a firm such as this will have all but extinguished the opportunity to generate these false profits and be subject to the fact, as is the case in oil and gas, the property, plant and equipment account is disproportionate to all else and as a result will need to be drawn down much faster that would otherwise be necessary to correct the historical imbalance. Therefore creating losses that will be equal to the excessive profitable amounts reported on the basis of the falsity of those earnings reported earlier.
Wise and astute readers may suggest that the fact that profitability was reported without cash will be offset by the periods in which losses will be reported with the generation of cash. And this would be the case in an appropriately managed enterprise. However, as we see the industry was not appropriately managed when the earnings were massaged to the short term, the softness of the management who believed they were superior managers were in reality pikers. Their best day would be to possibly manage the assets as a zero sum game. Which is what they’ve sort of been telling us for a few decades now. We must not have been listening or misunderstood their language. For me to understand or envision how they’ll suddenly become the requisite super-managers that are required demands that I assign a probability of 0%.
As was inevitable at some point, producers will be reporting greater losses than our model for the industry would have reported. Yet remain reporting significant losses under any basis of their management. This becomes inevitable over time as organizations grow older. The young organization may create the opportunity for the greater volume of the deferral of the depletion. As the organization reaches mid age, the amount of depletion begins to increase in excess of what “would have been” required due to the need to catch up with the need for more appropriate reporting. 2020 seems to be the definitive time in which we’ve crossed over that threshold.
The Preliminary Specification, our user community and service providers provide for a dynamic, innovative, accountable and profitable oil and gas industry with the most profitable means of oil and gas operations, everywhere and always. Setting the foundation for profitable North American energy independence. People, Ideas & Objects have published a white paper “Profitable, North American Energy Independence -- Through the Commercialization of Shale.” that captures the vision of the Preliminary Specification and our actions. Users are welcome to join me here. Together we can begin to meet the future demands for energy. Anyone can contact me at 713-965-6720 in Houston or 587-735-2302 in Calgary, or email me here.