Governance Over the Deployment of Capabilities
"This is the basic modularization of the market economy. It accords well with the modularization G. B. Richardson (1972) suggested in offering the concept of economic capabilities. By capabilities Richardson means "knowledge, experience, and skills" (1972, p. 888), a notion related to what Jensen and Meckling (1992) call "specific knowledge and to what Hayek (1945) called "knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place." For the most part, Richardson argues, firms will tend to specialize in activities requiring similar capabilities, that is, "in activities for which their capabilities offer some comparative advantage" (Richardson 1972, p. 888)." p. 27
What is it that we are trying to achieve in employing these capabilities? It is of course to generate value. But more importantly to generate value on behalf of the owners represented in the Joint Operating Committee. In economic terms this value is called “externalities.” After the operation, after the deployment of the right capabilities at the right time by the right people the value should have been gained by the members of the Joint Operating Committee.
So why don't we observe everywhere a perfectly atomistic modularization according to comparative advantage in capabilities - with no organizations of any significance, just workers wielding tools and trading in anonymous markets? We have already seen the outlines of several answers. The older property rights literature, we saw, would insist that the reason is externalities, notably the externalities of team work arising from the nature of the technology of production itself. The mainstream economics of organization is fixated on another possibility: because of highly specific assets, parties can threaten one another with pecuniary externalities ex post in a way that has real ex ante effects on efficiency (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Williamson 1985). Richardson offers a somewhat different, and perhaps more fertile, alternative. Firms seek to specialize in activities for which their capabilities are similar: but production requires the coordination of complementary activities. Especially in a world of change, such coordination requires the transmission of information beyond what can be sent through the interface of the price system. As a consequence, qualitative coordination is necessary, and that need brings with it not only the organizational structure called the firm but also a variety of inter-firm relationships and interconnections as well." pp. 27 - 28
If the Joint Operating Committee coordinates these capabilities in the appropriate manner then the externalities will flow to the producers represented there. That is what the governance of the operation is most concerned about. That there was leakage of some documentation of these capabilities during the operation is immaterial to the externalities and the competitive position of the firm. Recall during our review of Professor Giovanni Dosi for the Preliminary Specification. His research showed that it took an equal and sometimes greater effort to copy another firm's capabilities then it did to generate the capabilities themselves. It is therefore more effective for a firm to focus on their key competitive advantages of their land and asset base, and their earth science and engineering capabilities. And the effective and efficient deployment of these competitive advantages on a “just in time” basis.
We have asserted and I am certain that it is generally agreed that the oil & gas industry is moving towards its scientific basis as its primary form of competitive advantage. The days in which financiers or lawyers could build viable producers based on their skills are numbered if nonexistent. There is also a perception that is developed through the Preliminary Specification that the producer is a firm that maintains financial interests in a variety of Joint Operating Committees. That the producer will deploy their capabilities to these assets when and where they are needed and as these capabilities are developed. These processes of capabilities deployment are under constant levels of change and innovation in the innovative producer. This level of change and innovation causes “Dynamic Transaction Costs” to be incurred, and for people to question the direction of the changes. What is needed is a method of governance in the Compliance & Governance module over the overall process of change to ensure that the ship maintains its course and the costs remain in line. Quotations are from Professor Richard Langlois “Transaction Costs in Real Time” paper.
Over time, capabilities change as firms and markets learn, which implies a kind of information or knowledge cost - the cost of transferring the firm's capabilities to the market or vice-verse. These "dynamic" governance costs are the costs of persuading, negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching others. They arise in the face of change, notably technological and organizational innovation. In effect, they are the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them. p. 99
We introduced the “Operational Review & Governance Interface” and we will now continue with its discussion. In our previous discussion we had the ability to mentor the Project Manager and oversee or supervise the operation if required. What we need to discuss now is broader and more global in scope. An interface that encapsulates the entire firm's operations so that the user can see that the direction the firm has taken in terms of capabilities development is being optimized in its Joint Operating Committees, etc. It would be of little value if the firm was expending valuable resources on developing its capabilities on multilateral fracing in shale formations when none of its Joint Operating Committees were deploying, or able to deploy the technologies.
With the “Operational Review & Governance Interface” the user would be able to review the entire operation as it happened. From the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” to the “Planning & Deployment Interface,” AFE, Job Order and “Lessons Learned Interface.” Review all of the actions taken and the documentation that was generated during the operation to determine what was the critical cause of the success or failure of the operation. This could be done in fine detail or in summary form to oversee the many operations that may have been conducted.
Another variable that is being captured by the Preliminary Specification is the “Dynamic Transaction Costs” themselves. These are the costs associated with change and innovation. When people run into these costs then they will know to tag them with the Dynamic Transaction Costs tag for further review. This will be a red flag in the “Operation Review & Governance Interface” for the user to trigger on. When they see high levels of “Dynamic Transaction Costs” then they know the operation ran in to high levels of change and / or innovation. Therefore they will be able to see the implications of these costs in the knowledge and information in the interface. And know that either some significant change or innovation was the result.
The Preliminary Specification provides the oil and gas producer with the most profitable means of oil and gas operations. People, Ideas & Objects Revenue Model specifies the means in which investors can participate in these user defined software developments. Users are welcome to join me here. Together we can begin to meet the future demands for energy.