The Preliminary Specification Part CCXXVII (R&C Part XXXVII)
In yesterday’s post we noted how the information detailed in the “Capabilities Interface” of the Research & Capabilities module would provide the “knowledge, experience, and skills” of the operation. That these details were provided to all of the members of the temporary organization that was put together for the purpose of that specific operation. From the lease hands on the drilling rig to the engineers and geologists of the participating producers of the Joint Operating Committee. Everyone would be on the same page in terms of what and how the capabilities of the firms and market were being deployed. In today’s post we want to discuss these points further and relate how the People, Ideas & Objects Preliminary Specification enables the innovative producer to successfully complete these field operations.
[I]t seems to me that we cannot hope to construct an adequate theory of industrial organization and in particular to answer our question about the division of labour between firm and market, unless the elements of organization, knowledge, experience and skills are brought back to the foreground of our vision (Richardson 1972, p. 888).
Before we get too much further into this discussion let us also bring in the Military Command & Control Metaphor that was developed by People, Ideas & Objects. The MCCM provides a means for the “pooled” technical resources within a Joint Operating Committee to immediately adopt a command and control structure that is recognizable. It is expected that this command and control structure would also extend over the field personnel from the field contractors that were hired for the operation being conducted. This would therefore provide a level of control to the engineers and geologists that would attain the precision necessary. Such that once the engineer gave the order to drill to a TD of a certain depth, then that would be achieved at exactly the point where the engineer expected it.
Here in the next quotation Professor Langlois raises an interesting point about “incentive alignment”. We’ll be talking about this more in tomorrow’s post as well. But in essence he is saying that at a certain point its not about a matter of incentives that motivates a team to succeed.
As we will argue in more detail below, there are in fact two principal theoretical avenues closed off by a conception of organization as the solution to a problem of incentive alignment. And both have to do with the question of production knowledge. One is the possibility that knowledge about how to produce is imperfect - or, as we would prefer to say, dispersed, bounded, sticky and idiosyncratic. The second is the possibility that knowledge about how to link together one person's (or organization's) productive knowledge with that of another is also imperfect. The first possibility leads us to the issue of capabilities or competencies; the second leads to the issue of qualitative coordination. p. 11
Reading of this next quotation shows that we have a job to do here in the “Capabilities Interface” of the Research & Capabilities module. That is we need to replace this critical function that was done by the “firm” in the previous organization. As much as I want to criticize the current management they are doing the job to a certain level. And to not respect that level would be a failure on our part. What we need to do is to capture what the firm does now by “lowering the costs of qualitative coordination in a world of uncertainty.”
A close reading of this passage suggests that Coase's explanation for the emergence of the firm is ultimately a coordination one: the firm is an institution that lowers the costs of qualitative coordination in a world of uncertainty. p. 11
Going back to the incentives issue for a moment. Lets put in context the conflict between the service industry and the oil and gas producers. They have been in disagreement for a number of years as to the pricing of the services for field operations. Read this next quotation with this in mind.
All recognize that knowledge is imperfect and that most economically interesting contracts are, as a consequence, incomplete. But most of the literature considers seriously as coordinating devices only contracts and the incentives they embody. It thus neglects the role- the potentially far more important role - of routines and capabilities as coordinating devices. Moreover, the assumption that production costs are distinct from transaction costs and that production costs can and should always be held constant obscures the way productive knowledge is generated and transmitted in the economy. p. 14
Professor Langlois is 100% correct. The producers are relying on contracts to incentivize the contractors and its not working. What is required is better coordination. And that begins with systems like the People, Ideas & Objects Research & Capabilities module that details the capabilities of the producers and field staff in a manner that constructively deals with the problems of a scientific based business.
For the industry to successfully provide for the consumers energy demands, it’s necessary to build the systems that identify and support the Joint Operating Committee. Building the Preliminary Specification is the focus of People, Ideas & Objects. Producers are encouraged to contact me in order to support our Revenue Model and begin their participation in these communities. Those individuals that are interested in joining People, Ideas & Objects can join me here and begin building the software necessary for the successful and innovative oil and gas industry.
Please note what Google+ provides us is the opportunity to prove that People, Ideas & Objects are committed to developing this community. That this is user developed software, not change that is driven from the top down. Join me on the People, Ideas & Objects Google+ Circle (private circle, accessible by members only) and begin building the community for the development of the Preliminary Specification.