Professor Giovanni Dosi, Part VI
People, Ideas & Objects focus is on providing ERP systems based on using the Joint Operating Committee as the key organizational construct of the innovative producer. The reason for doing this is to support the innovative oil and gas producers in the difficult processes of identifying and supporting innovation. In this first quotation, I find Professor Dosi has captured the difficulty the producer faces in the scientific and business processes of the firm.
In general the uncertainty associated with innovative activities is much stronger than that with which familiar economic model deals. It involves not only lack of knowledge of the precise cost and outcomes of different alternatives, but often also lack of knowledge of what the alternatives are (see Freeman 1982; Nelson 1981a; Nelson and Winter 1982).
In fact, let us distinguish between (a) the notion of uncertainty familiar to economic analysis defined in terms of imperfect information about the occurrence of a known list of events and (b) what we could call strong uncertainty whereby the list of possible events is unknown and one does not know either the consequences of particular actions for any given event (more on this in Dosi and Egidi 1987).
I suggest that, in general, innovative search is characterized by strong uncertainty. This applies, in primis to those phases of technical change that could be called pre-paradigmatic: During these highly exploratory periods one faces a double uncertainty regarding both the practical outcomes of the innovative search and also the scientific and technological principles and the problem-solving procedures on which technological advances could be based. When a technological paradigm is established, it brings with it a reduction of uncertainty, in the sense that it focuses the directions of search and forms the grounds for formatting technological and market expectations more surely. (In this respect, technological trajectories are not only the ex post description of the patterns of technical change, but also, as mentioned, the basis of heuristics asking “where do we go from here?”) p. 1134Lets be clear, the uncertainty resides in both the scientific and business realms. I am not of the opinion that the two can be separated, as is done in other systems such as SAP. This is maybe why the industry has been poorly served, in my opinion, by the business systems that operate today. They don’t recognize the innovative and science basis of the business.
However, even in the case of “normal” technical search (as opposed to the “extraordinary” exploration associated with the quest for new paradigms) strong uncertainty is present. Even when the fundamental knowledge base and the expected directions of advance are fairly well known, it is still often the case that one must first engage in exploratory research, development, and design before knowing what the outcome will be (what the properties of a new chemical compound will be, what an effective design will look like, etc.) and what some manageable results will cost, or, indeed, whether very useful results will emerge. p. 1135Add to this situation the complexity of interactions of the producers that are represented in the JOC and we begin to see the difficulty expressed by Professor Dosi. Having misaligned frameworks where the bureaucracy is attuned to only compliance and governance of the firm. Is the easy way to deal with the complexity and difficulty in this business. In other words just ignore it. This is how you have CFO’s stand up at the annual meeting and state that, on a budget basis, the firm will produce an additional 10% next calendar year. Dosi notes;
As a result, firms tend to work with relatively general and event-independent routines (with rules of the kind “... spend x% of sales on R & D,” ... distribute your research activity between basic research, risky projects, incremental innovations according to some routine shares ...” and sometimes meta-rules of the kind “with high interest rates or low profits cut basic research,” etc.). This finding is corroborated by ample managerial evidence and also by recent more rigorous econometric tests; see Griliches and Ariel Pakes (1986) who find that “the pattern of R & D investment within a firm is essentially a random walk with a relatively low error variance” (pp. 10 - 11). In this sense, Schumpeter’s hypothesis about the routinization of innovation (Joseph Schumpeter 1942) and the persistence of innovation-related uncertainty must not be in conflict but may well complement each other. As suggested by the “late” Schumpeter, one may conjecture that large-scale corporate research has become the prevailing form of organization of innovation because it is most effective in exploiting and internalizing the tacit and cumulative feature of technological knowledge (Mowery 1980; Pavitt 1986). Moreover, companies tend to adopt steady policies (rules), because they face complex and unpredictable environments where they cannot forecast future states of the world, or even “map” notional events into actions, and outcomes (Dosi and Orsenigo 1986; Heiner 1983, 1988). Internalized corporate search exploits the cumulativeness and complexity of technological knowledge. Together with steady rules, firms try to reduce the uncertainty of innovative search, without however, eliminating it. pp. 1134 - 1135Such was the state of business in 1988 for Professor Dosi. I would argue that the luxury of time in 2010 doesn't exist. Given all the time and all the resources we are able to achieve great things. Dealing with the real world constraints of the science of oil and gas in this business has to be purposely addressed. That is the business of People, Ideas & Objects in developing the systems defined in the Draft Specification.
Internalization and routinization in the face of the uncertainty and complexity of the innovative process also point to the importance of particular organizational arrangements for the success or failure of individual innovative attempts. This is what was found by the SAPPHO Project (cf. Science Policy Research Unit 1972 and Rothwell et al. 1974), possibly the most extensive investigation of the sources of commercial success or failure of innovation: Institutional traits, both internal to the firm - such as the nature of the organizational arrangements between technical and commercial people, or the hierarchical authority within the innovating firm - and between a firm and its external environment - such as good communication channels with users, universities, and so on - turn out to be very important. Moreover, it has been argued (Pavitt 1986; Robert Wilson, Peter Ashton and Thomas Egan 1984) that, for given incentives and innovative opportunities, the various forms of internal corporate organization (U form versus M form centralized versus decentralized, etc.) affect innovation and commercial success positively or negatively, according to the particular nature of each technological paradigm and its stage of development. p. 1135For the industry to successfully provide for the consumers energy demands, it’s necessary to build the systems that identify and support the Joint Operating Committee. Building the Preliminary Specification is the focus of People, Ideas & Objects. Producers are encouraged to contact me in order to support our Revenue Model and begin their participation in these communities. Those individuals that are interested in joining People, Ideas & Objects can join me here and begin building the software necessary for the successful and innovative oil and gas industry.