Langlois, Innovation and Processs Part IV
Furthermore, there may be a relationship between the degree of embeddedness in the industrial district and innovation. It has been suggested that innovation increases as embeddedness increases, up to a point, and that beyond that point further embeddedness results in reduced innovation performance at the firm level (Uzzi, 1997; Boschma, 2005).3 Thus, depending on circumstances, participation in an industrial district can either encourage or impede innovation.Therefore certain levels of embeddedness in each community of practice is necessary. These communities of practice would consist of local, regional, national and international communities. With access and participation in each by those that work within oil and gas and the service industries. What Professor Langlois explores in this section of the paper is the extent that embeddedness can be under / overdone.
4. Negative Effects of Embeddedness
Much of impetus behind innovation may nevertheless derive from events outside a district - as a result of innovations developed elsewhere and of shifts in consumer demand. The survival of firms, and of entire IDs, therefore depends largely on their ability to adjust to external development. Indeed, Piore and Sabel's (1984) championing of industrial districts was based largely on their contention that small firms with generic equipment are more flexible in responding to shifts in demand than large, capital intensive firms with substantial investments in dedicated equipment. p. 14
andNevertheless, the factors underlying successful innovation in some industrial districts may turn out to be weaknesses depending on the broader innovation environment within a trade or industry. Firms in an ID may simply be slow to notice changes arising outside their district because they do not have good external channel of communication. As Marshall (Loasby, 1990) recognized, close relationships among firms and their workers could reduce their access to knowledge developed outside the district and their willingness to consider ideas from unfamiliar or distant sources. p. 15
Paradoxically this failure of firms is possible after their IDs have had a period of market leadership. they become over-confident and suffer from what Alberti (2006) calls "success myopia". The result is that trends in innovation (and not just innovation per se) in an ID tend to suffer from inertia - that once tendencies develop, they are harder to stop or to reverse than might be the case if knowledge were generally collected far and wide and if new knowledge were not generated to accommodate implicitly standardized local interfaces. this can lead to severe, perhaps fatal difficulties when the district is not at the leading edge or when consumer tastes have changed. p.15Definitely sounds like the Gulf of Mexico. Those that are not familiar with the oil and gas industry are frustrated by the efforts of BP. Why not just turn the well off? Why didn't someone think of these problems and have them solved in case of this type of event? Why are actions being taken at such a slow pace? It seems so elementary and yet the industry never considered the possibility of a blow out preventer failing in 5,000 feet of water.
In defense of the industry, the science has become pre-eminent. The Gulf of Mexico shows exactly the extent of these difficulties and tomorrow will not be any easier. Looking at the logarithmic decline curve of a reserve report focuses the mind and in my opinion limits the risks of the possibility of overconfidence. However, the scope of the overall sciences is too great for the means of organizational structures being currently employed. The scientists are working as hard as they can, it's the organizational constraints of the bureaucracy that are causing these problems. Then I could be biased towards building systems to identify and support the Joint Operating Committee in a fashion as described in the Draft Specification. Langlois would suggest that the level of embeddedness is "not enough" for the situation in the Gulf of Mexico.
I am not suggesting that a free-for-all of ideas being thrown at BP would have helped. Ideas developed without structure and governance are useless to any of the firms residing in any community of practice. This is an area where the Draft Specifications Military Command & Control Metaphor (MCCM) would enable the right type of ideas to percolate to the top. For example, if, the MCCM was in play in the situation in the Gulf of Mexico. Having everyone in the global oil and gas and service industries designated with a "name, rank and serial number" (etc.) would allow those ideas from participants who work in offshore oil and gas, who are senior engineers, who are intimate with sub-sea operations, be found instantly. In addition if there was a community of practice that existed with the MCCM implying some structure, would the social embeddedness of these individuals have thought of and possibly thought through some of the issues that would have arisen? I think so, but then again I am biased.Boschma (2005) argues that "too much and too little proximity are both detrimental to learning and innovation. that is, to function properly, proximity requires" just the right amount of distance between actors or organizations. geographic proximity, for example, may enhance inter-organizational learning and innovation though in the absence of geographic proximity other forms of proximity may substitute for it. On the other hand, too intense proximity, geographic and otherwise, can result in lock-in. Proximity / embeddedness can evolve over time too, from not enough, to just enough, to too much, suggesting a link between the issues of embeddednesss and life cycle considerations. p. 15
For instance, decentralized systems of innovation ( including industrial districts may be at a disadvantage in generating genuinely systemic innovations (Teece 1986), that is, innovations that require the development of new components as well as new ways of integrating components In such a case, the location of much of the relevant knowledge within a tightly coupled systems is likely to facilitate innovation. This need not mean a single vertically integrated firm, but it does mean that lead or coordinating firms - in modern terminology, systemic integrators - must possess a wise range of knowledge or capability and must indeed "know more than they do' (Bruisoni, Prencipe, and Pavitt, 2001). They also need to be powerful enough to force other firms to follow their lead. p. 16Seeing who has been designated as the "Red Adair" in offshore blowouts would have helped before and after a situation like this. And maybe this individual foresaw the difficulties in offshore blow out preventer's. And allocated a small budget of his engineering firm to research the idea that these could fail. And maybe they would have been well on their way to solving the problem when the incident happened. The alternative today is that the engineering firm would have had to fully developed the solution and marketed it throughout the industry for the oil and gas firm to turn their thumbs down on the idea. As we see in the Gulf today, we can't work this way anymore. Langlois notes;
In addition, their reliance on local standards can impede efforts by firms in an ID to indigenize innovation form outside, again raising the costs of adjustment and the time required. Finally, firms with a mature ID that do develop innovations may not only find it difficult to generate interest within their ID but are poorly placed to market their innovations externally. p. 16
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