Encana's Form of Corporate Socialism
This past week we saw a number of 2009 annual reports being published. The majority of them reflecting the difficulty in the oil and gas business during the "great recession". One particular company, Encana Corporation caught my attention. There are a family of 800 pound Gorilla's in their report, one issue stands above the rest, which ties into a paper that I recently read. The paper is written by Professor David Bardolet of Bocconi University, Professor Dan Lovallo of the University of Sydney, and Professor Richard Rummelt of UCLA. The paper is entitled "The Hand of Corporate Management in Capital Allocations: patterns of investment in multi- and single- business firms." This is another paper from the April 2010 edition of the Oxford Journal of Industrial and Corporate Change .
So why does Encana get singled out for this special treatment? Simply this issue needs to be addressed, and they did everything they could to avoid addressing it. Looking at the report their is no discussion of this issue in the message from the CEO. There is no discussion of the issue in the Management Discussion and Analysis. Only in the notes to the financial statements will the issue be brought up, and none of the press releases reflect the point.
The issue is that for U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) their is a $14.6 billion write down of the assets. This creates a $5.5 billion loss for all of 2009. However, as a Canadian company they have the option to report under Canadian GAAP rules and these show a profit of $1.862 billion. Just a small variance. Those that understand accounting for oil and gas will appreciate the ceiling test under Full Cost accounting. Both countries apply the same general principles for the ceiling test, the U.S. system has fewer exceptions and that is the cause of the $14.6 billion difference. What the management don't seem to realize is they will need to be explaining this anomaly in their reporting until such time as the timing differences in the Canadian reporting system expire. That could be as little as one year, or as much as the natural life of the firm, who knows, apparently not the management.
Reviewing the other Canadian firms that may report similar differences in the timing of their ceiling test write downs. I found no other material anomalies between Canada and U.S. reporting. So why has Encana been affected so materially whereas their peers have no such effect? Is it because they are "un-conventional" gas producers? Is there something inherently different in that classification that would cause these write-downs? We'll never know. As the management, led by the CEO, have taken the opportunity to be completely silent as to the anomaly. Why not take this as a teaching moment to inform and educate your investors as to why their assets have been impaired? Management doesn't think that way. They prefer to cower in the corner hoping that no one notices.
Encana defines it's strategy as a "low cost, margin maximizing natural gas producer". Whatever that means. The point of this post, and the branding of Encana as a form of corporate socialism, is based on the one size fits all strategy of this large bureaucracy. I will assert that the write down of $14.6 billion of its assets is a major hit to the firm. One that places them in the position of having to seriously address their asset base. An asset base where its natural gas production declined by 3%. If "non-conventional" gas is such a lucrative and valuable business model, why are the reserve valuations and production in such decline. From the paper.
One possibility is that our study of “averages” misses the blockbusters. That is, multi-business firms might subsidize CNU businesses because, once in a while, one of them really takes off. We cannot completely discount this possibility or measure precisely the extent of this phenomenon. However, our study of the dynamics of these segments in Section VI suggests that multi-business firms are really not that successful in finding and nurturing these blockbusters. p. 19By using the Joint Operating Committee as the key organizational construct, strategy can be set at the asset level. If the "low cost, margin maximizing natural gas producer" strategy doesn't fit the asset, a more appropriate one can be set for that asset. This assumes that we build the Draft Specification for the innovative oil and gas producer. Enabling them to manage their assets in that fashion. The use of generic global strategies is what firms did in the twentieth century, not today.
Our results are roughly consistent with the account of “corporate socialism” developed in the corporate finance literature. Some of the work in this line (e.g. Wulf, 1999; Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) stresses the agency conflict between division managers and corporate headquarters. Division managers are portrayed as rent-seeking agents that try to obtain additional compensation (in the form of extra capital allocations, among others) from corporate headquarters. They try to do so by overstating their divisions’ prospects or by engaging in direct lobbying. In turn, corporate headquarters might decide that avoiding this inefficiency in resource allocation is not worth the cost of increased monitoring or low morale and thus accede to their demands. In particular, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) make the point that managers from weaker divisions have a stronger incentive to engage in firm politics given that their demands for capital investment cannot be argued so effectively solely on the base of a prospect’s quality. Therefore, those managers end up receiving more investment capital than they should and that creates the comparative difference with their stand-alone peers in the same industry.Just to be clear the authors point out that this applies to oil and gas as much as it does any other business.
The corporate socialism argument rests on a complex set of relationships among various agents within the corporation. A simpler theory is offered by the literature on cognitive biases. In particular, the allocations observed in this study can be explained as a consequence of behaviors called “naive diversification” and “partition dependence”. Naive diversification (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001)—also known as the “1/n heuristic”—is the tendency for individuals to be biased toward even allocations. p. 19
Partition dependence is a consequence of naive diversification when the decision-maker faces a particular partition of the set of choices. In the case of capital allocations, this partition of choices would be the organization of the business units within the company. p. 19And here the authors make it abundantly clear how these decisions are made.
Naive diversification and partition dependence are well-observed phenomena in other fields of human decision-making. For example, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) found a similar effect in both laboratory and field data studies of investment in 401(k) plans. When asked to choose between investing in a stock or bond fund, many individuals choose to invest 50% in each. When asked to choose between two stock funds and a bond fund, many individuals choose to spread allocations equally among the three funds, which creates an aggregate investment that is more heavily weighted (2/3) to stocks. Bardolet et al. (2009) found strong naive diversification and partition dependence effects in managers facing hypothetical capital allocation tasks. The naive diversification account applied to internal capital markets would predict a tendency toward equal allocation among all the business units in a firm, thus underweighting factors that would demand more uneven allocations (such as growth rates, profitability, etc). The experimental character of Bardolet, Fox and Lovallo’s study shows that even in situations where social and political factors are not in play (i.e. a laboratory environment) those two biases are enough to cause a tendency toward even capital allocations among all business units, thus corporate socialism is a sufficient but not necessary explanation of inefficient allocations. pp. 19 - 20What I am asserting is that the capital allocations at Encana fall within the corporate socialism phenomenon. This has led to bad capital allocation decisions being made across the organization. Either too much capital was used in the development of the reserves, or the capital spent did not develop enough reserves to support the costs. Now those chickens have come home to roost in that the capital costs are too high to support the reserves held, forcing the write down. Those familiar with the nuances of the Full Cost ceiling test will realize the material nature of Encana's problem.
Further research on the anomalies we have identified seems warranted. In particular, it seems worthwhile to try to identify the relative importance of incentives, inertia, and biases towards even allocations in driving this result. One step in this direction would be a study which included data on corporate incentive mechanisms and changes in administration. p. 20If they wanted to study Encana, one should also study the cognitive bias towards promoting pretty young blonde's to executive vice-president positions. Our appeal should be based on these eight "Focused on" priorities and values of how better the oil and gas industry and its operations could be handled. They may not initially be the right way to go, but we are committed to working with the various communities to discover and ensure the right ones are. If your an enlightened producer, an oil and gas director, investor or shareholder, who would be interested in funding these software developments and communities, please follow our Funding Policies & Procedures, and our Hardware Policies & Procedures. If your a government that collects royalties from oil and gas producers, and are concerned about the accuracy of your royalty income, please review our Royalty Policies & Procedures and email me. And if your a potential user of this software, and possibly as a member of the Community of Independent Service Providers, please join us here.
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