Capabilities and Governanace.
From the abstract of the document I would like to note how much of the work that Langlois et al are doing is applicable to the work being done here for oil and gas. I would suggest that oil and gas may become an excellent resource for this type of research. The abstract of this document states;
"However, a new approach to economic organization, here called "the capabilities approach," that places production centre stage in the explanation of economic organization, is now emerging. We discuss the sources of this approach and its relation to the mainstream economics of organization." pp. 1Later in the document Langlois et al state
"One of our important goals here is to bring the capabilities view more centrally in the ken of economics. We offer it not as a finely honed theory but as a developing area of research whose potential remains relatively untapped. Moreover, we present the capabilities view not as an alternative to the transaction-cost approach but as complementary area of research" pp. 7.And
"In sum, whether we see it from the perspective of the capabilities perspective or from the perspective of the modern economics of organization, there is an exciting theoretical frontier ahead." pp. 31I can only concur.
A little review of Langlois' theories may help to assimilate the contents of this document. The market model requires "transactions" to occur between separate economic units. These transactions create "friction" in terms of the resources necessary to process the transaction itself. Typically these "transaction" costs were mitigated by industry forming companies that held the production and capabilities. This is referred to as the "transfer" model by Langlois et al. In the "transfer" model an employer only needed to tell his employees what needed to be done, there would be no transactions to process other then for the employee salary.
What happens as a result of this avoidance of "transaction" costs is that the industry needs to be defined and controlled through the traditional hierarchy's command and control structure. One of the key points that Langlois et al is providing evidence of is, transaction costs are used by the market to provide the oil and gas producer with what it needs in an entrepreneurial manner. The market is able to anticipate and make the determination of where the industry is heading and will work to anticipate and capture the future demands of the producer.
Langlois et al states that with the automation of transactions through the current Information Technologies. Transaction costs can be reduced to an immaterial level. This provides industry with evidence and a means to move from transfers within organizations, to transactions in markets.
It is at this point that I want to assert how damaging an economic model it can be when an industry is based on "transfers" instead of "transactions". In Calgary a few years ago many of the Drilling suppliers found their capacity utilization hit 100%. However, the market demand may have been at approximately 125% of capacity. Based on the history of the ups and downs in the market, the drillers were very hesitant to invest to increase their capacity. Recall that surplus capacity in any industry can become one of the largest fixed costs of a firm. Hence the producers who were needing the increased drilling capacity commissioned and paid for drilling rigs for their exclusive use. The drilling contractor would operate the new rigs for the producer on the basis of the producer's needs.
Why this type of "transaction" should be avoided is based directly on the Langlois et al theories that we have learned to date. The driller and his competitors, and most importantly the new drillers seeking to enter the business, seeing a new dynamic in the capacity increases and utilization, lost all incentive to take a risk in the market. Bringing a new rig or new technology to the marketplace would be too risky for any new player. What the producer signalled to the entire industry is that the hierarchies would now micro manage a drilling division due to the investment in drilling rigs. These types of "messages" are what Langlois et al is speaking about. The wrong message is being sent to both the competitive supplier side and the producer side. If producer A is willing to buy his own rigs, then producer B will have to do the same to have his wells drilled. The supplier marketplace, seeing that it is now possible to defer the risk and capital costs of new capacities to the industry will sit back and await the time for a producer to ask for the next great innovation. This is how the western capitalist marketplace begins to take on characteristics of the former Soviet Union.
In this scenario of market "transfers" it has become very difficult due to the lack of innovation and capabilities focus. The large producers don't understand why the marketplace can't accommodate its needs, and therefore feels compelled to get things done on its own. This is in essence what their large capital cost overruns are symptomatic of. Until an oil and gas producer does something to make the situation better by intervening in their suppliers marketplaces, nothing gets done.
The ability and capability of the management of the producers to deal and manage with the problems of the entire marketplace are as a result of what Langlois at al speaks of. The micromanagement of an entire industry, its suppliers and employees is not the domain of the producers hierarchical management. It is the responsibility of the market place left to resolve its own difficulties. That this has not been done for so long in the oil and gas industry only makes it look like there is strong demand for the producers management. This is false, it is an illusion. What is needed is the producers to signal to the marketplace in its entirety, that the innovative and risk oriented marketplace is what is necessary for all concerned to prosper in this new age.
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