Institution, Inertia, and Changing Industrial Leadership
Department of Economics and Management, University College, University of New South Wales, Australia
Richard N. Langlois
Department of Economics, The University of Connecticut, USA
March 1994,
One of the most persistent debates surrounding economic change is whether it is incremental or revolutionary in nature; whether, for instance, a period of change that lasted anywhere from seventy to one hundred years may be properly termed an Industrial Revolution. (Landes, 1991; Cameron, 1985). Unless we abandon standard models of causality and are willing to invoke an occasional deux ex machina to explain change, the incrementalists are of course correct in insisting that, in the end, any event represents a change in the existing framework in the sense that it flows from (can be explained by) antecedent events and conditions. This however begs the question of the rate of change since it is still entirely conceivable that there are periods when change accelerates or slows relative to other periods. Moreover, even a moderate rate of change may be consistent with significant discontinuities in that some economic agents (individuals, firms, or other institutions such as the regulatory system) may drop out altogether and be replaced by others. In this case, seeming stability on a macro level may mask compositional effects that have a great impact on the various components of the economy. p. 2
Several features of punctuated equilibrium stand out. Firstly, it is a lengthy process. Even the revolutionary or transitionary phase, in which two or more alternatives vie for success, may be prolonged for decades, or eons in the case of speciation. Secondly, the process, like Schumpeter's: creative destruction," is one of replacement. When there is punctuated equilibrium, the extinction of a species or discrediting of a scientific theory are not enough; there must be a new species available to take over the territory or a new theory to account for the phenomena that the old theory was once thought to explain. Thirdly, each period of punctuated change requires a behavioral shift to ensure alignment between the requirements of the new order and the actions of its agents. This shift might be accomplished internally, if the old agents adapt their behavior to meet the new conditions, or externally if they are supplanted by a new group of agents. Finally, inertia plays a central role in punctuated equilibrium by ensuring that change proceeds by fits and starts rather than smoothly and evenly. pp. 2 - 3
Inertia is the focus of this paper. As is explained in more detail below, inertia has two major functions in the cycle of punctuated equilibrium. Inertia result from, and in a sense embodies, the best feature of the stable phase of the cycle because it is based on the learning process in which producers determine which procedures are most efficient and effective. Once people are satisfied that the know how to do things well, they have very little incentive to look for or adopt new methods. In the words of Tushman and Romanelli (1985, pp. 197, 205), "those same social and structural factors which are associated with effective performance are also the foundations of organizational inertia..., success sows the seeds of extraordinary resistance to fundamental change." Inertia also provides the tension, however, that leads to the (relatively) short, sharp shock of the revolutionary period (Gould, 1983, p. 153) because the pressure required to displace a successful but inert system is considerable and takes time to accumulate. When there is little inertia, change can be assimilated in a gradual and orderly fashion, but an entrenched system may need to be vigorously displaced. p. 3
Here we concentrate on explaining the part played by inertia in causing economic displacement. We argue that inertia is often a rational response for firms or governments even after an important innovation becomes available, and that changes in economic leadership, whether on the level of the firm or the nation, may be inevitable when there is significant innovation. p. 4
There is a range of explanations of inertia. One set is the "real" or, in the narrow sense, "economic" explanations that look to abstract variables like demand levels, factor endowments, and relative prices to justify the failure of some organizations to change. A second reason for inertia is simple incompetence, when managers are either too stupid or too idle to adopt desirable new methods. p. 4
Here, we concentrate on the influence of institutional variables on inertia. Institutions may either retard or encourage innovation. If the institutional structure is unsuited to a new technology and inert, change will be difficult to implement. When existing institutions are flexible or well adapted to the requirements of an innovation, however, change will be accomplished relatively easily. p. 5
And institutional change, we argue, can often take place through the more or less slow dying out of obsolete institutions in a population and their replacement by better-adapted institutions - rather than by the conscious adaptation of existing institutions in the face of change. p. 6
In this paper, we restrict ourselves to pointing out that no single form of organization is appropriate for all, or even a majority of, cases in which innovation is desirable. p. 7
Overall, then, inertia exerts two principal influences on the ability of firms to cope with innovation. Inertia is often a product of successful adaptation to earlier innovation, as a firm develops ways of operating that appear to be so well suited to its internal and external environment that it sees no reason to change. In many instances, this adaptation may prove so effective that the firm can retain a total cost advantage for a prolonged period despite using an outdated technology because it can still capitalize on its master of compatible support and ancillary operations, while firms adopting a new, and technically more efficient technology, are still wrestling with the expensive process of acquiring the endogenous and exogenous institutional backup necessary to gain full value from the innovation (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). p. 7
When inertia retards the learning process necessary to deal with a subsequent important innovation, however, firms that are otherwise in a position to make the eventual transition to a new technology may be so slow in coming to grips with change that dominance shifts to new entrants who are unencumbered by prior developments, learn new adaptive procedures more quickly, and are able, therefore, largely to appropriate the market by the time the established firms have learned to cope with the innovation. The obstacle in this case is may be termed "lockout", as leaders using the old technology find that they cannot successfully make the transition when there is a significant innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p. 137). pp. 7 - 8
I continue to think back to Langlois' slides of his presentation at the ESNIE conference. The first slide documenting the market activities of the gun makers in the 1800's. It is the market that will be the form of organization that will rise to the challenge of peak oil. The market in oil and gas is in many ways runs parallel to the Joint Operating Committee. And what I think one of the most important attributes of a market is that it is made up of individuals operating in their own best interests. And this may be the key in having this software development project be successful. The culture of the Joint Operating Committee is a key foundation of the global energy business. What activities that I am recommending that we pursue here are 100% in alignment with the culture of the oil and gas industry. The corporations have regressed to a self serving model of compliance and summarily ignore the JOC. And as time passes, they will be less and less able to influence their inevitable demise.
Another aspect of capabilities that has recently received a great deal of attention is organizational culture. In practice, not all organizations may be equally able to cope with change, as existing patterns of behavior involving both executives and subordinates may be resistant to change. Organizations develop collective habits or ways of thinking that can be altered only gradually. To the extent that a given culture is either flexible or consistent with a proposed change in product or process technology, the transition to the new regime will be relatively easy. If, however, the culture is incompatible with the needs posed by the change and is inflexible, the viability of the change will be threatened (Robertson, 1990; Langlois 1991; Camerer and Vepsalainen, 1988). p. 9
Nelson and Winter have formulated an economic analogue of capabilities, including organizational culture. "Routines," as they put it, "are the skills of an organization." In the course of its development, a firm acquires a repertoire of routines that derives from its activities over the years. To the extent that these routines are efficient and difficult to come by, they are a most important asset, but they also induce inertia because they are difficult for the firm to change once in place. p. 10
Teece... fails to note that the inflexibility, or inertia, induced by routines and the capabilities that they generate can raise to prohibitive levels the cost of adopting a new technology or entering new fields. Such inertia can develop to the extent that existing rules are both hard to discard and inconsistent with types of change that might otherwise be profitable. p. 10
Whereas major competence enhancing innovations may, in time, be assimilated, the creation of entirely new organizations may be needed to deal with innovations that undermine the capabilities or competences of existing firms. p. 11
Langlois and Robertson have some additional key points that appear to me to be self-evident. I would also assert that the discussion about learning has affected the energy industry. The effect being that it has enabled the firms to remain blind to the issues associated with peak oil.
Firms that do not make the correct decisions (that do not know how to learn what they specifically need to learn) may lose irrevocably. In the words of Cohen and Levinthal (1990, p. 138):
If the innovation is competence destroying, the inertia generated by mastery of an older technology may preclude the rapid acquisition of knowledge that will permit the transition. Competence enhancing innovation, on the other hand, can benefit either existing firms or new entrants depending on whether the competences that are strengthened are related to or distinct from those associated with the old technology. p. 13Conclusion
Institutional factors, especially those embodied in capabilities and routines, can both improve the ability of a firm to exploit an existing technology and make it more difficult to innovate by generating an inertia that is hard to overcome. p. 25
When this is true, a change in industrial leadership is probable, with the hitherto dominant firms becoming either followers or leave the industry altogether because they are no longer competitive. p.25
A number of policy implications flow from this analysis: p. 25
2) Governments should be wary, however, of propping up firms that do not have the necessary capabilities to cope with change. Too little attention is sometimes given to the "destruction" aspect of creative destruction. It can be very expensive to help firms to cling indefinitely to outdated technologies or to pay them to acquire capabilities that other firms have gained more cheaply. to the extent that some firms are encouraged to persist with obsolete technologies longer than they otherwise would, the adoption of an innovation by other firms with better capabilities may be retarded, causing a long term cost to society. p. 25
3) If it is nevertheless felt, either by private firms or governments, that they need to obtain a foothold in the innovative technology despite a high degree of rational inertia, it is best to begin adjusting as soon as possible. Otherwise, competitors may have acquired so much experience with the innovation that late adopters will be hard pressed to catch up in the acquisition of tacit and proprietary knowledge. p. 25
4) One way of handling innovation when a firm has good reasons to remain inert is through "tapered adoption." In this way, through pilot projects it will be possible to acquire knowledge and avoid falling too far behind despite the probable losses that the innovation will bring in the early stages. The experiments can then be gradually expanded to replace the old technology as the cost advantage shifts towards the innovation. If an industry is believed to be of great strategic or economic importance, governments may wish to encourage firms to embrace tapered adoption. pp. 25 - 26
5) The analysis also offers evidence that in fact industry arguments can make sense if a nation whose firms have been followers under an old technology believes that there are sufficient capabilities available to support an innovation. In such cases, there could be a substantial long run payoff to providing tariff protection for domestic innovators so that they can develop capabilities while inertia technology encourages overseas competitors to continue to use the old technology. p. 26
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