Earnings Season
Cost Behaviors
The headline claim—$14 billion in “structural cost savings” since 2019, rising to $18 billion by 2030—sounds impressive. But against what baseline? What is the reference case? And how does one credibly report “cost savings” as a standalone performance metric without disclosing the counterfactual? This is the kind of accounting sleight-of-hand that has become the norm across the sector, and it reflects poorly on boards and executives who rely on it.The rationale offered is familiar: automation, supply-chain optimization, and “operational technology” improvements. These allegedly push the breakeven $10–$15 per barrel lower. If the breakeven move is operational, not capital-driven, the math still doesn’t reconcile. Operating costs are up in Q3 and year-to-date; revenues are down. Where exactly is the $2.2 billion in Q3 savings coming from?
Collapsing the breakeven from an implied $50–$57 range to $40–$42 echoes the accounting magic of the 2013–2016 downturn, when producers declared “profitability” at $70, then $60, then $50, then $35, and so on—even as falling prices should have forced reserve reclassifications upward in cost per barrel. Historical capital costs are fixed in time and cannot behave inversely to long-term price deterioration. The numbers don’t cooperate unless the accounting is engineered to achieve the outcome.
Reviewing actual operating-expense profiles reinforces the disconnect:
- 2021: $8.719 billion OPEX / $71.892 billion revenue = 12.13%
- Mid-2023: $8.696 billion OPEX / $88.570 billion revenue = 9.8%
- 2025: $10.094 billion OPEX / $83.331 billion revenue = 12.11%
Overproduction and / or Unprofitable Production
The next claim is contradictory on its face:“Exxon remains confident of its ability to generate profits … and has increased production to 4.7 million boe/d.”“Remaining confident” is hardly a compelling forward posture. Meanwhile, global overproduction concerns are escalating. Floating storage is rising. Tanker inventories are expanding. The persistent weakness in crude since 2022—despite the temporary $100+ window—underscores a structural imbalance. Yes, the gas-to-oil ratio dropping to ~13:1 is a bright spot, but it hardly offsets the broader fundamentals.
People, Ideas & Objects’ principle of cycling a producer’s PP&E over 30 months provides a clear diagnostic. Applied to Exxon, it implies:
- 2025 PP&E recognition: $119.4 billion
- Q3 PP&E recognition: $29.838 billion
- Implied quarterly loss: $12.4 billion
But they can’t do it—and won’t. Profitability at scale requires higher commodity prices, which can only be realized by eliminating the market imbalances they created. That requires the Preliminary Specification’s decentralized production model and price-maker strategy. It will never happen under the current system.
Meanwhile, the capital accounts balloon further each year. Some producers are already easing their earnings pressure by under-depleting—recording depletion materially below capital expenditures. In a capital-intensive business, product cost should be dominated by capital costs. Instead we see selective recognition and strategic deferral.
Prospects
Investors have been absent from direct participation for over a decade. Their rationale is unambiguous: poor financial performance and no credible strategy to address root causes. Producers have simply refused to acknowledge the underlying issue. Performance metrics have deteriorated further.Our evaluation suggests industry-wide performance in the 30% efficiency range. Pinpointing the gaps is difficult because the financials are homogenized to the point of opacity. Capital is overweighted to inflate earnings. The signal is gone.
The industry must confront its structural shortcomings. It must adopt the Preliminary Specification, overhaul its cost architecture—particularly overhead management—and begin building business models beyond “drill and produce.” What is the strategy to create real economic value? How does the industry intend to compete in North American capital markets?
And a fundamental question persists: in a shale-dominated environment where wells decline 65–80% in the first 18 months, why do capital costs linger on the books for decades? Who benefits from this?
Genuine performance uplift would permit authentic profitability at lower commodity prices. Inefficient production would be shut-in and moved to the inventory of innovative projects, not forced into the market. Today’s “miracle” production growth is largely a function of shale’s intrinsic performance—enabled by service-sector innovation such as coil-tubing and Packers Plus—not producer efficiency.
By 2021 producers openly labeled shale “uneconomic,” pivoted toward clean energy by 2023, and now cling to consolidation as their growth thesis. Beyond short-term shale uplift, there is little evidence of any disruptive business model emerging.
The sector has crossed the point of no return. Without radical restructuring, it cannot rehabilitate itself. The current model is obsolete, the cost structure is fictional, and the decade-long battle with investors ends with producers winning the narrative and losing the war.
