Encana's 2012 Results
Anyway we'll be taking a running total of the earnings and losses for 2012 as they're announced. The running total for 2012 stands at a loss of $2.79 billion. Its the beginning of the season so there'll be plenty more to come.
OUR PRELIMINARY SPECIFICATION MAKES SHALE COMMERCIAL. THROUGH AN INNOVATIVE BUSINESS MODEL SUPPORTING THE JOINT OPERATING COMMITTEE, WE PROVIDE OIL AND GAS ASSETS WITH THE MOST PROFITABLE MEANS OF OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS, EVERYWHERE AND ALWAYS. ENABLING THEM TO ACHIEVE ACCOUNTABLE AND PROFITABLE NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY INDEPENDENCE. OIL AND GAS’ VALUE PROPOSITION IS AT A MINIMUM, LEVERAGED TO THE POINT OF 10,000 MAN HOURS PER BOE. WE KNOW WE CAN, AND WE KNOW HOW TO MAKE MONEY IN THIS BUSINESS.
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Labels: competitive-advantage, Final-PS, Investor, Value-Proposition
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In the most general terms, private profit-seeking agents will plausibly allocate resources to the exploration and development of new products and new techniques of production if they know, or believe in, the existence of some sort of yet unexploited scientific and technical opportunities; if they expect that there will be a market for their new products and processes; and finally, if they expect some economic benefit, net of the incurred costs, deriving from the innovations.
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In the most general terms, private profit-seeking agents will plausibly allocate resources to the exploration and development of new products and new techniques of production if they know, or believe in, the existence of some sort of yet unexploited scientific and technical opportunities; if they expect that there will be a market for their new products and processes; and finally, if they expect some economic benefit, net of the incurred costs, deriving from the innovations.
Thus, I shall discuss the sources of innovation opportunities, the role of markets in allocating resources to the exploration of these opportunities and in determining the rates and directions of technological advances, the characteristics of the processes of innovative search, and the nature of the incentives driving private agents to commit themselves to innovation.
The search, development and adoption of new processes and products in market economies are the outcome of the interaction between:
1) Capabilities and stimuli generated with each firm and within the industry of which they complete.
2) Broader causes external to the individual industries, such as the state of science in different branches, the facilities for the communication of knowledge, the supply of technical capabilities, skills, engineers etc.
3) Additional issues include the conditions controlling occupational and geographical mobility and or consumer promptness / resistance to change, market conditions, financial facilities and capabilities and the criteria used to allocate funds. Microeconomic trends in the effects on changes in relative prices of inputs and outputs, including public policy. (regulation, tax codes, patent and trademark laws and public procurement.)
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BP’s latest energy outlook, which it released on Jan. 16 in London, said that worldwide, there are an estimated 240 billion bbl of technically recoverable tight oil resources and 200 trillion cu m (tcm) of shale gas. Asia’s resources total an estimated 50 billion bbl of tight oil and 57 tcm of shale gas, compared with North America’s 70 billion bbl of tight oil and 47 tcm of shale gas, it indicated.
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History is never kind to historicists, of course; and the facts of the last quarter century have made life uncomfortable for those who would project the Schumpeter-Chandler model into the present. It has become exceedingly clear that the late twentieth (and now early twenty-first) centuries are witnessing a revolution at least as important as, but quite different from, the one Berle and Means decried and Schumpeter and Chandler extolled. Strikingly, the animating principle of this new revolution is precisely an unmaking of the corporate revolution. Rather than seeing the continued dominance of multi-unit firms in which managerial control spans a large number of vertical stages, we are seeing a dramatic increase in vertical specialization — a thoroughgoing “de-verticalization” that is affecting traditional industries as much as the high-tech firms of the late twentieth century. In this respect, the visible hand, understood as managerial coordination of multiple stages of production within a corporate framework, is fading into a ghostly translucence. p. 7
In highly developed economies, moreover, a wide variety of capabilities is already available for purchase on ordinary markets, in the form of either contract inputs or finished products. When markets are thick and market-supporting institutions plentiful, even systemic change may proceed in large measure through market coordination. At the same time, it may also come to pass that the existing network of capabilities that must be creatively destroyed (at least in part) by entrepreneurial change is not in the hands of decentralized input suppliers but is in fact concentrated in existing large firms. p. 14
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The second hypothesis, which has resonances at least as far back as Gerschenkron’s famous “backwardness” thesis (Gerschenkron 1962), is that the way an economy responds to the problems of coordinating economic development depends not only on its own institutions and capabilities but also on institutions and capabilities elsewhere. It depends not only on an economy’s own history but on the history of other economies as well. The force of this observation is that an economy at the frontier of economic development (however we care to define that) is likely to respond to the coordination problem differently than an economy lagging behind that frontier. Specifically, an economy at the frontier is arguably more likely to rely on decentralized modes of coordination. This is so because uncertainty is greater at the frontier — uncertainty about technology, organizational form, market direction. p. 18
Indeed, traditional command-style economies, such as that of the former USSR, appear to be able only to mimic those tasks that market economies have performed before; they are unable to set up and execute original tasks. The [Soviet] system has been particularly effective when the central priorities involve catching up, for then the problems of knowing what to do, when and how to do it, and whether it was properly done, are solved by reference to a working model, by exploiting what Gerschenkron . . . called the “advantage of backwardness.” (Ericson, 1991, p. 21).
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Over time, capabilities change as firms and markets learn, which implies a kind of information or knowledge cost - the cost of transferring the firm's capabilities to the market or vice-verse. These "dynamic" governance costs are the costs of persuading, negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching others. They arise in the face of change, notably technological and organizational innovation. In effect, they are the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them. p. 99
Although one can find versions of the idea in Smith, Marshall, and elsewhere, the modern discussion of the capabilities of organization probably begins with Edith Penrose (1959), who suggested viewing the firm as a 'pool of resources'. Among the writers who have used and developed this idea are G.B. Richardson (1972), Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982), and David Teece (1980, 1982). To all these authors, the firm is a pool not of tangible but of intangible resources. Capabilities, in the end, are a matter of knowledge. Because of the nature of specialization and the limits to cognition, organizations as well as individuals are limited in what they know how to do effectively. Put the other way, organizations possess a pool of more-or-less embodied 'how to' knowledge useful for particular classes of activities. pp. 105 - 106.
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Modularity is a very general set of principles for managing complexity. By breaking up a complex system into discrete pieces - which can then communicate with one another only through standardized interfaces within a standardized architecture - one can eliminate what would otherwise be an unmanageable spaghetti tangle of systemic interconnections. p. 1
What is new is the application of the idea of modularity not only to technological design but also to organizational design. Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) go so far as to assert that modularity in the design of products leads to - or at least ought to lead to modularity in the design of the organizations that produce such products. p. 1
Why are some (modular) social units governed by the architecture of the organization and some governed by the larger architecture of the market? p. 2
The set of design rules that guide social interaction are what we can generally call social institutions (Langlois 1986). These rules determine (among other things) the extent to which, and the way in which a society is a modular system. The desirability of modular design is a theme with a long history in the theory of social institutions. Adam Smith long ago proposed a decentralization scheme based on what he called "the obvious and simple system of natural liberty," by which he meant a system of private property regulated by common law and subject to minimal central administrative intervention. On the economic level, this approach would lead, he believed, to economic growth spurred by innovation, learning, and an ever increasing division of labor. pp. 14 - 15
if we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place," he wrote, "it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its order. We must solve it by some form of decentralization" (Hayek 1945, p. 524). p. 15
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Either way it boils down to the same common-sense recognition, namely that individuals - and organizations - are necessarily limited in what they know how to do well. Indeed, the main interest of capabilities view is to understand what is distinctive about firms as unitary, historical organizations of co-operating individuals. p. 17
In a world of tacit and distributed knowledge - that is, of differential capabilities - having the same blueprints [or software] as one's competitors is unlikely to translate into having the same costs of production. Generally, in such a world, firms will not confront the same production costs for the same type of productive activity. p. 18
Moreover, by taking advantage of a range of capabilities far wider than the boundaries of what even the largest firm can encompass, a network of specialist suppliers and competitors is better able to exploit the value of a complex and potentially modular product architecture.
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