OCI Resource Marketplace Module, Part V
Software Development's Role
We now turn to the capabilities view of the Preliminary Specification. Capabilities are such a critical part of innovation and we have the Research & Capabilities module that focuses on the producer firm's capabilities. But what are they and where do they reside? We have shown how the Preliminary Specification would provide the capability to suspend production in the “Marginal Production Threshold Interface,” until the marginal costs of production are realized by the commodity price. By using the “decentralized production model," production and overhead costs are all variable, such as Production Accountants costs. These costs would not be incurred without profitable production. Maintaining firm profitability and saving reserves for a time when prices are better etc. This capability resides in People, Ideas & Objects software's ability to coordinate these actions. To the point where it’s asked which is more valuable? The oil & gas asset, or the software that makes it profitable?
We have listed the firm's capabilities in the Research & Capabilities module. They are accessed through the Knowledge & Learning module by the various Joint Operating Committees. We have used the football analogy to describe how they are formulated and deployed through a variety of interfaces. However, we have not discussed the "Dynamic Capabilities Interface" pages. Let's first be clear, it is the Joint Operating Committees that employ the engineers and geologists from their various firms that run the project. These committees dictate why these modules are configured that way. The "Dynamic Capabilities Interface" contains information that is used to manage the service industry members in the Resource Marketplace.
But first let's identify the differences between what exists today and what needs to change in the People, Ideas & Objects Preliminary Specification. Professor Richard Langlois' research includes Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). The market model requires transactions between separate economic units. These transactions create “friction” in terms of the resources necessary to process the transaction itself. Therefore in the past, to avoid transaction costs, firms hired people as employees to perform a variety of tasks and only told them what was required in exchange for a paycheck. This mitigated the cost of paying someone $5.00 to type a letter each time it was needed for that task to be completed etc. By automating transactions with current Information Technologies, Langlois et al assert that transaction costs, such as paying an individual $5.00 for typing a letter, can be reduced to an immaterial amount. This discussion is particularly pertinent to the changes being made to the producer organizations' administrative, accounting and overhead resources being reorganized into service providers. This is also happening at a time that coincides with the fact that the hierarchy's scope of operations has spanned to an impossible level. The hierarchy must now make a choice, either fully integrate and take control of all means of production, or decentralize and let the market provide for the means of production. The Preliminary Specification assumes the latter. Through the Resource Marketplace module, the producer firm and Joint Operating Committee will be able to access and coordinate market capabilities. From Professor Langlois’ “Capabilities and Governance: the Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization.”
However, a new approach to economic organization, here called "the capabilities approach," that places production center stage in the explanation of economic organization, is now emerging. We discuss the sources of this approach and its relation to the mainstream economics of organization. pp. 1
And
One of our important goals here is to bring the capabilities view more centrally in the ken of economics. We offer it not as a finely honed theory but as a developing area of research whose potential remains relatively untapped. Moreover, we present the capabilities view not as an alternative to the transaction-cost approach but as complementary area of research pp. 7.
In the Preliminary Specification, some of the elements have been captured in the interfaces. Additional interfaces would include the “Transaction Design Interface” in the Accounting Voucher module. And in the Resource Marketplace module we have discussed the three interfaces; the “Actionable Information Interface,” “Supplier Collaborative Interface” and the “Gap Filling Interface.” Each of these would be used in some fashion in the discussion of moving to a “decentralized production model.” There are however, many more elements of this research that we will discover and develop as we continue.
During the Preliminary Research Report I coined the phrase that “SAP is the bureaucracy.” Nothing turns an organization into cement like a good old fashioned SAP implementation. What an innovative oil & gas producer needs is an organization that remains open and flexible to innovation. It also needs software development capabilities as proposed by People, Ideas & Objects. As we continue our review of capabilities, this discussion will focus on the need for organizational flexibility in terms of capability. This is to accommodate innovations within the oil & gas producer, Joint Operating Committee and service industry organizations. A capability, similar to shutting-in production until prices recover, will be brought to the producer through the Resource Marketplace module of the Preliminary Specification.
First, the Joint Operating Committee is the key Organizational Construct of an innovative oil & gas producer. Having the legal, financial, operational decision making, cultural, communication, innovation, and strategic frameworks aligned with the compliance and governance frameworks is necessary. To have the Preliminary Specification built as software with a fully supportive user community, and service provider organizations will ensure that innovative producers' needs for change are met. To have all of this available without a dedicated long-term software development capability to accommodate the needed changes in the organizational structures of innovative oil & gas producers would only restrict future oil & gas organizations in the manner that software does today. And these software development capabilities are indeed necessary according to Professor Richard Langlois’ capabilities research.
The legacy of this "path-dependent” history, we will argue, has been a tendency (albeit an imperfect tendency) to respect an implicit dichotomy between the production aspects and the exchange aspects of the firm or, to put it another way, between production costs and transaction costs. p. 5
In the Preliminary Research Report we noted Dr. Wanda Orlikowski's Model of Structuration, which is based on Dr. Anthony Giddens' Theory of Structuration, and by extension states that software defines Organizational Constructs. Therefore, within Orlikowski’s Model of Structuration, I assert that ERP software applications define, support and constrain organizations. Professor Langlois found a similar finding in his research.
Seldom if ever have economists of organization considered that knowledge may be imperfect in the realm of production, and that institutional forms may play the role not (only) of constraining unproductive rent-seeking behavior but (also) of creating the possibilities for productive rent-seeking behavior in the first place. To put it another way, economists have neglected the benefit side of alternative organizational structures; for reasons of history and technique, they have allocated most of their resources to the cost side. p. 6
If we want an innovative oil & gas industry, the first thing we should do is ensure organizational flexibility. Flexibility is necessary to ensure that we do not constrain ourselves unnecessarily, to define and support the behavior that we desire. This is the role that ERP software plays in the 21st century. People, Ideas & Objects brings this capability to the oil & gas industry.
Coordination of Markets
Professor Richard Langlois researches the boundary between firms and markets. The Preliminary Specification relies on the Resource Marketplace module to provide capabilities to the producer and Joint Operating Committee from the marketplace. This is represented by the oil & gas service industry, subsequent tiers of industries and service provider organizations. How this boundary is formed, and its definition, determines the oil & gas industry's economic organization.
[I]t seems to me that we cannot hope to construct an adequate theory of industrial organization and in particular to answer our question about the division of labor between firm and market, unless the elements of organization, knowledge, experience and skills are brought back to the foreground of our vision (Richardson 1972, p. 888).
We have briefly discussed the determining role transaction costs have in how a firm operates. If transaction costs are high, the firm will seek to mitigate transaction costs by hiring employees to handle the tasks. This will reduce the number of transactions to a few paychecks. If transaction costs are low, as we are now seeing with Information Technology, the ability to source the work from the market, from the lowest cost producer is the ideal choice. Professor Langlois notes.
Production costs determine technical (substitution) choices, but transaction costs determine which stages of the productive process are assigned to the institution of the price system and which to the institution of the firm. The kinds of costs are logically distinct; they are orthogonal to one another. As a result, issues of economic organization - such as the boundaries of the firm - cannot turn on considerations of production costs. Present-day theory has not only brought into this view but has arguably reinforced the separation. p. 10
In a nutshell, firm boundaries cannot be defined by production costs. In order to organize its production, the industry will use transaction costs to determine whether the producer or the market generates the production cost. With the makeup of the oil & gas industry. Conducting detailed, logistically complex field operations in remote regions. Since conducting these operations internally has never been an option, defining the boundary between the firm and the market is not contrary to industry practice. We are applying Professor Langlois' theories to the oil & gas industry culture and determine the appropriate way forward. I think however, that the conceptual model of transaction cost economics considers that there will be “thicker” markets and an increased volume of transactions contemplated between the producer firms, Joint Operating Committees, and the marketplace. Thicker markets than the current service industry configuration. Using People, Ideas, and Objects et al Cloud Administration & Accounting for Oil & Gas software and services would result in these "thicker" markets developing. These are considered in the Preliminary Specifications Resource Marketplace module.
There is also the impact of changes within producer firms. Having the producer's footprint reduced to C class executives, earth science and engineering resources, and some legal support. With the remainder of the administrative, accounting and overhead resources being reorganized into an industry wide, variable cost capability provided by our user communities member led service provider organizations. These service providers will bill on the basis of our task and transfer networks. Transaction costs will be negligible due to the use of the various Organizational Constructs in the Preliminary Specification. These include specialization and the division of labor, the sharing of non-rival cost infrastructure, and the use of information technology.
Theoretically sound, but... That brings up the question of how are the capabilities needed to undertake significant and complex work coordinated? From Professor Langlois' paper
As we will argue in more detail below, there are in fact two principal theoretical avenues closed off by a conception of organization as the solution to a problem of incentive alignment. And both have to do with the question of production knowledge. One is the possibility that knowledge about how to produce is imperfect - or, as we would prefer to say, dispersed, bounded, sticky and idiosyncratic. The second is the possibility that knowledge about how to link together one person's (or organization's) productive knowledge with that of another is also imperfect. The first possibility leads us to the issue of capabilities or competencies; the second leads to the issue of qualitative coordination. p. 11
And
A close reading of this passage suggests that Coase's explanation for the emergence of the firm is ultimately a coordination one: the firm is an institution that lowers the costs of qualitative coordination in a world of uncertainty. p. 11
If we consider the Research & Capabilities and Knowledge & Learning modules “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” as the starting document for how the firm can achieve a task. The actual implementation is in either the Research & Capabilities or Knowledge & Learning modules “Planning & Deployment Interface” which brings in the capabilities from the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface,” the Industrial Command & Control for the resources seconded to the project, and what is not clear in either of those modules, yet, is the resources from the Resource Marketplace module that will be the elements that complete the work in the field. A producer firm or Joint Operating Committee resolves Coase's qualitative coordination concern in the "Planning & Deployment Interface". It is ERP software as represented in People, Ideas & Objects et al that holds the producer firm organization, Joint Operating Committee and industry structure and definition. As a result, these are also constrained without defined permanent software development capabilities. This is necessary to avoid organizational deficiencies in a business model.
Innovative oil and gas producers have their land and asset base, and coordinating the market for earth sciences and engineering capabilities as their distinct competitive advantages. What the Resource Marketplace module of the Preliminary Specification provides is the means for the producer and Joint Operating Committees to coordinate those capabilities from the marketplace. By integrating the Resource Marketplace module, we will make the supplier a key contributor to the producer's or Joint Operating Committee capabilities.
At this point we have the suppliers and vendors maintaining the key contact information for their firms in the “Vendor / Supplier Contact Database.” This is done to increase the accuracy of the information and reduce the time required for each of the producers to maintain the vendor contact data necessary and do so with each resource who may use that information. What will be required is for the producer to select the vendor as the supplier that the firm will use; either as a producer, or in one of its Joint Operating Committees. This tagging or designation method will be determined through a process that the People, Ideas & Objects user community determines. Upon selection in the “Vendor / Supplier Contact Database” it will bring in a variety of other vendor supplied data that will assist the user in the “Planning & Deployment Interface” of the Research & Capabilities or Knowledge & Learning module. Data such as their key field staff, operational staff and roles within Industrial Command & Control etc. This will also provide access to their calendars and other information if the resources were selected in the “Planning & Deployment Interface.”
What this denotes, and so much of the Preliminary Specification requires, is that the People, Ideas & Objects system is not a stand alone software application for one firm. It is a holistic industry-wide solution that spans the oil & gas industry and service industries that support it. In order to achieve this type of integration, it requires the level of cooperation reflected in the People, Ideas & Objects user community and Revenue Model.
The question also becomes how does the energy industry acquire its capabilities? For some time it has employed a hybrid market / integrated firm strategy that leaves it openly critical of its suppliers and vendors and is not working. Professor Langlois notes.
The organizational question is whether new capabilities are best acquired through the market, through internal learning, or through some hybrid organizational form. And the answer will depend on (A) the already existing structure of capabilities and (B) the nature of the economic change involved. p. 21
The consequences of economic change in oil & gas are clear, but where they will end is not.
If a profit opportunity requires a configuration of capabilities different from what already exists in the economy, the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction may be set in motion. p. 21
It is stated clearly in the Revenue Model of People, Ideas & Objects. Our core competitive advantage is that we provide the innovative oil & gas producer with the most profitable means of oil & gas operations.
Officers and directors of producers have caused significant destruction. To suggest that the Preliminary Specifications interfaces and the methods of innovation that are used in the Preliminary Specifications Resource Marketplace, Research & Capabilities and Knowledge & Learning modules will operate in an environment that is similar to what the oil & gas industry operates in today misses the point of how the industry will have to reorganize itself to undertake the workloads of the future. Advanced specialization and division of labor where increased throughput can be achieved from the same resource base. Most specifically, industry earth science and engineering resources. Additionally, it covers the service industries oil & gas field operations and service providers' administrative and accounting functions. How the task is completed today may be fundamentally different from how it is completed in the near future.
Coordinating this group of disparate individuals and organizations falls under the Joint Operating Committees. Reliance on the market is the only conceptual model for the future innovative oil & gas industry. It is almost certain that attempting this task without software that identifies, defines, and supports innovative processes will lead to failure. Professor Richard Langlois in his paper Capabilities and Governance noted the following two points.
Either way it boils down to the same common-sense recognition, namely that individuals - and organizations - are necessarily limited in what they know how to do well. Indeed, the main interest of capabilities view is to understand what is distinctive about firms as unitary, historical organizations of cooperating individuals. p. 17
And
In a world of tacit and distributed knowledge - that is, of differential capabilities - having the same blueprints [or software] as one's competitors is unlikely to translate into having the same costs of production. Generally, in such a world, firms will not confront the same production costs for the same type of productive activity. p. 18
Coordinating costs, and how that coordination is conducted are about to change. It will be those producers that participate in the People, Ideas & Objects user communities that will gain the greatest advantages. They will have their unique needs met, and be able to reorganize themselves to accommodate the software, and optimize their role in coordinating their capabilities. Producers' competitive advantages reside in their land and asset base and through the coordination of the earth science and engineering market. In a working paper entitled “Organizing the Electronic Century” Professor Langlois states.
Moreover, by taking advantage of a range of capabilities far wider than the boundaries of what even the largest firm can encompass, a network of specialist suppliers and competitors is better able to exploit the value of a complex and potentially modular product architecture. p.160