A Minor Point of Difference
There are two methods in which to deal with the problem. The first is to expand the spacing of the wells. This has the effect of maintaining the wells higher production throughput however, the overall recovery percentage from the lease will be less as there will be less oil and gas that is exposed to the well bore. The other is to maintain or reduce the spacing and ensure that the oil in place is recovered to an overall higher percentage than the previously mentioned method. Either way the WSJ correctly asserts the producers will need to adjust their production forecasts from those in their prospectus’ and annual reports. From a business point of view I see a few things differently. The article hinted at the area of concern that I have with this specific parent - child issue. But also the general issue that I have with all oil and gas. Which is the overcapitalization of the properties. The WSJ notes.
Shale companies face the equivalent of an industry wide write-down if they are forced to downsize the estimates of drill sites they have touted to investors, some of which promised decades’ worth of choice spots. That raises questions about the high costs shale companies paid to secure drilling sites from Texas to North Dakota, and the true worth of their land positions, one of the primary ways they are valued.
The tendency is to want to “build the balance sheet” and therefore it is implied that money spent is increasing the value of the company, a phenomenon only known to oil and gas. Nothing could be further from the truth. The spending must be recognized as the cost of production. The earlier that a producer can recognize and recover the costs of capital that were incurred at the property, the more competitive they are. Reducing the properties “asset” balance to zero as quickly as possible should be the strategic and competitive imperative of the producer and the industry. Instead what we have is all the motivation and incentives for the bureaucrats to defer any and all of the costs that are incurred by the producer firm across the entire formations reserves. Recognizing only those capital costs of the reserves that are produced. This leaves the majority of the capital costs in the ground for decades and demands the producer seek out new capital from investors in order to keep the lights on and for next years capital program. Recovering cash from the prior investments that have been made has never been a feature, or a bug of the oil and gas industry, it just isn’t done.
If as the WSJ suggest a write down of the properties capital costs is necessary, because of too much spending, or inadequate performance compared to what was expected, then the shale producers will be hit with that write down once again. And I am fine with that. What I don’t think is appropriate, and I’ve seen it in every oil and gas producer that has had to exercise a ceiling test write down. Is once the write down is complete, in the following year and subsequent periods is to reduce the amount of depletion because the write down took care of the excess costs that were valuing the property too high. Therefore the property value is now correct, the properties reserves remain the same, and therefore depletion per barrel is lower and therefore that which is recorded in subsequent financial statements is lower. This thinking only leads us to a second and third round of write downs. The first write down cleared out the past inadequate recognition of costs and therefore corrected that. What also needs to be corrected from the point of the write down, in my opinion, is the depletion per barrel has to be increased in order to better reflect the new cost dynamics based on the now known properties history.
Now if I was a CFO of an oil and gas producer I would have the entire company aligned against me arguing that I’d lost it. I’ve suggested throughout this dissertation, also known as the Preliminary Specification, that the producers are enhanced spending machines that have no concept of financial performance in the real world. Taking money from investors and spending it was the business for the past four decades, until recently. You have, not a generational issue, but a cultural issue. No one in the industry knows any different, or any better. The reason they would refute my argument as CFO is that it would prove they were unable to compete in a commercial environment, as I suggest all producers can’t. That is, they would continue to report they were losing money. I believe the solution wasn’t to subsequently change the measurement of performance of the properties by reducing the rate of depletion, as the industry has done for decades. The solution would be to get new engineers that were able to spend effectively and produce profitably in an environment oriented towards financial performance.
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