Professor Richard Langlois on Capabilities Part I
Introduction
There are two material processes that the Research & Capabilities module controls. The first is to divide the labor between research and development and the execution of those resulting capabilities. This process is separated into the Research & Capabilities and Knowledge & Learning modules. The other material process is to move the knowledge to the area where the decision rights are held, the Joint Operating Committee. Professor Richard Langlois notes in the following.The question then becomes: why are capabilities sometimes organized within firms, sometimes decentralized in markets, and sometimes coordinated by a myriad contractual and ownership arrangements like joint ventures, franchisees, and networks? Explicitly echoing Hayek, Jensen and Meckling (1992, p.251) who point out that economic organization must solve two different kinds of problems: "the rights assignment problem (determining who should exercise a decision right) and the control or agency problem (how to ensure that self-interested decision agents exercise their rights in a way that contributes to the organizational objective)." There are basically two ways to ensure such a "collocation" of knowledge and decision making: "One is by moving the knowledge to those with the decision rights; the other is by moving the decision rights to those with the knowledge." (Jensen and Meckling 1992 p. 253). p. 9
We should also point out the quote from Professor Carliss Baldwin of Harvard University. That “knowledge begets capability and capability begets action” and how this captures the objective of what it is we are after in the module. We need to remember to keep this focus in mind when we are working in the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface.” That the data elements that we bring in to the interface are designed to initiate action.
During our review of Professor Giovanni Dosi we learned of technical trade-offs. And how these trade-offs facilitate the ability for industries to innovate on the changing technical and scientific paradigms. Crucial to the facilitation of these trade-offs is a fundamental component that spurs the change and is usually abundant and available at low costs. For innovation to occur in oil and gas, People, Ideas & Objects asserts that the ability to seek and find knowledge, and to collaborate are two “commodities” that are abundant today. With their inherent low direct costs, knowledge and collaboration are the triggers for a number of technical paradigms which will provide companies with fundamental innovations. There are many knowledge based and collaboration focused interfaces in the Preliminary Specification, making the People, Ideas & Objects ERP system the ideal candidate for the innovative oil and gas producer.
Lastly we should note that when markets such as oil and gas are asymmetric, research & development are the ways in which to differentiate capabilities and build an innovative oil and gas producer.
It was during the Preliminary Research Report that we determined two important elements that we should point out here in the Research & Capabilities module of the Preliminary Specification. The first was the oil and gas industry was moving away from an easy energy era where producers were able to provide for bankable returns on investments. And moving to a much more difficult scientific basis of the business based on the earth science and engineering capabilities as one of the key determining competitive advantages. The other element that was determined in the Preliminary Research Report was that organizations are defined and supported by the software that they used. And we coined the phrase that “SAP is the bureaucracy” to reflect this fact. Therefore in order to change the organization it is necessary to change the software that defines the organization first. If we want an innovative and profitable oil and gas producer, then the first step is to set out in the software the elements of what that producer will look like.
Unique One-Off Derivative Organizations
It is in the Research & Capabilities module that we are defining and supporting the science basis of the oil and gas business. How the earth science and engineering capabilities of the firm are acquired and documented for subsequent deployment. It is with that in mind that we begin our review of Professor Richard Langlois paper “Capabilities and Governance: the Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization.”However, a new approach to economic organization, here called "the capabilities approach," that places production centre stage in the explanation of economic organization, is now emerging. We discuss the sources of this approach and its relation to the mainstream economics of organization. p. 1
It is by way of a scenario that we note that a producer was able to document the internal and external components of the capabilities needed to conduct multi-lateral and multi-frac shale gas operations. Through a series of tests and trials they have been able to secure these processes to the point where the capabilities are deployed successfully to their various Joint Operating Committees. These processes documentation in the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” is subsequently populated to all of the shale gas zones of all the Joint Operating Committees they participate in and are available to be deployed at any time. The Joint Operating Committees know they can rely on a fully tested process based on their publication in the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface.” By selecting the relevant capabilities in the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” everyone from the engineers and geologists in the Joint Operating Committee to the lease hands on the drilling rig can see their role and responsibilities in making the operation a success. It is through the Knowledge & Learning “Planning & Deployment Interface” that the individual capabilities are accumulated and the program is designed to be executed.
One of our important goals here is to bring the capabilities view more centrally in the ken of economics. We offer it not as a finely honed theory but as a developing area of research whose potential remains relatively untapped. Moreover, we present the capabilities view not as an alternative to the transaction-cost approach but as complementary area of research p. 7.
What we had not discussed in the Research & Capabilities or Knowledge & Learning module is an important element of the “Planning & Deployment Interface,” the AFE. It will naturally be the AFE that is a large part of how the business and operational end of the deployment is initiated. Therefore the AFE template is part of the “Planning & Deployment Interface.” Having budgetary control of operations is attained through the AFE.
In sum, whether we see it from the perspective of the capabilities perspective or from the perspective of the modern economics of organization, there is an exciting theoretical frontier ahead. p. 31
For clarity the marketplace or service industry is the source of the capabilities, with operational coordination coming from the producer firm and Joint Operating Committee. If the business is a science, having everyone read from the same, unique in each instance, hymn book will not only be necessary, but will be the only way in which to be successful.
Seldom if ever have economists of organization considered that knowledge may be imperfect in the realm of production, and that institutional forms may play the role not (only) of constraining unproductive rent seeking behaviour but (also) of creating the possibilities for productive rent-seeking behaviour in the first place. To put it another way, economists have neglected the benefit side of alternative organizational structures; for reason of history and technique, they have allocated most of their resources to the cost side. p. 6
You have a unique, one time, temporary organization which is derivative of the Joint Operating Committee. It is necessary to make sure that that organization is able to understand everything that it is working to accomplish.
Operational Control and Coordination
We have noted how the information detailed in the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” of the Research & Capabilities module would provide the “knowledge, experience, and skills” of the operation. That these details were provided to all of the members of the temporary organization that was put together for the purpose of that specific operation. From the lease hands on the drilling rig to the engineers and geologists of the participating producers of the Joint Operating Committee. Everyone would be on the same page in terms of what and how the capabilities of the firms and market were being deployed. We now want to discuss these points further and relate how the People, Ideas & Objects Preliminary Specification enables the innovative producer to successfully complete these field operations.[I]t seems to me that we cannot hope to construct an adequate theory of industrial organization and in particular to answer our question about the division of labour between firm and market, unless the elements of organization, knowledge, experience and skills are brought back to the foreground of our vision (Richardson 1972, p. 888).
Let us also bring in the Military Command & Control Metaphor (MCCM) that was developed by People, Ideas & Objects. The MCCM provides a means for these “pooled” technical resources within a Joint Operating Committee to immediately adopt a command and control structure that is recognizable. It is expected that this command and control structure would also extend over the field personnel from the field contractors that were hired for the operation being conducted. This would therefore provide a level of control to the engineers and geologists that would attain the precision necessary. Such that once the engineer gave the order to drill to a TD of a certain depth, then that would be achieved at exactly the point where the engineer expected it.
Here in the next quotation Professor Langlois raises an interesting point about “incentive alignment.” But in essence he is saying that at a certain point its not about a matter of incentives that motivates a team to succeed.
As we will argue in more detail below, there are in fact two principal theoretical avenues closed off by a conception of organization as the solution to a problem of incentive alignment. And both have to do with the question of production knowledge. One is the possibility that knowledge about how to produce is imperfect - or, as we would prefer to say, dispersed, bounded, sticky and idiosyncratic. The second is the possibility that knowledge about how to link together one person's (or organization's) productive knowledge with that of another is also imperfect. The first possibility leads us to the issue of capabilities or competencies; the second leads to the issue of qualitative coordination. p. 11
Reading of this next quotation shows that we have a job to do here in the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” of the Research & Capabilities module. That is we need to replace this critical function that was done by the “firm” in the previous organization. As much as we criticize the current management they are doing the job to a certain level. And to not respect that level would be a failure on our part. What we need to do is to capture what the firm does now by “lowering the costs of qualitative coordination in a world of uncertainty.”
A close reading of this passage suggests that Coase's explanation for the emergence of the firm is ultimately a coordination one: the firm is an institution that lowers the costs of qualitative coordination in a world of uncertainty. p. 11
Going back to the incentives issue for a moment. Lets put in context the conflict between the service industry and the oil and gas producers. They have been in disagreement for a number of years as to the pricing of the services for field operations. Read this next quotation with this in mind.
All recognize that knowledge is imperfect and that most economically interesting contracts are, as a consequence, incomplete. But most of the literature considers seriously as coordinating devices only contracts and the incentives they embody. It thus neglects the role- the potentially far more important role - of routines and capabilities as coordinating devices. Moreover, the assumption that production costs are distinct from transaction costs and that production costs can and should always be held constant obscures the way productive knowledge is generated and transmitted in the economy. p. 14
Professor Langlois is 100% correct. The producers are relying on contracts to incentivize the contractors and its not working. What is required is better coordination. And that begins with systems like the People, Ideas & Objects Research & Capabilities module that details the capabilities of the producers and field staff in a manner that constructively deals with the problems of a scientific based business.
What could only be described as a breakthrough, how we documented the Preliminary Specifications coordination of capabilities through the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” of the Research & Capabilities module. This relieving of the incentives problem that contracting of the service industry is presenting to the oil and gas industry. As we learned, coordination will provide oil and gas producers with the control over field operations. Coordination through the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” provides the alternative means in which to ensure the science of the oil and gas business is effectively controlled as opposed to motivating the service industry through incentive clauses in the contracts. We will continue with this concept of the “incentive problem” and test it further with Professor Richard Langlois paper “Capabilities and Governance: the Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization.”
More generally, we are worried that conceptualizing all problems of economic organization as problems of aligning incentives not only misrepresents important phenomena but also hinders understanding other phenomena, such as the role of production costs in determining the boundaries of the firm. As we will argue, in fact, it may well pay off intellectually to pursue a research strategy that is essentially the flip-side of the coin, namely to assume that all incentive problems can be eliminated by assumption and concentrate on coordination (including communication) and production cost issues only.
It is through the producers documentation of the capabilities in the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” of the Research & Capabilities module that the “knowledge, experience and skills” are captured. From the engineers and geologists that are part of the Joint Operating Committee to those that are in the field, each should have an understanding of what is required of them from the capability that is listed in the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface.” Recall that in the Knowledge & Learning module these capabilities are called like plays in the football analogy. Everyone on the team knowing what is happening and what their role and task is. That is what needs to be documented in the “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” for each of these roles, for each of the capabilities that are captured there.
In a world of tacit and distributed knowledge - that is, of differential capabilities - having the same blueprints [or software] as one's competitors is unlikely to translate into having the same costs of production. Generally, in such a world, firms will not confront the same production costs for the same type of productive activity. p. 18
And that becomes obvious when we consider that the capabilities that are available to each Joint Operating Committee, and the Military Command & Control Metaphor that is used, is going to be unique to each situation it is applied to. Using the same team to apply the same capability repeatedly should yield the same results. Therefore, if you were running a ten well drilling program then the consistency of the capabilities and the MCCM would provide the same precision and the same results.
This in turn, implies that the capabilities may be interpreted as a distinct theory of economic organization. p. 18
and
... while transaction cost consideration undoubtedly explain why firms come into existence, once most production is carried out within firms and most transactions are firm-firm transactions and not factor-factor transactions, the level of transaction costs will be greatly reduced and the dominant factor determining the institutional structure of production will in general no longer be transaction costs but the relative costs of different firms in organizing particular activities. p 19
This is inherently and simply true. The key to the successful implementation of any program is the level of documentation of the capability and the level of control during the operation. The “Dynamic Capabilities Interface” combined with the Military Command & Control Metaphor provide the producer firm and Joint Operating Committee with the means for successful operations. Recall that “knowledge begets capability and capability begets action.” And contrast this to the current situation where the producers throw more money at the service industry to incentivize them to succeed.
The Preliminary Specification provides the oil and gas producer with the most profitable means of oil and gas operations. People, Ideas & Objects Revenue Model specifies the means in which investors can participate in these user defined software developments. Users are welcome to join me here. Together we can begin to meet the future demands for energy.