Lazonick on Chandler Part III
In the first post on Professor Lazonick's paper we discussed the differences between optimization and innovation in terms of corporate culture. How in oil and gas we need to move from optimization to an innovation footing. To do so requires a substantial investment for the oil and gas producers. An investment that begins with the development of the software defined in the vision of the Draft Specification. An investment that up until today, the oil and gas industry has been unwilling to make. What I think Lazonick makes clear in this second part of our review of this paper is that the means to which to make the changes are within our grasp. All that is missing is the willingness to make the necessary investments. That willingness is a product of the innovative firms corporate culture.
2. The theory of innovative enterprise cont
Professor Lazonick begins with a comparison between what he calls the neoclassical firm and the innovative enterprise. The role of the entrepreneur and the assumptions supporting each. In oil and gas I see the bureaucracy believing theirs is a management discipline that deals with all aspects of the industry. That their management capabilities are the critical resource to the profitability of the industry.Lazonick notes;
There are two assumptions of the neoclassical theory of the firm that limit its ability to understand innovative enterprise. First, the neoclassical theory assumes that the entrepreneur plays no role in creating the disequilibrium condition that triggers the reallocation of resources from one industry to another. In the theory of the innovating firm, by contrast, entrepreneurs create new profitable opportunities, and thereby disrupt equilibrium conditions. Second, the neoclassical theory assumes that the entrepreneur requires no special expertise to compete in one industry rather than another. All that is required of the entrepreneur is that he follows the principle of profit maximization in the choice of industry in which to compete. In the theory of the innovating firm, in contrast, the entrepreneur’s specialized knowledge of the industry in which he chooses to compete is of utmost importance for his firm’s ability to be innovative in that industry. p. 6My experience in dealing with management of the oil and gas industry is accurately captured in Lazonicks text. What management has learned is they too can control the disruptive nature of the entrepreneur, by not allocating any resources towards it, and hence avoid the disequilibrium that is created. Or so they believe. This behaviour has become systemic and has the companies actively avoiding the necessary investments in the business of the oil and gas business. Optimization is the word that everyone marches to and any producer that makes the necessary investments ininnovativeness is deemed risky.
The limiting assumption here is that the entrepreneur does not choose the firm’s level of fixed costs and the particular productive capabilities embodied in them as part of his firm’s investment strategy. In the theory of the innovating firm, the level of fixed costs manifests strategic decisions to make investments that are intended to endow the firm with distinctive productive capabilities compared with its competitors in the industry. p. 7I referenced this article from the Calgary Herald the other day. It suggests the National Energy Board has determined that Alberta Natural Gas production will decline to 8.5BCF / day in 2012 from 12.7 today. Are we as an industry unaware of the consequences of inaction in the investments necessary for innovation? AsLazonick notes the costs of optimization eventually turn to eliminate the profit elements. The oil and gas industry in Alberta is experiencing these increased costs, of which they attribute to greedy suppliers, and the declining production values. Why, in discussing this with Canadian management, it clearly is not their fault. Imputing they are only a small part of the market.Lazonick discusses this U-shaped cost curve of the optimizers.
The assumption is that the addition of variable factors of production to the firm’s fixed factors of production results in a declining average productivity of these combined factors (i.e., the firm’s technology, which is also the industry’s technology). In deriving the U-shaped cost curve, neoclassical theorists give two quite plausible reasons why productivity declines as output expands. Both reasons assume that the key variable factor is labor. One reason is that as more variable factors are added to the fixed factors, increasingly crowded factory conditions reduce the productivity of each variable factor as, for example, workers continuously bump into one other. The other reason is that as more workers are added to the production process, the entrepreneur, as the fixed factor whose role it is to organize productive activities, experiences a “control loss” because of the increasing number of workers that he has to supervise and monitor. p. 7It is reasonable to assume that by 2012 the Canadian producers lack of investment in innovation, and the increased costs associated with the U-shaped nature of the optimizers fixed and variable costs, will eliminate them from the marketplace. As I have indicated here on this blog before, Canada, and that is all of Canada, represents a negligible 2 percent of the readership of this blog. I can say with almost 100% assurance, when the scope of the Preliminary Specification is determined by the users, that Canada will not be represented in the functionality of the People, Ideas & Objects application. Conversely, the U.S. makes up 88% of the total users represented here. Anyone want to guess where the innovative, or profitable, elements of the oil and gas industry will be located?
Hence organization—in this case the relation between the entrepreneur as manager and the work force that he employs—becomes central to the neoclassical theory of the firm. Within the theory of the optimizing firm, the constraining assumption is that the entrepreneur passively accepts this condition of increasing costs, and optimizes subject to it as a constraint. In sharp contrast, in the theory of the innovating firm, the experience of increasing costs, as shown on the left-hand side of Figure 2, provides the firm’s strategic decision-makers with an understanding of the limits of the initial investment strategy, and with that information they make additional new investments for the strategic purpose of taking control of the variable factor that was the source of increasing costs [for an elaboration of this argument, seeLazonick (1991: ch. 3, 1993)]. An innovating firm would not take a condition of overcrowding or control loss that results in increasing costs as a “given constraint,” but rather would make investments in organization and technology to change that condition. In effect, for the sake of improving its capability to develop and utilize productive resources, the innovating firm makes strategic investments that transform variable costs into fixed costs, which the firm, in order to innovate successfully, must now endeavor to transform into low unit costs. pp. 7 - 8Therefore investment in the productive capacity of the oil and gas industry starts here. Development of the innovative organization is deemed a necessity due to the demands of the marketplace and the increased complexity in the underlying earth science and engineering disciplines. Today we live in a sophisticated marketplace that demands the changes to organizational structure be contemplated and built within the software first. This is only the beginning of the investments that are necessary. These investments are a significant undertaking for the industry, and they are past due.
An innovative investment strategy is inherently uncertain, and investments in innovation must be made despite the existence of uncertainties concerning prospective returns. Any strategic manager who allocates resources to an innovative strategy faces three types of uncertainty: technological, market, and competitive. Technological uncertainty exists because the firm may be incapable of developing the higher quality processes and products envisaged in its innovative investment strategy; if one already knew how to generate a new product or process at the outset of the investment, it would not be innovation. p. 9In Part III of this paper we will begin to look at the risks associated with an innovative strategy. Our appeal should be based on these eight "Focused on" priorities and values of how better the oil and gas industry and its operations could be handled. They may not initially be the right way to go, but we are committed to working with the various communities to discover and ensure the right ones are. If your an enlightened producer, an oil and gas director, investor or shareholder, who would be interested in funding these software developments and communities, please follow our Funding Policies & Procedures, and our Hardware Policies & Procedures. If your a government that collects royalties from oil and gas producers, and are concerned about the accuracy of your royalty income, please review our Royalty Policies & Procedures and email me. And if your a potential user of this software, and possibly as a member of the Community of Independent Service Providers, please join us here.
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